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REINFORCEMENT PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE
MARKET ENVIRONMENT

Richard P. Eastman
Western Michigan University
A functional analysis of behavior requires a monopoly of con
trolling variables.

Where contingency-control is mutual, i.e.,

vhere there is mutual shaping of shaping, functional analysis of
contingency control is impossible.

Weingarten and Mechner's notion

of 'dependent-contingency* analysis restores some sense here, but
not enough to salvage grandiose schemes for monopolistically con
trolled experimental cultures.
Utopian behaviorists do not realize the scope of functions per
formed by markets in the human environment.

Prediction and control

of a dependent-variable culture requires prior elimination of entre
preneurship, (black) markets, and the far-reaching division of labor
that is provided only by market coordination.

Under such a system,

aversive control is inevitable and the high standards of living and
capacity for large populations in an industrial order must be fore
gone.
Skinner, a heterogeneous mixture of scientific and socialist
repertoires, has a theory of cultural control that generates con
clusions opposite from those of this, nevertheless quasi-Skinnerian,
analysis.
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PREFACE

This thesis -was began at Western Michigan University in 1974.
It is the evolution of an idea I had three years earlier at Lake
Forest College vhile taking George Weiner's undergraduate course in
microeconomic theory.

The idea concerned the problem of price de

termination in a market of tvo sellers, the famous 'duopoly' situ
ation of nineteenth-century French economist Augustine Cournot.

It

appeared to me that the issue of price determination could best be
resolved— at least in its "contingency-shaped" rather than its
"rule—governed" component*— -by a behavior— laboratory experiment.
(B. F. Skinner had recently von me over completely.)

Later, at

Western Michigan, my 'solution' entailed the construction of a syn
thetic birdseed-and—keypeck econony of five individually chambered
but electronically interconnected pigeons: tvo competitor pricesetting "seller birds" and three price-selecting "buyer birds."
Five chambers, five food dispensers, 16 peck keys, and panel

I presuppose the reader's more-than-passing familiarity vith
Skinner's system vhich includes a philosophy of science and a theo
ry of knovledge as veil as a science of behavior.
I have through
out reserved a strictly Skinnerian usage for the folloving terms:
deprivation, aversive stimulation, contingency of reinforcement,
discriminative stimulus, operant behavior, positive and negative
reinforcement, generalization, discrimination, abstraction, sched
ule of reinforcement, operant extinction, punishment, escape,
avoidance, verbal contingencies, rule-governed behavior, respondent
conditioning, and emotional predispositions and responses. Well
over a hundred expositions of these concepts are currently avail
able in published form. On the other hand, no initial knovledge
of economics systems or theories is called for beyond that usual
ly associated vith even a moderately sound liberal-arts education.

vi
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arrays vith a total of 72 stimulus lights were all assembled from
scratch and paid for by my father— who happens to be a seller (of car
polish)— and myself.

The electro-mechanical equipment (it took up

half a wall) required scouring the department for every available
piece of jetsam.

And jetsam was everywhere.

Thousands of dollars of

tax-paid 'Great Society* equipment had been tossed into dust-catching
heaps to make room for more advanced computer systems.

Much of this

salvage had to be overhauled and supplemented vith whatever parts
C. F. Eastman was able to find in California.

I hired assistants at

three dollars an hour (good money in those days, which I earned as an
all-night janitor at an Osco Drug store.)

They helped me solder over

a thousand electrical connections.
Euilding this 'market mechanism' placed me under the special
control of the technological and scientific problems involved in
generating and then monitoring interre infor cement, problems some of
which I could not then even begin to guess were insoluable.

It be

came increasingly distressing to find that by appealing to the con
tingency— of-reinforcement-and-probability-of-response paradigm I
could interpret synthetic-market pricing phenomena, but could not,
either experimentally or conceptually, functionally analyse them in
those terms.

This problem persisted no matter how simple or elegant

the experimental situation.^
After a year and a half of full-time effort (i was working to be

A detailed treatment of these problems occuring in an (actually
completed) experiment with similar analytical shortcomings can be
found in the discussion of Boren, 1966, p. 24, below.
vii
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in full operation by the tvo hundredth anniversary of Adam Smith's
Wealth of Nations), vith my buyer birds, in independent training ses
sions, nov shoving 'rational' price discrimination and vith the vir—
ing of the remaining chambers near completion, I sav that I could go
no further.
The analytical barrier before vhich I had been stopped vas the
delimiting boundary betveen psychology and economics.

"One science

is distinguished from another neither by theory nor by data.

Differ

ent types of experimental control over the various subject matters
provide the defining characteristics."*

In my synthetic-market de

signs, isolated chambers notvithstanding, controlling contingency
variables vere running loose.

Antecedent stimuli, behavior, and con

sequences could not be isolated or made discriminable.
peared to be under the control of its ovn past tense.

Pricing ap
With each nev

vrinkle it became more evident that markets are not simply instances
of 'complex cases,’ but rather basic and distinct behavior-control
ling relationships.

I had not ceded

independent-variable control

to the incidental histories of five pigeons; I ceded it to a market
of such histories.
A second rude avakening came vhen I found that I could not in
terest Skinnerian faculty either in my technique for generating mar
ket pricing or in its resulting conceptual difficulties.

(That one

Nev-Class don refused even casual discussion of my vork vith me and

*Murry Sidman, Tactics of Scientific Research, (Nev York: Basic
Books Inc., I960) p. 17
viii
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that the department— sponsored Behaviorist's for Social Action labeled
me a fascist vere only tiro points of a larger pattern of resistance.)
I could not but agree vith Sidman that:
M. . .psychologists differ vith respect to the phenomena
they consider important. Their evaluation, therefore, of a
nev behavioral control technique -rill be colored by the impsr'uiace they attribute to the phenomenon over irhich the im
proved control is demonstrated.
To those the set the fashion at Western's psychology department, the
idea of order in market control vas clearly outre.

It vas unreason

able for me, considering this, to assume that a technique for finding
that order vould be taken any more seriously.
Frozen out, I shelved my experiment and began looking for some
thing else to do.

Still, a residue of interest had escaped abulia.

I began to vrite a theoretical analysis of operant behavior in mar
kets and, incidentally, a critique of the science and Weltanschauung
of anti-market behaviorists.
Then Jack Michael agreed to chair a theoretical thesis of mine,
prospectus unseen.
I immediately took on a full-time position as a gas station at
tendant for Clark Oil, a job vhich has enabled me to spend the last
few years (from 64,9 to 78.8 cents per gallon) independently reconsid
ering the prevailing science of human behavior vhich does not account
for market activity, but vhich, nonetheless, is offered by groving
numbers of our university products as a guide for redesigning or abol
ishing our profusely market-propagated culture.

This required pover-

H o c . cit., p. 16
ix
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ful and anomalous method.

Borrowing heavily from Neo-Classical and

Austrian School economists and from quasi—behavioristic exchange— theo
ry sociologists, I have elaborated a supplimentary science of market
cultures, a benevolent mutation of Skinner's reductionistic sociology.
Perhaps working in this kind of vacuum has not been without ad
vantages.

Placed thus, far outside, one finds that the centrifugal

force of reinforcement from new knowledge of one's subject matter be
comes sufficient to overcome the gravitation of a fortress intellec
tual community.

And even for a very ordinary investigator, that can

lead to something.

x
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PART ONE

Monopolistic Contingency Analysis

The Nature of the Problem

No subject has been more faithfully explored by behaviorists
than the effect of pre-specified contingencies upon the operant e—
missions of single organisms.

Yet, even the most ovine adherents

to this estimable strategy suspect that contingencies must addi
tionally be investigated as^ effects, for only when its practition
ers aver that controllers too are controlled does a functional analysis of behavior yield reinforcing properties of consistency
and completeness.
According to current analysis, arranging contingencies of be
havior reinforcement and, by that, altering response probabili
ties, topographies and strengths, is itself behavior that is
shaped and maintained by such contingencies.

It makes no differ

ence whether the subject of control is the controller himself or a
second organism.

The controlling relation occurs when exogenously

supplied contingencies, verbal and nonverbal, contribute to the
topography and strength of the first instance.

Resulting opera

tions of the controlled upon the environment of the controller may
then take over the maintenance of subsequent controlling re
sponses.

These responses may be differentially reinforced as the

controller makes contact with the changing requirements of con
trol, requirements presented by the instruments of control, the
1
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state of the subject, and, of primary concern in this thesis, the
extraneous contingencies which compete in generating prepotent re
sponses.

These other contingencies with which the contingency ar

rangements of the controller contend exist whenever deficience in
resource, appliance or repertoire precludes a monopoly of relevant
controlling variables.
The introduction of multiple controlling agencies presents
difficulties in a functional analysis of control.

How does one

analyse control when the partial controller's missing variables
are subject to control by other organisms, i.e., other partial
controllers, and, at the sane time, each partial controller's
control-contributing manipulations are reinforced and punished in
widely dissimilar ways by different features of their common sub
ject's repertoire?

How, even in the laboratory, does one discrim

inate independent and dependent variables when attempting to pre
dict the behavior of a partial controller under the control of
both l) features of the subject's repertoire, and 2) variable ma
nipulations of control-sharing rivals who, in turn, are Tinder the
control of a) incompatable features of the same subject's reper
toire and b) variable manipulations of the first partial control
ler?
Presumably, principles gleaned analysing behavior as a func
tion of contingencies still operate in multi-organism relations
where contingency arrangements mutually control contingency ar
rangements.

Such relations, although complex, present no analyt

ical anomalies and require no new explanatory processes.

Nonthe—

less, it is questionable whether familiarity with the body of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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single organism research, even when supported by the computer and
systems analysis, can trace and differentiate component contingen
cy—behavior functions from larger interactive relations.

Such

multi-controller relations may not be reducible to specifiable be
havior-free independent variables and single organism behavior,
or, if reducible, the relations may have no counterpart in the
mechanical or algorithmic contingencies we can devise (short of
one day uncovering and synthesizing the very organic processes
that permit operant responding).

In either event, future analysis

of contingency-governed behavior -would require two distinct meth
ods, each vith its appropriate class of controlling variables: the
original Skinnerian or 'monopolistic* contingency analysis vith
behavior-free independent variables, and the catallactic* or
'multiple— controller1 analysis of concern here.

The distinction

vould be based upon the inherent accessibility of subject matter
and not upon the level of analysis or the physical properties of
variables.
If, however, contrary to the present thesis and in accordance
vith the tacit assumptions of contemporary analysis, catallactic
relations can, in fact, be broken dovn into discrete subject be

*The term 'catallactics* vas first used by economist Whately
in 1831 to mean 'the science of exchanges' and more recently by
Austrian School economist Ludig Edler von Mises in his Human
Action; A Treatise on Economics. 3rd revised ed., (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co., 1963) p. 3. It is derived from the Greek verb katallattein, 'to barter'j 'to exchange' or "to admit to the com
munity." F. A. von Hayek, Studies in Philosophy. Politics and
Economics. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967) p. 1B4
Present modified usage is proposed for inclusion in the technical
terminology of behavior analysis.
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haviors and behavior-free controlling variables, analytical bifur
cation may still be the logical course of investigation since the
process of identifying appropriate 'pure* independent variables
•will unavoidably entail big, and up-to-nov unforeseen strategic
costs.

To search for uncontaminated or pure relations within a

complex interactive process is to direct attention away from con
trolling relations as they actually exist and to divert it instead
toward 'model selection skills' made necessary for selecting just
those behavior-free-independent-variable relations that best ac
count for the observed interaction.

This removal from the phenom

enon studied would necessarily entail a retreat to 'theory testring' since every theoretical reduction of catallactic relations
into constituant pure relations, i.e., the inferred 'atoms* com
prising actual catallactic relations, would have to be validated
empirically.

Pure operants, the discovery of which marked a major

advance in the science of behavior, would then, ironically, serve
the function of an other-dimensional explanatory entity, the same
kind of weak device which radical behaviorists have, so far, as
siduously avoided.

Inevitably, an analysis of catallactic rela

tions will appeal to either l) incorporation of behavior— free in
dependent variables where they do not actually exist and must
be conceptually 'fitted', or 2) direct inspection of subject mat
ter 'in one piece' which will require a (possibly futile) search
for effective research methods.

If the former proves to be so

weak and uninteresting that its practice is extinguished (as has
happened with work initiated by Homans) or if the latter is unsuc
cessful, then the experimental analysis of behavior will remain

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5

■what it is today: a science of the monopolists, by the monopolists
and for the monopolists.

Catallactic relations and the analysis of control by contingencies

The notion of a nev kind of contingency relation which is inpenetrable to contemporary analysis is bound to appear spurious to
behaviorists vith long histories replete with reinforcement of ex
tremely plausible a posteriori accounts of daily life.

The fol

lowing example should sharpen their discrimination (one way or an
other) :
A grain company installs a vending machine which dispenses
sacks of grain of given size and quality according to a schedule
determined by, perhaps, a faulty coin mechanism.

A behaviorist

with a known grain-buying history and motivated by known rein
forcer-establishing operations comes to buy pigeon grain with
money from his limited research fund.

From these events we may

assume that, barring extraneous factors, our behaviorist's long
term performance on the machine operandum is accountable to con
temporary analysis, and is even immediately predictable, in gener
al terms, provided direct inspection of the coin apparatus identi
fies the schedule in maintenance as one similar to those already
studied elsewhere.

Perhaps, it will resemble a familiar conjunc

tive of various ratio schedules.

At any rate, the contingencies

within the relevant controlling environment are givens not subject
to endogenous modification.

(Our behaviorist does not tamper with

the workings of other peoples vending machines.)
mains non-catallactic.

The relation re

Even when, one year later, a rival company
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installs a second machine three feet avay vhich dispenses sacks
containing a different quantity and quality of grain according to
a somevhat different schedule, monopolistic analysis remains ap
propriate since the behaviorist in our example cannot reinforce or
punish mechanically arranged contingencies.

The nev tvo-machine

situation vill, of course, require consideration of additional
factors appropriate to concurrent schedules, such as the 'match
ing' phenomenon, but, disregarding the initial placement of the
second machine by some human competitor, neither machine is be
ing reprogrammed as a function of the moves of the other.

The

relevant independent variables remain devoid of contingency-shaped
features.

Next in our example, the tvo vending machines are each

connected to a computer in the respective home office.

Each is

programmed to compete vith the other's contingencies according to
a once-and-for-all pricing formula derived, perhaps, from gametheoretic *maxi-min' strategies, micro-economic 'reaction curve'
analysis or even some predetermined 'systems' approach to behavior
modification.

Whatever the pre-programmed strategies of these

'smart' vending machines, the resulting combinative concurrent
schedule can be calculated in advance and described in terms of
some equilibrium or cyclical pattern of co-ordinate probabilities.
Despite its greater complexity, this subject-environment relation
is also non-catallactic since the programs-generated adjustment of
schedules is not behavioral and, therefore, not contingency
shaped.

Prediction remains 'in the cards' (in this case IBM

cards) of contemporary analysis.

After a second year (during

vhich ve have still not located the elusive catallactic relation)
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the machine from the first company is replaced by a human sales
representative authorized to make deals.

He arranges contingen

cies designed to undercut (i.e. gain prepotency from) those of the
rival vending machine and supplies verbal contingencies pointing
out the extra reinforcing consequences of buying grain from the
first company.

'Whether the introduction of the dealer is enough

to initiate a catallactic relation depends, further, upon the
variables of vhich his deal-making is a function.

Is it as a

function of the changing 'counter offers' of the behaviorist that
the dealer emits contingency manipulations of different topog
raphy, duration, intensity or rate; or, contrarily, is he attend
ing only to the deals arranged by his computerized rival from
company number tvo?

If the former, then vre must inquire further

into -whether the behaviorist's actions are merely discriminative
vith the rest of the contingency being supplied extraneously, as
vhen the hone office supplies reinforcement contingent upon folloving a rule-governing sales strategy vhich, in the language of
business,

'anticipates every contingency'?

Where the dealer at

tends only to the machine or is under the purely discriminative
control of the behaviorist, the substitution of a dealer for a
machine presents no nev problem to contemporary analysis beyond
those imposed by sloppy design.

If, hovever, the behaviorist is

arranging verbal contingencies (e.g. If you come dovn a dollar.
I'll buy ten sacks right nov.) that actually reinforce or punish
the offers of the dealer (i.e. the dealer is, pre-scientifically
speaking,

'bargaining in good faith1) and vice versa then the re

lation is catallactic and, it may be seen, outside the range of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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contemporary analysis.
It is important to note that it is the addition of mutual
contingency shaping of contingency shaping and not the absence of
rule government that is essential to catallactic relations.

As

long as the former is included the latter may also be present.

If

an organism arranges contingencies vhich generate rules or deter
mine the selection of rules governing bis controller, the relation
remains catallactic.

Where the problem occurs

To learn just There monopolistic analysis falls short one
must step back to vhere one can see the vhole system.

The radi

cal behaviorist interprets the organism as a locus of dependent
variables vithin the universe of physics.

This locus moves rela

tive to itself and relative to vhatever is near it.

This motion

Then either released, elicited or emitted is the behavior of an
organism.

Emitted behavior characteristically operates upon the

environment.

For analytical convience it is arbitrarily delimited

into operationally defined classes of discrete emitted responses.
The basic dependent variable in a science of emitted behavior is
the probability that a response of a given class Till be emitted
under given circumstances.

This prabability is frequently defined

operationally as rate of response, response per opportunity or
inter-response time.

Among the many independent variables knovn

to effect these measurements of probability are the familiar onto
genetic contingencies of operant selection.

In a given state of

organism and environment the emission of a unit of operant behav
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ior is follcnred by some rearrangement of environing stimuli.

Re

peated occurance of this contingent rearrangement according to
some schedule may or may not alter the probability of further op
erant emissions under similar circumstances.

Given a dependent

variable, an obvious task for a science of emitted behavior is to
contrive a ride variety of response— contingent transitions from
one environing stimulus arrangement to another and see rhat hap
pens.

The first contingencies analysed rere one— for-one trans

itions scheduled trial-by— trial.

Intermittant contingency main

tenance in real time vas later introduced by Skinner* rhen he ad
ded clocks and counters, at first separately and later in combin
ations of increasing complexity.

Recently 'on line' computers

have accelerated the pace if not the quality of this research.
Despite the scale and variety of present work, contingencies in
vestigated can all still be specified in terms of clocks, count
ers, responses and stimulus events, regardless of -whether the
medium of maintenance involves microcircuits or rule-governed
*consequating* by a researcher or behavior modifier.

A catalog

of known contingencies indexed by clock-and-counter settings and
describing corresponding response-rate patternings would easily
fill a snail library.

Of course, a science of behavior, to be of

service in the business of living, must not only catalog the con
dition-bridging contingencies and their characteristically gener
ated response probabilities; it must (at least in theory) also be

*B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms. (New York: Appleton-Century, 1938)
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able to identify contingencies in maintenance at a given time and
place in the vorld.^

Since the entire scientific enterprise can

be described as individuals coming under the control of contingen
cies maintained in the physical universe, the job of identifying
contingencies is a burden that radical behaviorists can appropri
ately share vith other disciplines.

The astronomer can best de

scribe the probable frequency of meteors that vill reinforce star
gazing on a particular night.

A mathematician can quickly tell a

behaviorist vhether continued operation of a long division problem
vill result in reinforcing completion of a rational ansver or in
finite extinction by an irrational number.

The semi-sciences of

statistics and acturial vork can calculate the probability that
vhen a salesman rings a doorbell in a given neighborhood he vill
be reinforced or punished by the appearance of a person of a given
age or income bracket.

To our great relief, the description of

many such contingency-maintaining mechanisms or processes are rea
sonably placed beyond the academic boundaries and concern of a
science of emitted behavior and need not clutter our journals.

The division of the vorld into amenable (contingency-knovn)
design and unamenable (contingency-unknovn) accident does not ob
viate this issue of science. The absurd consequence of this dodge
has merely been the proposal by aberrant radical political behav
iorists to destroy through revolution or subversion all contingen
cies or all controlling human relations vhich they cannot monopol
ize. Sather than using the controllable conditions of the labora
tory to isolate and explore unknovn contingency mechanisms operat
ing in the human economy, they vould remake the vorld into a cen
trally-controlled setting thereby eliminating everything not con
forming to their current and lamentably limited state of analysis.
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However, not all of the environmental contingencies at large in
the world have their origins in non-behavioral or statistical
realms.

Some contingencies controlling behavior originate within

the behaviorist's baliwick and must necessarily be accounted for
there.

Of these, a multitude are rule governed.

rule-governed contingency maintenance is easy.

Accounting for
We may simply

point to the reinforcer-establishing operations, the reinforcers,
and the discriminative text books, instructions, maxims, experi
mental designs, descriptions of contingencies and/or sales strate
gies involved.

However, just as the world's contingencies cannot

all be mapped and interpreted for us by other disciplines, so,
too, those behaviorally arranged contingencies encompassed by a
science of behavior cannot all be accounted for in terms of rulegoverned stimuli.

Much contingency maintenance is contingency

shaped and imperfectly, or not at all, correlated with a set of
discriminative rules.

In fact, every rule-governing stimulus has

its origins, however remote, in prior episodes of contingency
shaping.

Still analysis is not problematic if the contingencies

controlling a shaper's shaping can be traced back 'across the
border* to another discipline.

A man's behavior may be contingen

cy-shaped by another man whose own shaping is, in turn, shaped by
yet another man and so on until the shaping bb the first man in
the sequence is found to be controlled by contingencies originat
ing in the field of mechanics, medicine, agricultural science or
some other non-behavioral science.

Tracing this logical extension

back into history would be difficult only insofar as familiar data
would have to be reconstructed.

But what if there is no 'first
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contingency* originating in another area of science?

"What if the

chain of control loops around within the domain of the behavioral
variables producing mutual shaping of shaping?
In such a case, a contingency is no longer an identifiable
parameter.

Partitive analysis of such reciprocally determining

performance encounters the ineluctable problem of solving a sin
gle equation with two or more unknowns.

However, ulike the math

ematical problem where associative, distributive and other proper
ties are originally ascribed to the subject matter, permitting
manipulations from which a locus of solutions can be confidently
derived, the behavioral processes within catallactic relations
cannot be experimentally modified without at once destroying the
relation of interest.

Attempts to 'plot a solution* against ex

perimentally insinuated 'substitutions* which override or obstruct
a partial controller’s contingency-governed contingency manipula
tions can only serve to create a new catallactic relation with one
less agent.

When all partial controllers save one are systematic

ally regulated in this way, allowing finally, for parametric study
of the remaining

behavior, we find that the relation we are left

with is monopolistic rather than catallactic, as would be the case
when a grain buyer finds the town*s last ’flexible’ dealer
replaced by a vending machine.

Why catallactically generated contingencies cannot be specified

Unlike the subject matter of appropriate monopolistic analy
sis, the contingencies generated in catallactic relations are not
discriminable by direct inspection of design, apparatus or program
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and they cannot be replaced by a known set of clock-and-counter
equivalents.

Experimental replacement of part of an unknown with

an arbitrary known only works when what is replaced is purely an
independent variable and not also an inextricable component of the
dependent variable.
Only observation after the fact, i.e., history, yields such
specific data as, for example, that in environment x, at time t,
partial controller One arranged contingency c for partial control
ler Two, whereupon, in s seconds, partial controller Two transited
partial controller One to new environment x*, etc.

Only from such

data can we identify specific clock and counter settings describ
ing correlated events generated within a catallactic relation.
However, these data are necessarily incomplete.

Even hindsight

fails to reveal more than a glimps of the contingencies in main
tenance throughout any temporal segment of a catallactic rela
tion's cumulative record. A within-relation contingency can only
be known to have been in maintenance during those relatively few
instances when all of its requirement has actually been met and a
mediated stimulus rearrangement observed to follow.

A grain deal

er may make an offer, but later, in the ensuing seconds of si
lence, may already have come to emit, under the control of the
buyer's latest counter offer, covert maintenance of a new counter
counter contingency which may again be modified before it is ever
met and the consequence overtly delivered and recorded.

The scat

ter of data points may prove so thin as to be insufficient to con
trol accurate discrimination of generality or replicability among
catallactic relations, making both criteria of comparison and,
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ultimately, prediction impossible to obtain.
Although covert behavior may be of little theoretical import
ance as a dependent “variable, its presence as an uncontacted con
tingency in a catallactic relation cannot be ignored.

There is a

difference between a response -which falls short of meeting a par
tial controller's contingency and a response which is emitted in
the absence of any contingency.

The difference is in the possi

bility that with just slightly varied amplitude in the behavioral
'noise', the contingency may be met at a point where in previous
replications it has fallen short.

Such an event could precipitate

a chain reaction of radical deviations in all subsequent contin
gencies and counter contingencies as the relation unfolds.

Of

course the effects of any deviation will be more far-reaching than
in monopolistic experiments since each partial controller's move
ment is never without its own effects in catallactic relations
where looping, i.e. mutual, contingency control generates ever
widening ramifications.
It will be asked why an experiment cannot be designed in
which the contingencies maintained by the partial controller are
always overt.

Partial controllers can be placed in environments

where some contingency is always in maintenance and controlling
responses merely select schedule-setting values.

For example, a

pigeon may select a schedule for another, yoked, pigeon by pecking
one of several keys, thereby illuminating that key, changing
schedules in the other pigeons's chamber and darkening the previ
ously lit key which had activated the previously operating sched
ule.

Or, a grain dealer may be required to continuously point
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somewhere along a scale of prices on the "wall, -whichever number he
is pointing to at a given instant being the current price offered
to his prospective buyer.
unbroken record.

Prices offered would then present an

Yet, even this strategy does not yield identi

fication of within—relation contingencies.
Let us see why not.
Suppose two partial controllers, one selling grain for money
and the other buying grain with money, each bargain exclusively by
pointing respective index fingers at numbers drawn along a hoizontal scale on the wall.
or kilos per dollar.

The scale is graduated in dollars per kilo
At the outset, it is safe to predict that

each partial controller will first point at a ratio on one end of
the scale opposite the other's pointing finger.

After an interval

(of extinction?) one or the other will shift his finger slightly
towards the center of the scale.

From this moment on, each move

by one towards or away from the other reinforces or punishes the
latter's differential responding, until, eventually, two fingers
meet at the same point.
established.

Here an instantaneous 'market price' is

Grain and money exchange hands and the next sack of

grain or dollar bill goes up for sale.
lation.

This is a catallactic re

The market price, which may differ from episode to epi

sode, may be, but is not necessarily, mutually reinforcing.

It

may be aversive, as when a partial controller moves his finger
over to his high cost side, having in this way previously lured
'his pigeon' to his own side, but, this time, fails to avert an
unprecedented and immediate closure by the other.

We may obtain a

record of such haggling by placing a slowly unwinding roll of pa
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per across the price scale and connecting a pen to the tip of each
partial controller's pointing finger.

A market transaction -would

then be indicated at ratios -where the two performance lines meet.
With such an arrangement we see at once that each line is a record
of both an ongoing performance and, when correlated with the rec
ord of the other partial controller's performance, a continuous
stream of consequences and antecedent stimuli.

We also recognize

that each excursion of the finger pens may be registering either
superstitious responding or noise, as well as behavior under the
(catallactic) control of the other's movements.

Putting both

facts together, we discover that regardless of their source of
strength, all finger excursions function impartially as both ante
cedent and consequence in relation to the other’s behavior.

In

monopolistic analysis, noise and superstitious responding are
merely emitted, recorded as relevant history and otherwise done
with.

In catallactic relations no discriminated movement can be

expected to have merely transitory or minor effects since contin
gency features are also changed with circular effects which con
tinue indefinitely.

This confounding characteristic of the

continuous price— scale procedure poses fundamental problems to re
searchers seeking experimental replicability among relations.
A second arresting feature of this price scale relation be
tween partial controllers is that neither performance line pre
sents obvious partition boundries for isolating coherent units of
analysis.

The inter-transaction interval, i.e., the dual perform

ance record between each finger interception, lacks the unambigu—
status of, for example, the inter-reinforcement interval or inter—
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shock interval of monopolistic analysis.

How do ire delimit a seg

ment of ongoing performance as a discrete stimulus confronting the
the partial controller?

Do we synoptically treat the entire

length of the preceding performance as one long schedule or can
smaller units be found enabling us to confront a more manageable
succession of discrete and short-lived schedules?

If the former,

must we then, following the economist, compute derivatives from
data to deal effectively with rates and accelerations as important
discriminative properties?

Alternately, if performances are to be

dealt with as shorter localized contingency components, must we
attend to the absolute positions of fingers on the scale or to
relative positions; absolute movements or relative movements?
Finally, hw shall we evaluate a method which yields from just
two co—varying performances an organized and complete set of stim
uli, behaviors and consequences for each partial controller?

(One

hears the structuralist laughing up his sleeve.)
We are attempting to discover whether a continuous pricescale procedure affords discovery of specific contingency rela
tions within catallactic relations.

So far, we have mentioned two

technical difficulties: one, concerning the indiscriminability of
relationally determined stimulus effects against other inevitable
effects of extraneous or incidental origin, and the second, in
volving the practical separation of discrete stimulus events or
the effective organization of data.

It would be rash not to allow

for the eventual resolution of these problems.

However, assuming,

optimistically, that satisfactory answers will be supplied, a
third difficulty, more formidible and fundamental remains.
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By now, it should be evident that the central problem in
analysing partial control behavior is identifying and accounting
for replicable intra-relational contingencies.

Certainly, this

corresponds in importance to the monopolistic researcher's famil
iar and now almost automatic task of determining the effects of
known and deliberate contingencies upon behavior.

We define a

contingency as the differential consequences of emitting and not
emitting a particular response upon a given occasion.

In a catal

lactic relation, such as our price-scale arrangement, the conse
quences which follow each response are indicated in the cumulative
record.

What is not indicated are the consequences of not re

sponding or of emitting a response with just slightly different
spatio-temporal relations.

No matter how they are collected and

correlated, the partial controllers'

'haggle' data supply no clue

as to the way in which the seller's subsequent offers would have
been modified had the buyer countered differently in a particular
instance.
Such contingency information, missing here, is, in monopolis
tic analysis, always available to be described fully in 'state
notation’.

This schematic device, fast becoming the standard

idiom for representation of the monopolistic independent variable,
exhaustively maps all of a monopolistic procedure's possible envi
roning states and, for each of these, all of the various clock,
counter, probability generator and yoke— triggered events which
transfer the subject to other states.

In all, it is an expedient

that is useful in both experimental and conceptual analysis.

How

ever, when drawn up on the basis of all available price— scale rel—
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ation data, such diagrams would have to omit all operative trans
fer criteria or 'transition arrows' except those along that 'part
icularized' course actually traced by the two hagglers.

Since

states are defined not only by currently environing stimuli, but
also by the various time and behavior requirements for state
transition, ire are faced -with the problem of correctly locating
the organism in one of many possible topographically identical,
but functionally different states.

If we identify states by the

set of all transition arrows leading from each, and if our methods
permit the discrimination of but one arrow for each state, i.e.,
that requirement actually met in empirical replication, -we see
that our hopes for nomothetic generality are in big trouble.

Nor

are we cheered when we consider that even the simple price— scale
procedure, with its sequential stimulus continuity and looping
control features, allows for an astronomical number of obtainable
states; in fact, a state diagram surpassing in its complexity the
layout of all possible chess situations from the opening moves to
every imaginable checkmate, stalemate and draw.

A finite number,

to be sure, but certainly one large enough to dampen the prospects
of those who would construct a complete diagram 'space' through
the formalistic application of statistical analysis and static
game theory to sufficiently huge samples of replications.

Which

is just as well, for these armamentaria would be misapplied and
unavailing here anyway.

A partial controller may indeed find him

self in a repeat situation, either with respect to recurring fin
ger positions along a price scale, or, in chess, with respect to a
previously encountered deployment of pieces, but it is also true
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that in both cases, -when endeavoring to predict state— transition
ing contingencies, the effect of an intervening history of con
ditioning must also be considered.

Have those irhom the other par

tial controller has been up against moved defensively or offen
sively, conservatively or recklessly, straight-fonrardly or with
bluffing?
fect.

'Whatever the additional history, it will have its ef

If a partial controller has, in the past, responded to move

A with move B and to move C with D, the fact that he again re
sponds to move A with B does not imply that he would have again
responded to move C with D.

A current environmental state may

have any of a number of different sets of transition arrows, each
set positioning the organism in a different sector of the concep
tual diagram of all possible situations and transitions.

'Without

knowing which transition requirements are obtaining at a particu
lar moment, the actual pathway of a partial controller through the
scheme of all possibilities can never be drawn.

There appears to

be no way of escaping the possibility that observed similarities
among replications may be merely topographical, the 'accidental'
outcomes of wholly dissimilar systems of controlling relations.
In other words, relational comparison is out of reach.
It will be countered that among experienced chess players,
i.e., those who have had long contact with the contingencies of
tLe game, certain mid-game and final-game outcomes are readily
replicable.

Here, it must be pointed out that it is only the

final moves, where an inescapable resolution is known to inhere
and the catallactic element

of mutual shaping is absent, that

replicable solving of the essentially monopolistic 'chess problem’
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is reliably predictable.

Catallactic Relations as a Function
of "Independent Contingencies"

The contribution of Weingarten and Uechner

In the preceding section of this thesis it was established
that one sure way to destroy a catallactic relation of interest is
to attempt parametric analysis of a partial controller's behavior
by substituting monopolistic arrangements for the control-contributions of other partial controllers.

Yet, the scientist's assump

tion of an orderly universe suggests the possibility that even
this 'destructive* process embodies a lawfulness around which a
new or ancilary functional analysis may be evolved.

What have

been construed as disruptions may thus be reinterpreted as trans
itions from one distinct catallactic relation to another.

Each

relation then stands as one value of a new dependent variable that
is functionally related to a particular extra-relational arrange
ment.

The entire catallactic relation is thus an analytical unit

controlled by circumscribing non-catallactically determined vari
ables.
For example, the exchange rate between grain and dollars
(i.e. the price of grain) generated within the catallactic rela
tion of our previous ’price scale' example (pp. 15— 16 above) is
such a dependent variable or outcome.

It is a function of such

non-catallactic 'facilities of exchange' as the concrete price
scale itself, the so-rauch-full grain bin, the buyer's wallet or
check book and pen, as well as the various other instrumentalities
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(or capital^) such as the parking lot, cash register, grain sacks,
commercial scales, scoop, etc., along with their costs of opera
tion.

Together, these factors constitute the current non-behav-

iorally maintained contingencies governing the transfer of grain
or dollars from one partial controller to another.

(Of course,

the present analysis is not intended to denigrate the relevance
of prior conditioning, especially the role of the reinforcing
verbal community, who provide the partial controllers with hag
gling and exchange repertoires at initial strengths.)
From the time it was first ’hatched* by Weingarten and Mechner,^

the general principle of this interpretation has been left

dormant by a basic-research community bent on the pursuit of ever
higher-resolution and finer-grain 'readouts* from their singleorganism experiments.

Perhaps indifference to the article has

stemmed from a lack of laboratory-generated interest in problems
of mutual reinforcement exchange.

Certainly, the 'right ques

tions' are not forthcoming from research concerning inter—response

^Capital are operanda, 'conditioned reinforcers', called by
some, 'frozen labor', the completed 'precurrent’ construction of
manipulanda 'of value* in the chain of behaviors leading to a fi
nal consumption good.
(Cf. Skinner's treatment: "Conditioned reinf orcers are often the product of natual contingencies. Usual
ly, food and water are received only after the organism has en
gaged in 'precurrent’ behavior
after it has operated upon the
environment to create the opportunity for eating and drinking.
The stimuli created by this precurrent behavior, therefore, be
come reinforcing." Science and Human Behavior, (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1953) p.76)
^Kenneth 'Weingarten and Francis Meehner, "The Contingency as
an Independent Variable of Social Interaction," in The Experimen
tal Analysis of Behavior, ed. Thom Verhave (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1966) pp. 447-59
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times, adjunctive behaviors, conditioned suppression, and other
such 'micro' topics— important as they may be.

Nor has curiosity

been piqued by the, semmingly obvious, implications of the semieconomic 'matching lav' or the recent and interesting attempts*- at
analysing 'consumption patters', i.e., the demand schedules

p

of

albino rats for root beer and Tom Collins mix, as a function of
monopolistically arranged, and, therefore, non-catallactically
determined 'budgets' and prices.

It may be that the leap has not

been taken because we lack the sufficient repertoire of market
economics on which to land.

At any rate, -whatever selective fac

tors peculiar to this stage of the evolving science are respon
sible for the failure to utilize Weingarten and Mechner's original
analytical device, it is nontheless evident, as ve shall see, that
no investigation of the nature and operation of catallactic relations can proceed without it.
The innovative strategy of Weingarten and Mechner identifies
as its basic dependent variable the behaviorally arranged contin-

^John E. Kagel et al,, "Experimental Studies of Consumer De
mand Behavior Using Laboratory Animals," Economic Inquiry XIII
(March, 1975) pp. 22-38

p

A microeconomic term, loosely applied by Kagel

^One by-product of the present truncated corpus (and of the
Skinnerians' self-imposed separation from traditional social psy
chology) has been to leave the field clear for 'scientific social
ism' and its candid assertion that any exchange analysis found incompatable with the dialectical interpretation of historical class
conflict is unscientific and must be spurious. Wholesale accept
ance of this line by radical political behaviorists then contrib
utes further to this research restriction and low yield.
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gencies within what we have been calling catallactic relations.
Such variables they call 'dependent contingencies' (but, as we
have seen, they have coequal status as behaviors).

They are to be

analysed as a function of 'independent contingencies', i.e., the
monopolistic contingencies which specify and delimit modes of in
teraction, and, in an experimental analysis, are systematically
arranged according to a particular research design.

Boren, 1966

Boren's monkey interreinforcement procedure* may be reclassi
fied as an early experiment in this catagory.

During one phase of

his investigation, two macaque monkeys, Si and Al, were placed in
adjacent chambers, wherein 32 bar presses in one produced a pellet
next door and activated within the pellet-receiving chamber an
identical lever so that 32 presses there delivered a reciprocating
pellet to the first chamber.

These apparatus parameters were

Boren's independent contingencies.

They were present and opera

tive whether Si and Al were in their chambers or not.

However, to

obtain any responding at all, Boren had to develop his independent
contingencies through successive stages; not including the prior
monopolistic 'delayed reinforcement training' which was also re—
quired.

P

These earlier stages included continuous interreinforce—

Johen J. Boren, "An Experimental Social Relation Between Two
Monkeys," Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior IX
(November, 1966) pp. 691-700
2loc. cit., pp. 692-93
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ment schedules, alternating red and -white stimulus lights, and
five seconds of ’time out’ for responding out of turn, i.e., dur
ing the red light.*

The result was high, steady states of re

sponding, resembling the short, fixed-ratio-schedule runs found
in monopolistic analysis.

"A stable social relation" had been

achieved.^
After a convincingly long steady-state performance under
these independent contingencies, the alternation requirement (i.e.
the fixed exchange rate of one pellet for one pellet, 32 respon
ses) was lifted and replaced with the "free responding proce
dure. ^

Now, no matter where Al was in his own lever sequence, 32

presses by Si gave Al a pellet, and vice versa.

With 32 responses

no longer required in a chamber before a pellet could be delivered
to that chamber, the rates of behavior exchange were now wholly
dependent contingencies.
To monitor this dyadic catallaxy, two cumulative recorders
were used, each with a pen held steady while a clock mechanism
pushed the graph paper along beneath it, marking the time axis.
Both clocks kept the same paper speeds, allowing easier temporal
correlation of performances.

When a monkey pressed his lever, the

respective recording pen then jumped a small fraction of an inch;
perpendicular to the movement of the paper, along the response

*ibid.
2loc. cit., p. 699
3loc. cit., p . 695
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axis.

After 540 responses, i.e., the iridth of the paper, both

pens then reset to the zero—response position.

Rate of response

for each monkey thus equaled the slope of the record in each seg
ment between resets.

To indicate pellet deliveries, a relay acti

vated by the thirty-second response of the other monkey, momentar
ily tugged the receiving monkey's pen leaving a small hatch mark
on his ongoing record.
Since we are especially interested in the experimenter's be
havior with respect to his experiment it is necessary to quote ex
tensively from his account of the results.
"Both monkeys maintained relatively high rates the
first two sessions (84— 85) under the free responding pro
cedure. By session 86, however, Al's rate had dropped
very low. . . At the beginning of this session (as during
the entire first session) both monkeys responded rapidly
(sometimes simultaneously) so that they received a simil
ar number of pellets. At the end of the session, however,
an important change took place. At approximately the
fourth reset of the recorder . . . Al stopped responding
and Si continued. The result was that Al received a num
ber of reinforcements for sitting and not responding. The
seed of social instability had been sown.
"This pattern continued through session 86 and most
of session 87 and accounts for the low rate shown for Al
and the high rate shown for Si. . . S i did most of the
responding while Al did most of the eating. By the sixth
excursion of the pen . . . Si had made more than 3000 lev
er presses but had received only two reinforcements from
Al. A short time later (before the seventh excursion) Si
began to pause for long periods— a behavioral consequence
which probably resulted from the large amount of respond
ing and the small amount of reinforcement. A second con
sequence of Si's pausing was that the reinforcement fre
quency for Al dropped. At this point Al's rate increased
sharply while Si sat and received a number of pellets.
■While the reasons for the sharp change in Al's behavior
is not definitely known, Al's extensive past history with
the alternation procedure was probably involved. With
that procedure, the reinforcement frequency was increased
by responding, since after one monkey emitted a run of
responses, it usually received a pellet back from the
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other monkey."*
■Why did Al's responding suddenly drop off?

Boren's examin

ation of the data within sessions 84— 87 does not tell us.

No ref

erence is made to intra-relational schedule control as we now un
derstand it.

Appeal is made to an earlier set of independent con

tingencies (i.e. the alternation procedure), but this explanation
amounts to no more than a description of those contingencies.

The

account of both monkeys' responding after Al's sudden transition is
similarly structural (i.e. topographical, not demonstrating func
tional relationships): ". . . Al stopped responding and Si contin
ued.

The result was that Al received a number of pellets . . . for

not responding."

And finally, "This pattern continued . . .

and

accounts for the low rate shown for Al and the high rate shown for
Si."
In giving this account of this phenomenon Boren includes actu
al pictures of cumulative records from the relevant sessions.

He

claims that this data "was particularly important because it perO

mitted an understanding of how the social interaction developed."
A source of ambiguity is the word how (rather than why), a word
which applies equally to both structual and functional accounts.
The fact is that Boren's analysis is structural when he is attend
ing to endogenous events and functional when controlling relations
are sought elsewhere.

After Si emitted 3000 lever presses and re-

*loc. cit., p. 695
2loc. cit.. p. 699
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ceived only tiro pellets he began to pause.

Boren attributes this

"behavioral consequence" to aggregate molar events, to "the large
amount of responding and the small amount of reinforcement."

Al

though this conclusion is plausible it is not a discrimination of
correlations demonstrated -within the experiment itself.

The exper

imenter completely overlooks consideration of the minutiae of mo—
ment-by-moment catallactic control, although nothing in his data
3njcins dis!niss£>l of
shaping.

1c

1 fcs-tnrss of nnztus 1 contisgsiicy

Even within the canons of standard monopolistic analysis,

the effects of differential reinforcement of low rates, reinforce
ment of other behavior, discrimination and the completely novel ef
fects of untested reinforcement schedules are not to be lightly
discounted.
The account continues:
"Although Si had been the high responder before ses
sion 88, Al became the higher responder afterwards. . .
A l ’s rate increased gradually and reached a maximum on
session 97. Since Al received only a small portion of the
140 pellets allotted to each daily session, the increased
responding may have been due in part to increased food
deprivation.
Ilowever, the results with the other two mon
keys (and later work with these monkeys) where deprivation
was held constant indicated that increased deprivation was
not the essential variable for this type of result. . .
A l ’s overall high rate was formed of runs of 32 responses
followed by brief pauses.
The termination of the run and
the initiation of the pause coincided with the click of
Si's pellet dispenser and the delivery of the pellet.
S i ’s pattern was usually the same. This performance pat
tern indicates that each monkey was influenced by the
delivery of food to the other.
"After session 97, A l ’s response rate decreased
steadily, an effect which would seem to follow from the
low rate of reinforcement. From session 97— 101 Al made
more than 4000 responses per session but received an
average of only five pellets. At the same time Si's
rate remained at its usual low level. The probable rea
son is not hard to find. Si was receiving an average of
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135 pellets per session, the bulk of which -were delivered
vhen he was not responding. Thus Si -was frequently re
inforced for not responding.”1
Boren has little difficulty explaining maintenance of A l ’s lov
response rate in sessions 87 and 88.

This, as veil as Si's own

paucity of reciprocation during sessions 88 through 101, is pre
dictable as a consequence of reinforcement of other behavior, i.e.,
behavior emitted in lieu of lever pressing.

Boren is here general-

xzxng from behavior p r m c i p l g s discovered m

monopolistic studies

concerning unsignaled transitions from contingent to non-contingent
reinforcement and from high-frequency to low-frequency reinforce
ment.

His statements are thus (not necessarily incorrect) inter

pretations of the data in terms of already familiar contingencies,
not a description of the discovery or isolation of contingencies
currently obtaining.
Not so easily accounted for is the difference between the pat
tern of Si's rate changes (lasting two sessions) as a function of
Al's sloughing off and, later, Al's much more persistent perform
ance as a function of Si's rate drop (88— 101), a slowdown which
lasted until danger to Al's life forced a change in experimental
design.

As problematical as Al's continuity-breaking slowdown in

session 87, is that monkey's return to the lever after session 88.
Here, Boren was only able to offter negative analysis, discounting
the relevance of an increase in Al's level of deprivation.

\loc. cit.. pp. 695— 6
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■was accomplished through systematic "variation of food intake, a
monopolistic technique which did not directly intefere with the
catallactic contingency features of the experiment.

We may note

here Boren's use of the deductive method to discover a functional
relationship between the click of Si's pellet dispenser and the end
of a run.

Recall that any direct experimental manipulation of pel

let deliveries, i.e., the empirical method, would have transformed
the independent contingencies; doing violence to the catallactic
relation.

The experimenter yields to the analytical barrier pre

sented by catallactic contingencies without discovering its gener
al principle.
We may compare the present interpretation with Boren's own assesment of his achievement.
"This study has described: (l) a technique for study
ing a social relation between two animals, including a
training procedure; (2) an alternation procedure for main
taining a stable social relation; and (3) the finding that
the social relation will not be reliably maintained by a
free responding procedure.
It is clear from (2) and (3) that Boren is treating the depen
dent contingencies generated under the free responding procedure as
the same social relation that is generated under the alternation
procedure.

This interpretation is at variance with our present un

derstanding of the functional relationship between different inde
pendent contingencies and catallactic relations.

Nevertheless,

Boren's assumption could still be valid were he able to demonstrate
that he was able to wary his independent—variable procedures from

~loc. cit., p. 699
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alternation to free responding ceteris parabus. i.e., -without al
tering the fundamental dependent-contingency relationships.
was not done.

This

The experiment thus falls into the same catagory as

switching players from checkers to chess contingencies and then
discovering that 'jumping* will no longer be maintained.

We find

it useful to discriminate between not jumping in checkers and not
playing checkers, between not responding under a given procedure
and not responding when the procedure is withdrawn.

Boren clearly

views maintenance of a social relation, rather than the relation
itself, to be the variable controlled by his procedure.

Indepen

dent variables, such as schedules of reinforcement, control behav
ior.

Boren, of course, appreciates this fact.

Independent contin

gencies (e.g. Boren's various interreinforcement procedures) also
control behavior, but not without the attendant contribution of
dependent contingencies, the schedules of which are indiscriminable
and vary as an unknown function of those same independent contin
gencies.

Boren approaches, but misses, the distinction:

"As in the natural environment, the subject of the
present experiment and the basic situation (rather than
the experimenter) exercised control over the critical
variables.
On the other hand, the laboratory contribut
ed (l) the special environment of the chamber, levers,
pellet dispensers, etc. which set some of the conditions
of the experiment; (2 ) the experimental analysis of the
social interaction; (3) the ^ast history of training which
established the interreinforcement repertoire; and (4) the
objective recording of the social behavior. The recording
was particularly important because it permitted an under
standing of how the social interaction developed.

*ibid.
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As he sees it, Boren has observed the dependent contingencies
maintained by tiro monkeys and has extracted basic monopolistic
reinforcement relationships relevant to the behavior of each:
"The above analysis of the social interaction empha
sizes the reinforcement contingencies of the individual
member of the social pair. The approach is to explain
how the relevant variables affect the individual partici
pant.
In this -way the interaction can be accounted for
by established principles of individual behavior -with
out requiring special "social" formulations. From this
point of view the major problem cf analysis seems to be
the complexity of the social interaction due to the in
consistency, the intermittency, and the number of con
trolling variables programmed by one organism for an
other. "1
The experimenter l) has not emphasized what he claims to have
emphasized, the contingencies affecting individual monkeys} and 2)
has not explained what he claims to have explained, how the inter
reinforcement variables control individual participants.

Eis ex

periment gets us no closer to the specification of contingencies
than would careful recording of exchanges in a real-world situa
tion.

This is not to say that Boren's data is worthless or that

his procedures are not an important development in an analysis of
catallactic relations.

In retrospect it appears to have been the

right experiment, conducted for defective reasons and evaluated ac
cording to inapplicable criteria of, perhaps, the wrong science.
Despite its interpretive shortcomings the experiment does ful
fill some of the task set by Weingarten and Mechner, viz.. deter

^loc. cit., pp. R99— 700
^op. cit., p . 449
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mining "what, if any, dependent contingencies ■various types of in
dependent contingencies produce."
any" part of this objective.

Boren has satisfied the "if

As for "what" has been generated, in

the final analysis, the cumulative records -which Boren offers are
not decipherable into the three-part-contingency elements called
for.
We require a new formulation of the problem of interreinforce
ment in order to avoid wasted effort plumbing the depths of what
Boren calls "inconsistency, intermittency, and the number of con
trolling variables programmed by one organism for another, " but
which we have since come to recognize as a pervasive barrier to the
contingency analysis of catallactic relations.

The Dependent Variable of Catallactic Analysis

According to Weingarten and Mechner, social interaction in
variably involves organisms responding to "complex and changing
contingencies."*

However, they aver, present ignorance prevents us

from generating the dynamic complexity which interests us, "except
by actually introducing the second subject."2

Apparently it is not

appreciated that even after proceeding in this way, contingencies
will continue to be unspecified.

In expounding their discovery of

"the specific contingencies which function as independent variables
O

of social interaction" , the authors completely neglect analysis

*loc. cit., p . 458
2ibid.
3ibid.
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made necessary by the notion of dependent contingencies.

The

unique status of the experimental -variable and its importance as a
nev monopolistic 'handle' are given preeminence, as though it were
understood that the dependent contingencies would remain our old
familiar firends, the reinforcement schedules of monopolistic anal
ysis.

Accepting their monograph at face value, one expects that a

proper Weingartenian-Mechnerian reanalysis of, say, Boren 1966,
would reveal such detailed contingency information as, for example,
that between his 16th and 40th pellet in session 100, Si maintained
an alternative mixed variable— interval multiple fixed-ratio sched
ule with differential reinforcement of low rates.
Although the prospects of obtaining such information have al
ready been dealt with earlier in this thesis, it will nevertheless
be convenient to continually remind the reader of that analysis by
substituting our neologism, catallactic relation, for Weingarten
and Mechner's misleading coinage, dependent contingency.
The problem of formulating a suitable measure of the dej>endent
variable of catallactic analysis is not insurmountable.

Binary

criteria of maintenance versus non—maintenance or control versus
non-control have been proposed.

Hake and Vukelish, for example,

recommend evaluating cooperation procedures (of which Boren, 1966,
is one of their examples) on the basis of "demonstration of con
trol."!

Cooperative behavior must be shown to be controlled by

Bon F. Hake and Ron Vukelich, "A Classification and Review of
Cooperation Procedures," in Journal of the Experimental Analysis of
Behavior XVIII (September, 1972) pp. 333-343
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"(a) the reinforcer resulting from the cooperation procedure, and
(b) the specified procedural relation between r e i n f o r c e r s . A
procedure which defines a set of independent contingencies will
either be found to sustain interaction in this way or it will not.
Although such criteria are attractive insofar as they supple
ment Skinner's concept of survival versus non-survival of cultural
practices, they unfortunately have the disadvantage of not leading
us to inquire further after specific dimensions along which catal—
lactic relations, apart from their survival, can be measured.
Exchange does more than just happen or not happen.

For exam

ple, it may be currently in my repertoire, albeit at a low initial
probability, to manipulate variables over which I have special con
trol, in order to rearrange some stranger's environment according
to his instructions.

Likewise, if sufficiently motivated, that

that same stranger can employ his distinctive control advantages
to rearrange features of my own situation according to my specific
ations.

Given a set of independent contingencies including l) an

otherwise unobtrusive agency which effectively prevents any re
course to force, threat, theft or fraud; 2) bargaining appliances,
such as measuring instruments and the 'price scale' of our earlier
example; and 3) appropriate initiation, bargaining, and exchange
repertoires; it is then left to a science of catallactic relations
to inquire after the terms of the exchange that the stranger and I
will settle upon*
The dependent variable we seek is a rate of exchange.

Each

environmental rearrangement which a partial controller can effect
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is susceptable to quantitive measurement and qualitative (i.e.
chemical or taxonomical) specification.

The exchange of environ

mental rearrangements or behaviors can thus always be expressed in
ratios, e.g., two loaves of bread and a jug of wine for one book of
verse and a song.

A science of catallactic relations is a science

of exchange ratios rather than response rates.
In Boren, 1966, we failed to learn the contingency conditions
(i.e. the schedules of reinforcement) under which observed response
rates were taking place.

The only unambiguous outcome (besides

maintenance or non-maintenance) was the quantitative relation be
tween the two cumulative performances.

This is a rate of exchange.

It is an important characteristic of such exchange rates, that
unlike the response rates of monopolistic analysis, they tell us
nothing about the strength or intensity of the behavior in ques
tion.

A man may trade the opportunity of saving the lives of one

hundred strangers for the chance to save a good friend, a ratio of
one hundred to one, but this same ratio obtains when a marble is
traded for a hundred baseball cards.

In either case, the transac

tion may be slow and weak or quick and intense.

Exchange ratios

tell us the relative ordering of response probabilities and envi
roning arrangements for two (or more) partial controllers with
given histories, when under l) given independent contingency con
ditions, 2) given states of deprivation, and 3) given levels of
aversive stimulation.

Presumably, transactions are broken off when

what each does or offers to do for the other no longer controls
what is being done or what is asked to be done in return, and when
haggling aimed, at modifying the going or offered terms becomes toxr
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punishing or is extinguished.

A t this juncture, more exchange con-

not reinforce one -without punishing the other.

For this reason it

is perhaps more useful to interpret the cessation of such transac
tions as an equilibrium, the point -where the ratio of exchange
equals zero; rather than as an instance of non—maintenance, nonsurvival or -weakness of a relation or practice within a procedure.

The Pitfalls of Artificial Classificatory Schemes

Efforts to provide a classification of independent contingen
cies in current radical-behaviorist literature have been vitiated
by a high frequency of artificial distinctions and fictions.*
amples are supplied in two monographs by Hake and Vukelich.^

Ex
Both

begin with the same paragraph:
"The essential aspects of a (any) cooperation pro
cedure are (l) that the reinforcers of both individuals
are at least in part dependent upon the responses of the
other individual, and (2 ) that the procedure allows such
responses, designated as cooperative responses to result
in an equitable division of responses and reinforcers."

^Mentalisms are not the only explanatory fictions in the sci
ences of human action. Analysis of the shortcomings of all such
fictions originates not with Skinner, but with early-nineteenth—
century economist Jeremy Bentham, who insisted that such every
day supposititious expressions as, for example, community need to
be redifined in terms of what is real and perceptable.
Cf. C. K.
Ogden Benthamfs Theory of Fictions (New Jersey: Littlefield,
Adams and Co., 1959 and Nicholas Capaldi, Mill. Bentham and the
Utilitarian School (New York: Monarch Press, 1965) p. 13
o
Hake and Vukelich, op. cit.« p. 13 and id.. "Analysis of the
Control Exerted by a Complex Cooperation Procedure," in The Journal
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior XVIV (January, 1973) p. 3
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A definition of cooperation procedures -which requires that the
responses of each individual allow an equitable division of respon
ses and reinforcers introduces an obviously ideological category of
dubious analytical value.

It is perhaps indicative of the homogen

eity of political orientation among Skinnerians that this strange
notion has not been challenged in our journals.

No rationale is

offered by the authors, even though their resulting classificatory
scheme leads to absurd distinctions because of it.

For example, if

in an alternation procedure rat A presses a lever that delivers
equal quantities of water to himself and rat B, whereupon rat B may
then press his own lever delivering equal amounts of food to both
himself and rat A, i.e., reciprocal yoking, the procedure qualifies
as cooperation.

But if I pay skillful you five dollars to do what

would cost clumsy me six dollars and twice as much time to do my
self, that, according to Ilake and Vukelich, is not cooperation.
Thus the very process which allows a far-reaching division of labor
within a market economy or smaller group is denied the label ’co
operation. 1

Compounding this damage to reasoned analysis is its

subsequently propounded complement which defines competition as ob
taining wherever "reinforcers are unequally distributed."*
A second arbitrary feature of the Bake and Vukelich classific
ation is the division of cooperation into social and nonsocial cat
egories, as if these represented distinctive properties of either
behavior or the controlling environment.

Under a social cooper-

*op. cit., p. 334
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ation procedure "the subjects are typically tested in full view of
one another, and are either told about the-social relationship or
presumably learn i t . I n

nonsocial procedures the subjects do not

learn about the dependence of reinforcement upon the behavior of
others;
"The rationale is that the main factors controlling nonsocial behavior are the lairs of conditioning for individ
ual subjects, rather than the complex variables intro
duced by social interaction."*^
The tiro authors are apparently unaware that tl.eir defining
principle is completely intuitive.

The adjectives social and non

social add no more to our understanding of cooperation then they
add to the words modified in such oxymoronic terms as social .jus
tice, social democracy or social services, where what is actually
supplied is a convenient ambiguity.

For example, we may well ask

whether or not we are in contact with a genuine social relation
when a subject either l) is told that his invisible opponent is
really a "smart" computer, or 2) faces a machine with changeable
features resembling at one moment a smile and at another a frown
or evidences changing ’body-language1 configurations or humansounding sighs and groans, or 3) is told that there may be a second
subject, or 4) believes in an anthropomorphic god who deals out
fate as would a human controller, or 5) is told that his visible
human opponent is merely making counter moves according to computer
instructions or a pre-determined formula, etc.

loc. cit., p. 338
'loc. cit., p. 337
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It may be that all such fictions as cooperation, altruism^,
communal responses3 , social emergents3 , and even society and social
science are pre-scientific terms requiring not operational redefin
ition so much as remo-val from the lexicon of a non-normative
science of behavior.

All are but poor shorthand terms for unanaly—

sed monopolistic-contingency and independent-contingency effects.
They elicit strong emotions and unquestionably invite undisciplined
political noise which can only interfere with current research and
scientific discourse and which actually make rational analysis of
the potentially harmful activities of behavioral scientists that
much more clumsy and confusing; more so, in fact, than do the mentalistic fictions of old.
The problems associated with the specification of the indepen
dent variable in catallactic analysis cannot be circumvented by
contriving an arbitrary taxonomy of fictitious dimensions.

The

sterile strategy which classifies procedures according to an arti
ficial system of, for example, degrees of equality, socialness,
sharing, etc., and then empirically explores its combinations ac
cording to the criterion of maintenance versus non-maintenance,

^Arther 1). Coloan, Klaus E. Liebold and John J. Boren, "A
'Jethod for Studying Altruism in Monkeys," The Experimental Analy
sis of Behavior, ed. Roger E. Ulrich and Paul T. Mountjoy (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972) p. 76
9

Ogden R. Lindsley, "The Experimental Analysis of Cooperation
and Competition," in The Experimental Analysis of Behavior, op.
cit., p. 500
ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

must give way to a science of independent contingencies as such
and to their control of catallactic relations as measured in rates
of exchange.

Terminological Considerations

It is the goal of scientific practice to evolve a verbal rep
ertoire which controls the most effective action possible "with res
pect to a given subject matter.

(it matters little whether one

views the control as logical necessity or as the product of a
specialized conpnunity which arranges verval contingencies under the
narrow control of contingencies maintained by their particular
subject natter.)

The selection of the terms catallactic relation,

catallaxy, partial controller, and independent contingency is,
this sense, not arbitrary.

in

Alternatives, such as capitalism and

market economy have been passed over because of their frequent con
founding with historical ’mixed1 or interventionist economies of
the current non— communist world.

The terra, perfect competition, is

rejected because of its long-standing association with certain
hypothetical constructions of logic and mathematics.

Free market

and free enterprise, although the preferred terms of this student,
are permanently excluded from any hehavioristic formulation.

Too

many otherwise competent graduate students and professors fail to
discriminate between Skinner’s notions of ’uncaused behavior* and
‘autonomous m a n ’ on one hand, and those views of such liberal sav
ants as John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer.

These latter have

inquired into "not the so-called ’liberty of will,1 so unfortunate
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ly opposed to the misnamed doctrine of philosophical necessity; but
civil, or social liberty; the nature and limits of the power which
can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual," es
sentially the interest of those who seek to elucidate the nonobvious effects, throughout a catallaxy, of different types of legal
(independent— contingency) frameworks.
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of many analytical terms of
economic theory, there are a large number of commercial and banus—
iac words, such as borrow, build, buy, contract, cost, interest.
money, produce, profit, and sell, which exercise remarkably precise
semantic control, perhaps owing to several centuries of selection
by the requirements of profitable trade.

It is also significant

that of all such basic terms, only one, property, is ambiguous and
not readily translated into a non— controversial behavioral defini
tion.

This may be because property is a practice from which the

other behaviors follow, a given the effects of which are taken for
granted.

Property is not an outcome of catallactic action.

practice is a requirement for such action.

Its

It is a practice which

endogenously establishes the independent contingencies which sup
port and control a culture's catallactic relations.

The cultural

practices which shape the complex behaviors known as 'respect for
private property' and 'business ethics' as well as the rule—govern
ed police power which through the maintenance of punishing contin
gencies protects property (however it is defined) from 'infringe
ment' together fulfill a function similar to that served by Boren's
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segregating chambers*, ■which, through physical restraint, permitted
Si and Al, two otherwise Neanderthal types, to peacefully trade to
mutual advantage.

(The fact that some of Boren’s procedures failed

to sustain interreinforcement merely suggests that not all property
practices are equally conducive to exchange.)

At any rate, because

they are put there by variously motivated men, rather than by nat
ure or divine providence, the restrictions imposed by the practice
of property and the partial control such practice gives to others
over us, rarely meet with unanimous consent.
erty is a product of cultural evolution.

The practice of prop

The attempt to monopol—

isiically control the catallaxy through the scientifically guided
modifications of property practices is a cultural mutation which
will always have the support of less effective partial controllers
and 'closet monopolists'.

Such a mutation, however, if it can

survive at all, will only do so with the help of some kind of
catallactic analysis.

The Present Status of Catallactic Analysis

It will be asked how the concept of catallactic relations dif
fers from that suggested by the famous cartoon of the white rat who
boasts that he has his experimenter trained to supply food at the
press of a lever.

Have not catallactic relations already been ac

knowledged in Skinner's accounts of "counter control"^, the state

*Boren, op. cit.. p. 692

2

Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, op. cit., pp. 321, 346-

347

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ment "the subject is always right"*, his characterization of laboraotry research as coming under the control of contingencies mainO

tained by subject and apparatus

and the contingency selection proQ

cess implied in the notion of survival of reinforcement practices?
First of all, it is doubtful, even in long-term studies with
frequent design changes, -whether the performance of a rat or pigeon
actually comes under control of the effects its own performance has
had upon the researcher’s experimental-design modifications.

If

they exist, such relations have not found their -way into current
journals.

Even in human experiments -we do not hear of subjects

emitting modified data as a function of consequential design re
visions that are more comfortable or remunerative from the sub
ject’s point of view.

Such ’extraneous’ factors, if discovered,

would tend to be ignored, thrown out or fudged rather than foot
noted.

Admittedly, various chimp verbal experiments contain ele

ments of mutual contingency shaping between subject and researcher,
but the episodes are rarely planned and have never been more than
anecdotally described.

Furthermore, no token system has ever been

designed to study catallactic 'market* relations.

On the contrary,

animal laboratories, mental hospitals, detention homes, parentchild settings and prisons have maintained only monopolizing 'com
mand economies'.

Whenever catallactic 'black markets' have sprung

*id.. Walden Two. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948) ^
^id., Contingencies of Reinforcement; A Theoretical Analysis.
(New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969) chap. 4
3
loc. cit., p. 46
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up, they have universally been treated as aversive and contaminat
ing extraneous variables; never as lawful contingency-control phen
omena of interest in themselves.
In an appendix to Verbal Behavior* Skinner reminds readers
that his foregoing analysis was not a functional analysis of the
verbal community.

One may expand the point by adding that Science

and Human Behavior^ and Schedules of"Reinforcement^ were not func
tional analyses of the general reinforcing community.

In Skinner's

analysis, community or cultural contingencies are taken as 'givens'
or else offered as 'plug-ins'.

The above mentioned books are man

uals for effective monopolistic control (a fact "which soi-disant
radical political behaviorists have not been lax in spotting).
When a functional analysis of behavior uses reinforcer-estab
lishing operations, contingencies and stimulus states as variables,
it is following the strong suit of science.

However, there is the

evolving interpretation, based, in £jart, on the persistent pattern
of gaps left by advancing monopolistic analysis, that a complete
and consistent system of study of the reinforcing practices of
verbal communities, economic communities, entire cultures or the
man in the street requires analysis of catallactic relations.

Such

analysis can only proceed without the now-strongly-favored behav—

*B. F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior, (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1957) p. 461
o

op. cit.

^id., Schedules of Reinforcement. (New York: Appleton-Century—
Crofts, 195T)
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ior-free independent variable.

It will treat relations among or

ganisms, rather than the behavior of isolated organisms, as its
subject matter, and, following this, will require a new dependent
variable (akin to 'relative exchange rate* or 'price level' in
economics) in place of those measures of single-ogranism response
probability appropriate to monopolistic research.
further analysis

'Without such

no prediction, regulation or interpretation of

non-totalitarian culture and its reinforcement practices shall be
forthcoming.
The epistemological problems posed by contingencies generated
within catallactic relations, although new to psychology, should
not be unfamiliar to students of other fields in which selection
processes figure prominently.
Human biography and those branches of history dealing with the
contributions of individual behavior rather than aggregate vari
ables such as class, race, ethnicity, civilization, etc.; as well
as those natural sciences seeking to construct accounts of the
selection of species, innate (released) behaviors, susceptibility
to reinforcement, etc., are all alike in that the selecting con
tingencies responsible for the natural or historical structures are
inaccessible.

Either no one was there to record them, or, for var

ious reasons, the contingencies, like catallactic contingencies,
are not usefully recordable.

Biography and history do not pass

down the relevant reinforcement history responsible for Caesar
crossing the Rubicon.

No one was taking that data.

However, nei

ther can history reveal the immediate consequences of staying north
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of the Rubicon.

This for additional reasons.

Similarly, in na

tural selection, ire may only venture more— or-1ess educated guesses
about the precise nature of the contingencies responsible for pres
ent-day phenotypes.

We may never know the extinction-bringing con

sequences of being trilobites or tyrannosauri, but, with greater
certainty, neither will we ever learn what minimal mutations might
have kept these venerable organizations in business.

Just as the

would-be effects of a hypothetical deviation, small and momentary,
from the actual performance within our catallactic price-scale re
lation can never be known, neither can we ever learn the effect of
a hypothetical

'sport1 within a given Mesozoic or modern ecology.

In medicine, the objective is to catalog all known diseases
and disfunctions and to locate at least one cure for each*

After

a cure is obtained, research may continue until a cheaper cure is
found or until prevention is possible.

Similarly, a behavior ther

apist or kindergarten teacher, when monopolistically controlling
behavior, needs merely one affordable (and ethically admissible)
procedure that will generate the target performance.

When predict

ing the behavior of partial controllers within catallactic rela
tions, however, finding one or a few 'sufficient1 controlling rela
tions in operation is not enough.

All actual or potential rela

tions must be discovered, weighed and taken into account.

As we

have already seen, any experiments or model which would reliably
predict the course and outcome of a catallactic relation on the
basis of generalization (i.e. principles) derived from prior rep
lications requires duplication of all relevant features to a degree
of tolerance which we can still neither determine nor achieve.
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This required exhaustiveness is, of course, in stark contrast to
the mere 'satisficing' measures sought in applied behavior analy
sis.
This, then, is the problem of catallactic analysis; a problem
which our science of behavior, our behaviorism and our behavioral
utopianism faces everywhere and confronts nowhere.

It is the prob

lem of the "invisible hand" which since its first clear formulation
at the hands of the classical economists, viz., Hume, Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, etc., has persistently remained beyond the pale of
monopolistic analysis.

The general market or catallaxy^ is the

product of many catagories of behavior: respondent and operant,
conditioned and unconditioned, verbal and nonverbal, rule-governed
and contingency-shaped, as well as scientific and prescientific,
yet, it itself is not the product of human design.

p

Rather, as the

result of an unplanned behavioral evolution, it encompasses and in
tegrates the designs and plans of all of its individual partial
controllers.
T?hen it was first discovered it was already in operation, and
now, after twG hundred years, Adam Smith's original account (apart
from its naive ethology) still remains in the central tradition of
scientific economic analysis;
"In almost every other race of animals each individual,

*Hayek, op. cit., p. 164
2

loc. cit., chap. vi
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■when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely indepen
dent, and in its natural state has occasion for the
assistance of no no other living creature. But man
has almost constant occasion for the help of his
brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from
their benevolence only. He -will be more likely to
prevail if he can interest their self-love in his
favor and shew them that it is for their own advan
tage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever
offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to
do this. Give to me that which I want, and you shall
have this which you want, is the meaning of every such
offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from
one another the far greater part of those good offices
which we stand in need of. It is not from the bene
volence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to
them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Nobody but a begger chuses to depend chiefly upon the
benevolence of his fellow citizens.
"As every individual, therefore, endeavours as
much as he can both to employ his capital in the sup
port of domestic industry, and so to direct that in
dustry that its produce may be of the greatest value;
every individual necessarily labours to render the
annual revenue of the society as great as be can. He
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting
it. By preferring the support of domestic to for
eign industry, he intends only his own security; and
by directing that industry in such a manner as its
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends on
ly his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it al
ways the worse for society that it was no part of
it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently pro
motes that of society more effectively than when he
really intends to promote it. I have never known
much good done by those who affected to trade for
the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not
very common among merchants, and very few words need
be employed in disuading them from it."^

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, (1776; New York; M o d e m Library, 1937) Book
I, chap. ii
2

loc. cit.. Book IV, chap. ii
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Adam Smith's notions are strickingly reflected in Skinner
ian apostate, Richard Herrnstein's response to Noam Chomsky's
defense of the monopolistically administered and radically
egalitarian collectivist state.
"Does anyone donbt that the differential rewards
granted in society function like the potential differ
ence in an electrical circuit
as a kind of labor
pump? By attaching different outcomes for different
jobs, or for jobs done -well or poorly, society dir
ects the flow of labor one way or another
as, for
example, out of vaudeville and into rR(?io and motion
pictures, which had captured its audience and the
attendant multiple rewards. As a more timely exam
ple, consider the diminishing ranks of applicants for
graduate schools and the lengthening queuse for law
and medical schools, precisely in tune with the shift
ing demands of society at large. Or remember that
when the rewards for manufacturing spats disappeared,
so did spats manufacturers.
The inherent rewards of
making spats, such as they were, could not have
changed, but the extrinsic ones evaporated, and so did
the industry. Now this is not to suggest that society
always distributes its rewards sensibly, humanely, or
even attractively; merely that the distribution ex
presses something like a social consensus, which then
gets converted into human effort. Sometimes, because
of extraneous perturbations, or short-term influences,
the consensus may be faulty . . . But, all is not
lost, for there is glory (if not money) waiting for
the fellow who sets the public straight . . ."1
Here, Herrnstein is addressing Chomsky's notion, intraverbally linked to the literature of such 19th-century social
theorists as Proudhon, Marx, and Bakunin, that catallactic re
lations among partial controllers are merely unfortunate his
torical aberrations and not the lawful or natural consequence
of man's hereditary endowment in combination with a limited and

^"Richard Herrnstein, "Tfhatever Happened to Vaudeville?
Reply to Professor Chomsky." Cognition. I (1973) no. 2
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changing environment (i.e. the early 19th-century liberal1 view
that, when coercion is forcibly proscribed, catallactic rela
tions are naturally selected by the reinforcing benefits of the
consequent division of labor).
There is, today, a common thread in all socialist tracts
to urge the elimination, or ’nationalization1 of every individ
u a l ’s ability to produce and distribute reinforcement to oth
ers according to his own arranged partial-controlling contin
gencies.

These authors assume that with the eradication of the

individual’s control of ’means' generating 'goods and services'
for others, there will be left, within the residual environ
ment, sufficient influence to shape a collection of wholly al
truistic human beings.

('When we consider the warmly solicitous

regard of the approaching panhandler or the sycophantism of the
'communal person1 towards the one in charge of ’access' to the
cooperative’s car, typewriter or phonograph, we begin to see
their point.)

Whatever one makes of this, it cannot be escaped

that man can only live as either a monopolistic controller, a
partial controller, or, less fortunately, a monopolistically
controlled non-controller of others or an anchorite under the
control of the roots and berries of the forest.

There are no

other openings.
Since the discovery of the market, economists have been
seeking means to reliably predict the buying, selling, consump
tion and investment behaviors of individuals in the catallactic
economy; a type of prediction which, when accurate, selects
through bestowal of increased bidding power (i.e. more dollars
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or more ’grain*) the successful entrepreneur of the moment and
his capital-supplying backer.
No fact of our era has been more obvious than the failure
of economic science to establish exact and effective predictive
practices.

Entrepreneurship remains synomous with risk-taking

and the economist today is more frequently a -ward of the state
than a captain of industry.

So dismal have been the results

that maintenance of the original objective among academic econ
omists is all but extinguished.

It is not an unfair generaliz

ation to say that the new self— set task of economic analysis is
the development of models from which the effects of the state’s
monopolistic manipulations of police power (i.e. the arraying
of positive sanctions and punishing contingencies) can be pre
dicted and planned.

These models are invariably based upon ar

bitrary statistical aggregations supposed to represent segments
of the catallactic economy as if each segment were an integrat
ed unit.

In view of our preceding discussion of the problems

of partitive analysis of catallactic relations, we may suspect
that it is the convenience and prestige of monopolistic analysis
and the meritricious

attractions of political 'decision making',

more than a record of predictive successes which sustains these
efforts.

Even those rare economists who present themselves as

critics of 'conventional wisdom' merely fashion their alterna
tives after earlier American 1institutionalist*’literature or
the practices of contemporary main— stream sociology and cultural
anthropology, all three of which deal exclusively with merely
structural accounts of behavioral and institutional topographies
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and ignore entirely the all-important controlling relations.
Of all prominent schools of twentieth-century social thought
it appears that only the modern heirs to Marx's dialectical mate
rialism, a variety of post—Hegelian German historicism, can be
creditied with attempting to interpret society as an ongoing sys
tem which subsumes all of the monopolistic machinations of its
members into one universal and determinate process.

(The meth

odological underpinnings of this general orientation may now be
cursorily touched upon.

However, a thorough examination of the

specific kinds of functional relations— of which the Marxians
claim special knowledge— must await the further elaboration of
the concept of the catallaxy which follows in the second part of
this thesis.)

Unfortunately, as science and as theories of be

havior, history's various Marxisms (including 'Chomskyism' and the
so-called 'conflict theories' of radical sociology) are wholly incompatable with the practices and generated principles of contem
porary behavior analysis.

This point is quickly made by a sam

pling of inimical features: dialectical relations among material
opposites, e.g., Engels' statement that a butterfly "is the neg
ation of a caterpiller"^ versus functional relations among vari
ables; loosely defined catch-all variables, e.g., economic clas
ses, class interests, class consciousness, the material productive
forces of a stage of history versus variables that can be oper-

Friedrich Engels, cited, along with many of his similar
statements, by Ludwig von Mises in his Theory and History. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) p. 105
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ationally defined exclusively in the measurement units of physic
al science; a Ricardian ’labor theory of value* (from -which the
specious concepts of ’surplus value’ and 'exploitation' are de
rived) versus the Pavlo-Skinnerian 'reinforcement theory' which
takes account of such events as deprivation operations, contigu
ous presentation of neutral events with reinforcement, operant
'chaining', etc.; and 'alientation'

as something which stems from

non-ownership (by one's class) of the means of production versus
alienation as behavior resulting from defective contingencies of
reinforcement.
From these few dissimilarities it is evident that while 'sci
entific socialism' does treat behavior within historical economies
as a unitary, dynamic and lawful subject matter, it nonetheless,
unquestionably and undefensibly fails to establish for its method,
function and variables any objective criteria of validity, reli
ability or generality; criteria easily reached by the standard
practices of radical behaviorism, methodological behaviorism and
many of the less rigorous statistical psychologies.

Marx's Capit

al simply does not pass muster before the modern research stand
ards set by Sidman's Tactics of Scientific Research.^
Yet, to dismiss communism merely on the basis of its faulty
empirical logic is to ignore its increasing acceptance and advo-

Murry Sidman, Tactics of Scientific Research, (New York:
Basic Books Inc., I960)
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cation among yonng behavior modifiers and radical behaviorists.
The tendency is clearly evidenced by the we11-attended Marxist
societies and demonstrations and by the widespread pamphleteering
and poster exhortations within our 'stronghold1 state graduate
programs and professional conventions.

There is also in many de

partments a surge towards 'progressive social action'

(i.e. the

use of 'Marxist-Leninist, Maoist analysis' to direct localized ap
plications of behavior modification and to limit its use in sup
port of 'the system'.)

Perhaps what we are witnessing is the

prognosticable effect of politically sensitive student-acceptance
criteria coupled with the tellingly effective teaching methods of
a loose-knit corps of zealous fellow travelers, with, in the
heights, a waffling B. F. Skinner.

A more substratal and less in

criminatory explanation appeals to the failure of all species of
monopolistic analysis to proficiently interpret the problems, both
real and apparent, of deprivation and aversive control within the
'mixed' economy.

Seeking to retain science, our 'strong suit',

which many behaviorists erroneously identify exclusively with the
practices and instrumentaria of monopolistic analysis, a growing
minority immediately move to eject the world's poorly understood
catallaxy of partial controllers and aim to engineer, in its
place, a dependent—variable culture operated according to our
facile laboratory research paradigm.

These impatient tutelaries

of mankind are desirous of realizing, in their lifetimes, a uni
versal polity of behaviorally designed 'small is beau
tiful’ collectives.

Understandable, they are attracted to com

munism's promise of quick and salutary overthrows.

With this
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expeditious alternative they need not -wait for the slow Grey Em
inence of cultural evolution, the always-tentative selection and
dissemination of practices -within the market system.

They are not

aware that what they are rejecting is the scientific conception of
catallactically controlled man and his place in nature.
The two-tiered Marxist Behaviorism, or 'Skinnerianism in a
hurry1 is the great hoax of modern psychology.

It has no more

claim to the mantle of Minerva than would an Augustinian Behavior
ism, a John Birch Behaviorism or a Vegetarian Behaviorism, or than
has had a Marxist genetics.

Our concern here is simply to show

that this particular 'materialist philosophy' does not offer a co
herent account, either rational or empirical, of behavior within
catallactic relations.

(As for their analysis of the macro per

formance of catallactic economies, see Part Three below.

To those who will criticize polemical digression from a
purely theoretical disquisition upon catallactic control, I apol
ogize for having offended their taste, but I point out that I am
commenting upon recent modifications obvious within the relevant
scientific community.
It is a new kind of 'flight from basic re
search', with powerful aims and interests of its own which will
undoubtedly effect that community's critical behavior with re
spect to the present thesis.
In the marketplace of ideas one can
not help moving according to the competition.
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PART TWO

Interpreting the Catallaxy

The Partial Controller Within the Catallaxy

Homo oeconomicus is, as Skinner has pointed out, an explana
tory fiction "endowed with just the behavior needed to account for
the overall facts of the larger g r o u p . T h e s e facts are the his
torical data of interest to economists, i.e., the levels of
prices, wages, inventories, sales, etc. from the most recent mea
sures to the earliest considered relevant and accurate.

The be

havior (motivation? objectives?) that sufficiently accounts for
these facts is usually conceived by economic theorists as utility
maximization, growth maximization, long and short-run profit maxi
mization,

and so on.

However, this picture of man, deduced ex

clusively from financial and government indices, is not enough to
illuminate even the broad aggregate concerns of economists.

Skin

n e r ’s remarks on this topic are not without relevance:
"Some attention to the individual transaction is of
ten required when generalization at the level of the
group prove invalid. We have already noted the special
conditions which affect economic value. . . Economists
frequently explain the failure to predict a particular
consequence from a broad generalization by appealing to
special conditions of this sort. Although the supply of
money and goods may suggest inflation, for example, some
condition, not otherwise related to the supply of money
or goods, may generate undue caution on the part of a

^Science and Human Behavior, op. cit., p. 399
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large number of buyers.
If a science of economics were
to take all such extraeconomic variables into account,
it would become a complete science of human behavior." 1
Skinner may be venturying outside his recognized area of com
petency, however his views are by no means alien to the best qual
ified thinking on the subject.

Milton Friedman, in his Nobel Lee-

ft
ture on inflation and unemployment , also claims that we can no
longer rely on generalizations at the level of the group which ex
clude consideration of the way in which specific variables make
contact with individuals.

The relationship between aggregate

measures of inflation and unemployment were once thought to be a
permanent inverse relation which came to be called the ’downwardsloping Phillips Curve’.

This last statistically controlled gen

eralization played a key role in Free-World economic policies for
almost two decades.

In the present era of 'stagflation,1 however,

this macro ’law’ is continually being violated as inflation and
unemployment rise together.

According to Friedman,

O

stagflation

cannot be accounted for without attending to exactly how an in
crease in the supply of money first makes contact with the indiv
idual partial controllers.

When the money supply is increased,

producers, in direct and easily discriminated contact with their
own individual sales receipts, first conclude that there has been
an increase in the demand for their own products.

Each thinks

that the rising revenue from sales results from a change in conr-

Xibid.
‘Tlil ton Friedman, "Nobel Lecture; Inflation and Unemploy
ment," Journal of Political Economy LXXXV (Summer, 1977)
3.
—

Price Theory, (Chicago; Adliue, 1976) chap= 11
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snmer behavior vith respect to his product only.

He has received

the usual market signal that his product is now a more powerful
reinforcer commanding a larger portion in exchange against all
other goods and services that it did before.

In response to this

stimulus control, each producer moves to meet the perceived new
market conditions with more hiring, greater output, orders for new
plant and equipment, etc.

This action is based on what economists

call imperfect knowledge, the illusion of increased real vealth
(as opposed to increased 'paper' or nominal -wealth, i.e., more
certificates entitling one to a 'slice of the economic pie,' but
smaller slices since the size of the pie has not grown with the
issue of certificates laying equal claim to it.)

Only later does

the producer come into contact with indications that all other
producers (i.e. his suppliers and competitors) have been respond
ing in the same way, i.e., that the paper-money demands for all
products have gone up together while the relative exchange rates
among these items (except for paper money) are little changed.
Having eventually come under the control of these remote changes
outside his sales departments, the producer readjusts his behavior
to all relevant exchange-rate data by cutting back on hiring and
inventories, and discontinuing what are now seen as mal-investments.

These investments were planned to supply a buying public

who, when they first discriminated a higher number on their pay
checks, interpreted the event as a jump in their own real wealth,
and at once began purchasing less urgent shopping items which be
fore they would have passed over.
that the sellers'

Only later is it discovered '

'pointing index fingers’ on the various 'price
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scales'— see Part One, above— are no longer responding to dollar
offers as before.

Price tags are nov higher.

Paychecks, for

those still receiving them during the producers1 readjustment, are
nov considered niggard, especially in contrast to the preceding
magnification of their apparent purchasing poirer.

Yielding to the

political heat this generates, the monetary authority then acts to
bolster paychecks.

The cycle is repeated, but vith a difference.

The producers and consumers are nov less likely to be tricked into
buying more goods and services simply on the basis of another in
flationary 'jump* of the same magnitude.

In order to 'stimulate'

the economy the government must nov engineer higher rates of in
flation, and soon accelerations of the rate of inflation.
l?e may speak of homo economicus 'adjusting his expectations'
and of this 'anticipated inflation rates', etc. or ve may speak of
the changing catallactic relations among partial controllers as
their behavior is brought under the control of changing indepen
dent contingencies, i.e., the monopolistically manipulated money
supply, government spending and taxation etc.
present point is made.

Either vay the

Economic theory cannot ignore events at

the level of the psychology of the individual; perhaps, ultimate
ly, the only level of economic lavfulness.
The present notion of the partial controller fits the emerg
ing behavioristic interpretation of human action, and, in fact,
extends that interpretation to cover behavior not under the direct
control of either the natural environment or a monopolistic con
troller.

Thus ve recognize the catallaxy vhich includes both the

dependent contingency arrangements of the partial controllers and

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

RO
the independent contingencies of which they are a function, as
•well as all other factors pertaining to individual behavior -which
have been discovered by monopolistic behavior analysis.

The Approach of Fourraker and Siegal

An experimental science -which seeks to predict the ratios in
■which environmental rearrangements are exchanged has been ap
proached in many fields.

One may refer to various learning ex

periments with game situations, the various quantity-adjuster oli
gopoly experiments, prisoner’s dilemma games, conflict experi
ments, price-bidding experiments, and the n-person game experi
ments of mathematicians.^-

A common denominator of all of the

(sometimes catallactically_controlled) dependent variables in
these experiments is that they are inevitably functions of inde
pendent contingencies designed specifically to approximate the
conditions postulated in theoretical models.

These conditions may

be classified as either l) game-theoretical decision spaces or 2)
economic markets containing a small number of buyers and/or sel
lers with different cost and market-demand conditions obtaining at
various combinations of price and quantity offered.

The work of

Fourraker and Siegal furnishes important examples of the later,
characteristic features of which may be briefly sketched;

o

Anatol Rapoport and Carl Orwant, "Experimental Games; A Re
view," Behavioral Science, VII (1962) pp. 1—37

2
Lawrence E. Fourraker and Sidney Siegal, Bargaining Behav
ior, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963)
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Randomly selected subjects were segregated and placed in
paired cubicles.

One subject of the pair vas designated as the

seller and the other as the buyer.

Each was given a profit table

■with a 'profit matrix’ showing profit levels for each possible
combination of price and output.

The subjects, during earlier in

struction, had been told that they could pocket whatever profits
— dollars and cents— they generated.

The profit matrices were de

rived from hypothetical cost and revenue functions of an imaginary
’bilateral-monopoly’ market situation.

(The profit-determining

terms by which the sellers previously aquired the products they
sell and on which the buyers will subsequently resell the products
they buy, are thus simply givens imbedded in the matrix data.)
Negotiations began when the price-setting seller wrote his bid on
a piece of paper and handed it to a research assistant who then
handed it to the buyer.

The buyer, presumably acting under the

control of the seller’s offer and the profit table, then selected
a quantity to be bought.

The experiment was designed so that

selection of the highest of sixteen prices and the highest of
eighteen quantities yielded most money to the seller, while the
lowest price and highest quantity maximized the profit of the buy
er.

Behavioral outcomes were evaluated against two hypcthetico-

deauctive predictions; individual nrofit •>«>viTrvLzation (the Bowley^

^See Arthur Lyon Bowley, "On Bilateral Monopoly," The Econom
ic Journal, XXXXVIII (1928) pp. 651-59 for derivations.
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solution), and joint maximization (the Pareto optimum*-).

In the

former, the theoretical seller (a set of mathematical assumptions)
selects the price bringing himself to the highest minimum profit,
given the range of the buyer's possible reactions; and the buyer
sets the quantity which maximizes his profits, given the seller's
price.

The final price and quantity supply the coordinates of a

solution (the Bowley point) -which has logical properties in com
mon -with the saddle point of a two-person conflict game.

In con

trast, the joint maximization solution, arrived at through pro
tracted bidding and counterbidding, grants greater profits to one
or both interactants.

Given the two alternatives, it was the

Fouraker and Siegal hypothesis that different combinations of (in
dependent contingency) conditions each had a different liklihood
of conforming to either the Pareto or Bowley solutions.

Three

parameters were systematically varied: l) the matrix cells: either
showing to each the profits of both or to each only his own, 2)
the form of contract: either one-shot episodes or repeat bidding
which allows for the accumulated effects of new reinforcement his
tory, and c) the position of the 'equal split* of profit payoffs:
either at the Bowley point or the Pareto-optimality position.

The

experimental result was that when the interactants had no indica
tions of the other's profits and when profits were split equal at
the Bowley price, or when interaction was limited to a one-shot

Pareto Optimality: Any situation where no one can aquire
further advantage without withdrawing some benefits that another
already has. From: Vilfredo Pareto, Manual d'Economie Politique,
(Paris: M. Giard, 1909)
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episode; the Bowley model reliably supplied accurate predictions.
"However, by manipulating the experimental conditions (amount of
information, form of bidding, and the location of the equal profit
contract) we could induce the Pareto solution."^

In some experi

ments this solution required the interactants to alternate trialby-trial between the twin peaks of a bimodal profit distribution
curve.
In a second series of experiments conducted by the same team
of investigators^ two sellers, rather than a buyer and a seller,
confronted each other.

The market they competed to supply was

again a given, based this time on hypothetical demand functions,
i.e., the predicted behavior of suppositious ’buyers*— in reality,
arbitrary parametric substitutions for actual partial controllers.
It has already been established that such measures should not be
interpreted as simulations of catallactically controlled behavior.

s

These manifestations of theory function exclusively as the

independent contingencies of a two-subject interaction and not as
reliable surrogates for mass markets.

It was the objective of

^Fouraker and Siegal, op. eft., p. 204
2loc. cit., pp. 89— 199
^The behavioral assumptions of a downward-sloping demand
curve are based both on statistical analysis of aggregate market
data, and, more generally, on appeals to the law of demand which
states that the lower the price of something, the more of it
people will buy. This law, in turn, is based upon l) the prin
ciple of diminishing marginal utility, i.e., the more something
is consumed per unit of time, the less will be the utility from
additional units relative to the utility to be derived from
additional quantities of other goods, services, and/or leisure,
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Fouraker and Siegal merely to discover how their flesh-and-blood
sellers would divide their stationary—state pseudo-market between
themselves and at what offered prices.
two— seller situation were tried.

Two variations of this

Each variation was based on a

particular model and associated with a different derived outcome.
In the first variation, both sellers were quantity adjusters with
prices being automatically determined for each price by the de
mand function.

Each seller was given a profit matrix indicating,

at the intersection of columns labeled "Quantity produced by me,"
and rows labeled "Quantity produced by my competition," their own
profits at each quantity combination, and also, in some experi
ments, the profits of their rivals.

The experimental result was

that rival quantity adjusters, when lacking each other's profit
data, tended to set quantities

corresponding to the competitive

(i.e. relatively high-quantity, relatively low-price) solution
predicted by quantity-adjuster

duopoly theory, whereas with com

plete profit information, there obtained a much greater diversity
of outcomes.

When the exogenous promise of an eight-dollar bonus

to the highest-profiting sellers was introduced, the range of out
comes was once again narrowed to the high quantity and low-price

and therefore the smaller the price one will pay for another unit;
2) the fact that owing to people's differing incomes, as the price
declines, more can afford the item; 3) the fact that as price de
clines, even weak reinforcers will be purchased; and 4) the fact
that individuals tend to switch to the lowest-price instruments
appropriate to their aims.
It is important to note that actual
contingency control by partial controllers plays no part in this,
the neo-classical theory of demand; learned behavior is assumed to
be constant.
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In the series of experiments with price adjusters (-where market
quantity -was an automatic function of the sellers* combinative
pricing policies) it was found that, -where information about one’s
rival’s profit structure -was lacking, subjects tended to undercut
each other’s rrice to a point well below joint—profit maximiza
tion, and when information was complete, contract diversity in
creased with non-maximizing (immediately costly) ’signals* often
leading to more Paretian relationships, or what is referred to in
the language of antitrust power politics as successful tacit col
lusion.
In evaluating the significance of this type of experiment we
best begin by examining the disclaimers and prescriptions of the
researchers themselves:
. . we are employing student decision makers in a rad
ically simplified situation; economic conflict (sic) in
the real world generally takes place among gargantual or
ganizations with varying historical backgrounds and cur
rent postures.
The entrepreneur in a real situation may
be concerned about the financial structure of the organ
ization or about public opinion as reflected in the ac
tions of, for example, the JusticeDepartment; he may be
worried about potential competitors or product obsoles
cence. Indeed, the list of possible critical variables
is without end. Thus it jjs dangerous to go blithely from
a study such as this to prediction or policy formation in
business. However, this gap results more from the short
comings of the theory than it does from innate deficien
cies of the experimental method. Most economic theory
presupposes individual actors with relatively simple ob
jectives; if these assumptions lead to grievously in
correct conclusions, we must construct better economic
models."1

h o c , cit., p. 20F
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"In any case we cannot cope directly with the com
plexity of the actual phenomenon: There seem to be too
many facts and relationships for a brain, even a mechan
ical one, to treat in an orderly fashion. Abstraction
and model building are necessary to reduce the problem
to managable proportions. The experimental method can
contribute to the process of identifying critical vari
ables and the nature of their roles in conflict situ
ations."*
I leave it to the reader to ponder the usefulness of a method
which "can contribute to the process of identifying critical vari
ables" in a field in thich "the list of "the list of possible critO
ical variables is without end."

Our present concern is with

whether or not this method has isolated any critical variables at
all.
The method of Fouraker and Siegal involves the relationships
between three realms: l)a discriminated segment of the real world,
2) a conceptual (hypothetico-deductive) model of that segment of
the real world, and 3) an experiment which takes as its independent
variables monopolistically arranged laboratory conditions which
meet the specifications of the nonbehavioral (independent contin
gency) assumptions of the model and adopts as its dependent vari
able such apposite catallactic outcome measures as price level or
relative exchange rate.

An economic model invariably makes both

behavioral and independent-contingency assumptions.

By construct—

^loc. cit., p. 207
p
A critical variable is one which exerts such powerful control
over a subject matter that no reliable prediction is possible with
out taking it into account.
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ing within the laboratory a set of independent contingencies which
faithfully incarnate a model's market— structure postulates, we
then have two outcomes, one experimental and the other deductive,
which are suitable for comparison.

(This is provided, of course,

that commensurable units of measure are found for both; numbers
qualified with dollar signs and actual greenbacks and coins meet
this compatibility requirement.
We are analysing a method which involves the contributions of
two disciplines.

First, the economic theorist, confronted with the

concatenation of real—world phenomena, abstracts from it a scheme
of semi-permanent functionally related systems or statements.

The

precision of the contingencies that establish such abstractions is
always open to question.

Not only his subject matter, but also the

literatures of his culture and the practices of his intellectual
community set up contingencies which narrow the control exercised
by the real world so that there emerges a manageably small number
of statements about functional relations (e.g. when piecework rates
are raised, output per manhour increased; when ceteris paribus, the
amount of money tokens is increased, each token comes to control a
smaller fraction of the total o.o0ds and services, and consequently,
controls less labor.)

These statements are then selected from and

intraverbally manipulated in accordance with rules of logic (or
'wish fulfillment,* in the case of those who, to paraphrase Alois
Schumpeter,^ avoid errors of reason by escaping reason altogether.)

^J. Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy.
3rd. ed. (New York: 1950) p. 307
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The result is an economic model.

Some models are so simple that no

claim is ever made for ti.eir descriptive accuracy (e.g. the neo—
Walrasian general equilibrium theory).

Others are claimed to have

captured all of the essentials (e.g. Marx's dialectical theory of
history).

What distinguishes them is the claim by proponents of

the latter group that their schema are somehow under the exclusive
stimulus control of their subject matter* with nothing but logical
organization added.
truth.

Actually, nothing could be further from the

The fashioning of every so-called descriptive model is dis

torted by reinforcing and punishing consequences that have been
meted out by various social, intellectual and economic communities
according to circumstances.

However, contrary to the teachings of

scientific socialism, the fact that distortions are a necessary
concomitant of community control in no way discredits any analysis.
Those who condemn bourgeoise psychology and economics solely on ac
count of their 'ruling-class interests,' and attribute to their own
analysis the one true logic because of their identification with
the final social class of history, fail to see that even an abso
lutely objective reference frame is to be valued over its anti
thesis only insofar as it can be demonstrated to afford greater ef
fectiveness in achieving objectives.

A theoretical economist or

contingency analyst comes to know a real-world culture (or catal
laxy) in the sense that he acquires behavior which satisfies the

*In the language of Skinner's analysis of verbal behavior, it
is claimed that the model is a pure tact.
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contingencies it maintains.

But control of the

model—builder’s

behavior with respect to his subject matter, and apart from his
logical manipulations and mathematical calculations, is limited to
variables -which lie in his immediate environment.

Kis actual con

tact vith the catallaxy is restricted to books, journals, lectures,
discussions with his (similarly restricted) colleagues, government
and business statistics, engineering data, newspapers, radio, in
terviews, questionnaires; and his own first-hand experience with
the buying and selling of goods, labor, savings accounts and in
vestments, and finally, to the extent that they touch him directly,
the contingencies arranged by political institutions (e.g. form
1040, speeding tickets, OSEA inspections, etc.).
things which his knowledge is about.

These are the

We may behavioristically de

fine economics as the science which investigates discrepancies
among different responses of economic model builders.

At any rate,

owing to the disparate control exercised by various distinctive
provinces of community reinforcement, we have no trouble discrimin
ating among contributions of the Manchester (laissez-faire),
Chicago (monetarist), Keynesian and Marxist schools of economics
and their various sets of analytical practices.
In the second phase of this model-based experimental method,
the experimental researcher, who is also not free from the contin
gencies of ideological communities and literatures, selects from
among the theorist’s models those most compatible with his current
repertoire and instrumental means.

Fouraker and Siegal, for exam

ple, selected market models which stimulated price and quantity
problems confronting corporate managers in competition with a few
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big firms; the very situations one would expect to be most of in
terest to the sponsoring Harvard Graduate School of Business Admin
istration, a main feeder of oligopolistic enterprises.

Further

more, the models which were selected involved only two or three
relevant interactants operating along clear-cut and easily quanti
fiable dimensions and under the control of reinforcers unambiguous
power— prime criteria for experimental managability.
From this brief excursion into the sociology of economic know
ledge several important conclusions may be drawn.

First, the in-

dependent-contingency features of the model-based experiment bare
no natural, automatic or point-to-point relation to the actual in
dependent contingencies of the system the model is supposed to de
pict.

Second, since the degree of correspondence between the theo

rist's independent contingencies and the independent contingencies
of the real world is unknown, the catallactic relations generated
under the contro1 of the experimental conditions bare an unknown
relation to the behavior generated by the real-world catallaxy.

V/e

may say that the trans-dimensional method lacks validity in its
construction, since it cannot be demonstrated that the experiment's
outcome measures are not related to theoretically irrelevant vari
ables introduced during either l) abstraction of functiona rela
tionships from real-world phenomena, 2) model construction from re
lation statements, or 3) model selection and the design of the
chosen model's experimental manifestation.

For this reason, com

parison of theoretical results with model deductions sheds no light
upon the model's real-world descriptiveness or generality.

Even

when an experiment vares out a model completely, all that is proven
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is that the theorist's behavioral predictions agree -with the sub
ject's performance when the latter is placed under the control of
contingencies meeting the theorist's non-behavioral assumptions.
The power of empirical functional analysis simply cannot be brought
to bare -when the independent variable is given the status of an
operationalized manifestation of a distorted conception of an actu
al market or economy.

This conslusion is further strengthened when

we consider that a model's constant conditions, which are the basis
for design of the experimental independent contingencies, are them
selves merely convenient simplifications

which assume constant the

catallactically controlled behavior of all other partial control
lers, (e.g. in the bilateral monopoly situation, those who sell to
the seller and those who buy from the buyer; in the

duopoly case,

the two sellers' buyers.)
As we have seen this general method is useful for investigat
ing the minimal partial— controller feedback conditions (features of
the independent contingencies) necessary before collusive price and
output adjusting can occur.

The method is only misapplied when the

model-based experiments are employed as accurate microcosms provid
ing valid tests of the basal model's predictive, diagnostic and in
terpretive power.

(Of course, the latter formed no part of the in

tention of Fouraker and Siegal.)

We may conclude that in its ap

propriate application this method is irrelevant to the present the
sis.

In its inappropriate application its validity rests on the

accurate discrimination and abstract representation of all relevant
real-world independent contingencies.

Sources of distortion have
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been suggested so far.

However, a definite barrier to such know

ledge, a barrier having to do with the nature of the world outside
the laboratory, is yet to be considered.

Homans and Blau

When the client leaves the clinical psychologist at the port
als of the real world, he is entering an environment which ines
capably includes the catallaxy.

The standard applied-behavior-.

analysis interpretation of the real world as a series of divisible
monopolistic settings is simply inappropriate.

All non-coersive

human interaction involves exchanges the terms of many of which are
determined in episodes of rautuaj contingency shaping of contingency
shaping.
This thesis has, for the sakes of brevity and clearness, been
limited to treating only exchanges of what are most narrowly inter
preted as economic goods, viz., grain, bread, tools, money, etc.
This has been misleading.

As George C. Homans

1 and Peter Blau 2

have meticulously established, we are constantly exchanging favors,
gifts, respect, approval, loyalty, status recognition, legitima
tion, advice, association, and obligations.

Such exchanges go on

often without prior open agreement as to the terms of the exchange.
(Although, the rates of exchange do exist and can be measured.)
Suddenly the picture is greatly complicated, although nothing that

^George C. Homans, Social Behavior; Its Elementary Forms. (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jo v a n o v i c h , 1974)
%>eter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19R4)

(New York:
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has been previously presented here need be changed.
Although both Homans and Blau credit Skinner with providing
the basis of their analysis, it is not generally realized that
neither Homans nor Blau conform to the Skinnerian strategy of mono
polistic contingency analysis.

Neither has sought means to discov

er the specific schedules of reinforcement which will emerge in
given exchange situations.

They have predicted the principle.

They have not predicted either specific response rates or specific
contingency values.

They have shown how general patterns of ex

change, but not definite magnitudes or ratios of exchange, are a
function of group differentiation, bureaucratic hierarchy, and
other independent-contingency

orderings of individuals with re

spect to each other and their environments.
While Homans and Blau have each ignored the fact and implic
ations of the loss of resolving power in the transition from mono
polistic to catallactic analysis, they have nonetheless provided us
with the only two attempts at a behavioristic treatment of the full
range of human exchange.
It is worth noting, in passing, that the analyses of the ex
change theorists present a complement, if not an alternative, to
Skinner's account of dignity.

According to Skinner,* dignity is

approval or social reinforcement reserved for persons whose valu
able behavior is emitted for unknown or seemingly weak reasons.

*B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, (New York: Knopf,
1971)
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However, the exchange theorists show that the man who grants dig
nity in so doing also diminishes himself.

Thus loss of stature

(i.e. the granting of dignity) is traded for unaccountable benefits
from another.

We see then that behavior attributing dignity may

have its catallactically determined price.

We may further cynical

ly suspect that even obviously motivated behaviors, if scarce
enough and valuable enough, can command the giving of dignity when
no other partial-control variables are available.

Number of Controllers as an Independent Variable

Veingarten and Mschner have stressed the importance of the
number of interacting agents in behavioral research.
"It is even possible that dyads, triads, tetrads, and
larger groups constitute different levels of analysis and
will come to be regarded as separate major provinces of
behavioral science. . . Psychologists have till now large
ly confined their attention to one of these levels: the
monad. . . t h e reductionist fallacy of insisting that
dyads must receive attention before triads, and triads be
fore tetrads will have to be avoided."!
It is an important discovery of economics that under certain
circumstances the introduction of additional partial controllers
ceases to be a determinant of exchange rates or prices.

With less

than a nod to the elegance and careful qualification of the class
ical theory of the firm, we may satisfy our present purpose by us
ing an admittedly oversimple, but not always wholly unrealistic,

^Kenneth Weingarten and Francis Mechner, op. cit., p. 458
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model to suggest the nature of these limiting circumstances.
^hen the products sold by partial controllers are homogeneous,
i.e., of the same grade or utility, and when the sellers are unable
to differentiate their products by brand-name advertizing or extra
services, we may then safely assume that competition -will occur on
ly along the single dimension of price.

Furthermore, -when all of

the producers face the same cost conditions, e.g., the soil of
island on which ■we may suppose they live is uniformly productive,
and transportation costs are identical, each jjroducing place be
ing equidistant from the marketplace at the center of the island,
•we may then conclude that number of sellers will control price in
the following way.

If there is one seller only, he will be able to

adjust his price so as to maximize his profits from each buyer,
i.e., what he gets in exchange minus what he would give to get his
original production back again.

If a second seller enters the mar

ket we may asgl3me that he will initiate a price war and them make
efforts to collude in price fixing which will somehow divide the
market.

The same may hold true after the introduction of the next

few sellers.

However, at some point, as the number of sellers in

creases, all sellers will become price takers rather than price
setters.

If one sets one's price above that asked by one's compet

itors one will sell nothing.

If one attempts to undercut the com

petition price, one's revenue per unit will cover less than one's
minimum cost per unit, resulting in a punishing loss of partial
control.

Finally, if one attempts to persuade all of one's compet

itors to raise their prices together, either by market signaling
(i.e. contingency shaping; price leadership) or outright verbal
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agreement, one Trill find that at the moment of truth no one, in
cluding perhaps oneself, -will have gone along.

A competitor’s

verbal assent to price fixing is easy to obtain, but since there is
no enforcement power, there being no private means to coerce com
pliance or pay partial controllers not to produce, most will end up
selling the products he had agreed to hold back, even at the con
sequently lower but still profitable prices the buyers are ever
ready to pay.

The critical number of sellers beyond which collu

sion must break down to the competitive price undoubtedly depends
upon the independent contingencies, i.e., the modes of communica
tion and tlie proximity of the interactants.

Once the critical num

ber of partial controllers is reached for a particular set of inde
pendent contingencies, partial controllers cease being partial con
trollers, or by another interpretation, become partial controllers
locked into one powerful equilibrium price outcome, an outcome
wherein all but one price-setting response is always punished.
Obviously this equilibrium model of a generalized catallaxy is
static and incomplete.

No mention has been made of the buyers or

what it is with which the buyers buy.

More than that, the model is

based upon structural independent— contingency assumptions which
rarely apply to human experience.

Conditions and costs of produc

tion and delivery are never uniform and unchanging.

The products

of human action are most frequently heterogeneous and differenti
ated by combinations of brand name, reputation, advertising, and
supplemental services such as warranties, installment, maintenance,
efficiency, and the courtesy, attractiveness and status stimuli of
the sales personel.

The economist views this multiformity as so
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many disequilibrating ’market imperfections’ which confound the
pristine models with new dimensions for catallactic competition.
New partial controllers affect the baseline exchange rates through
their competitive, retaliatory and signaling adjustments of the
control medium provided in the independent contingencies.

There

can be no simple combination of parameters, such as number of sel
lers or concentration of partial control, discoverable through fac
tor analysis, which can side-step precise specification of the in
dependent contingencies.

Additional partial controllers must not

only be counted and ’weighted', they must also be located within
the concatenation of manipulanda and consequences and all condi
tional and temporal independent-contingency relations.

To predict

exchange rates we must know more than, for example, that Si and A1
formed a bilateral monopoly.
We have here suggested conditions under which the number of
partial controllers by itself determines exchange rate outcomes.
These conditions correspond to the economists' model of perfect
competition.

We have further suggested that where there is heter

ogeneity of product and differentiation of partial-control vari
ables, then the number of partial controllers, apart form other in
dependent-contingency considerations, will have little or no pre
dictive power.

As Edward Chamberlin has asserted:

"In all fields where individual products have even
the slightest element of uniqueness, competition bears
but faint resemblance to the pure competition of a high
ly organized market for a homogeneous product."^-

^Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic
Competition, (Cambridge: Earvard University Press,19B5) p. 9
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The Concatenated Catallaxy

Exchange rates of goods and services fluctuate as a function
of -worldwide independent— contingency unknowns,

Weather affects

crop production as well as energy requirements, rates of deprecia
tion for equipment and inventories, and the costs and speed of
transportation.

Plagues, blights and earthquakes ’reprogram* in

dependent contingencies in incalculable -ways.

Discoveries and in

ventions, i.e., newly established control by natural contingencies,
insofar as capital accumulation exists to employ them, constantly
alter the composition and distribution of partial control within
the catallaxy.
This concept is not new.

One hundred years ago, English econ

omist William Stanley Jevons set forth the theory that trade cycles
are a function of sunspot activity*— an idea now semirevived.

Ear

ly in the present century, Swedish social theorist Rudolf Iljellen
interpreted social and political action to be a function of nation
al geography.^

The state, according to Kjellen, operates as a vast

superindividual organism vying with other states for control of the
geographical resources necessary for spatial expansion and surviv
al.

Land area, rivers, soil, mountains, outlets to the sea, and

S. Jevons, Investigation in Currency and Finance. (London:
1887)
O

Rudolf Kjellen, Per Staat als Lebensform, (Leipzig: S. Iiirzel, 1917)
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the general ecological endowment of the land -were considered among
the macro— environmental independent variables appropriate to this
quasi-Danrinian science of agglomerate behavior.

There is no need

to add anything to what has already been said about the indispensa—
bility of individually locating each partial controller among di
vers monopolistic contingencies and independent contingencies of
the concatenated environment— the job of a micro-environmental
analysis.

Prediction of exchange rates, i.e., the foretelling of

relative flows of products and behaviors, although not the same as
prediction of the solitary individual's response rate or response
intensity, nonetheless requires reference to

environmental contin

gencies equally as detailed and at the same level of specificity as
that required for monopolistic prediction.

Like Ejellen's geopol

itics, catallactic analysis emphasizes pre-behavioral independent
contingencies, but unlike the older discipline, catallactic analy
sis is wholly social-recuctionistic.
We may contrast yet another weakness of Kjellen’s orientation,
which has been a source of appeal to more than one of this cen
tury’s nationalist totalitarians, viz., the artificial partition
ing, in analysis, of the natural unit of the catallaxy along the
political boundries of the nation state.

The range of human ex

change is effected by the coersive practices establishing national
frontiers, but it need not be isolated or transformed by them.
While legal control often terminates at the political frontier, the
concept of a national economy being similarly bounded is both his
torically and theoretically unsupportable.
In order to see why this may be so, and so that we may better
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grasp the range and -workings of the catallaxy, -we may resort to an
imaginary chain of events that is suggestive of contemporary ac
counts of a part of recent history:
A change in the penetration of radient energy from the sun,
caused by the steady accumulation of released by-products of human
economic activity changing the sun— screening properties of the at
mosphere, causes shifts in ocean currents which affect the temper
atures, precipitation and sunshine over large tracts of the Euras
ian continent.

The modified weather alters the (non-catallactic)

contingent relation between seed planting and size of harvest yield
throughout central and western Russia.

A smaller than usual yield

(Soviet agricultural is generally inefficient) affects catallactic
relations wherein those manipulating the distribution of grain ex
ert partial contingency control over those partial controllers man
ipulating the distribution of all other goods and services (i.e.
rubles, larger apartments, better positions on automobile waiting
lists, party membership, flexibility in the application of bureau
cratic regulation, praise, submission, feigned affection, minding
one's own business, foreign currency, and so on ad infinitum.)
By established economic reasoning, a less plentiful supply of
grain means that less of it can enter exchanges for other kinds of
reinforcing events.

However, in our imaginary story nothing has

lessened the reinforcing potential of grain.

The activities of

those who do not produce grain must be punished by either a dimin
ished rate of incoming units of grain products or by the sacrifice
of more possessions than was earlier necessary to sustain accus
tomed grain-product consumption.

In general, transactions involv
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ing grain in exchange for non-food-related products ■will end in
less of the former controlling more of the later.
comes about regardless of official plan or policy.

This change The effects are

transnational, transystemic and indifferent to ideology.

They re

sult from the (to the Russians) exogenous change in independent
contingencies.

State controls, foreign policy, and 'the black mar

ket problem1 all are modified by a catallactic process involving
l) partial controllers -who manipulate the distribution of nowscarcer grain and make it contingent upon others' behavior, and 2)
the others, who similarly manipulate everything else.

Internation

al political advantages, such as trading concessions, withdrawal of
warships from certain oceans, and even concessions in ideological
posture, enter the scales as partial control measures controlling
those who control grain.

As the process is worked out by individ

uals moved by the catallactic invisible hand, people in those coun
tries exchanging grain for whatever the Russians are providing in
return soon discover effects on their own domestic grain transac— '
tions.

Some (e.g. farmers and the caviar importers) are now in a

better position owing to the infusion of Russian material and con
cessions.

Other (e.g.

are worse off.

bakers and people who eat a lot of bread)

Somewhere in the Midwest, a clinical psychologist

records weekly changes in a breakfast-cereal exuctive's self-eval
uation, security in his job, overall stress, family relations, and
ability to

continue paying ofr his sessions.

It is not known; by

either this clinician or his client that all of these behavioral
measures have to do with the fact that the client is a partial con
troller, linked through the catallaxy to partial controllers in
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Russia and to the independent contingencies operating bejond the
stratosphere.
Admittedly, the foregoing construction of events is far too
fanciful and theory-controlled to "withstand historical scrutiny of
any of its particulars.

However, its intended purpose, viz., mere

ly to establish a principle, has been met.

We see how, contrary to

Kjellen's views, the catallaxy, as a unit of analysis, may extend
beyond either a nation's politics, its laws, or its economic poli
cies and plans.

The "Mainspring and Regulator" of the Market Culture

Wilhelm Ropke, a market economist whose noninterventionist
policy recommendations are largely credited with twenty years of
post-World-War— Two German prosperity, identifies what we have been
calling catallactic relations among partial controllers as both the
"mainspring and regulator" of the market culture.*

They are the

mainspring in the sense that the contingencies they arrange rein
force.

They are the regulator in that they adjust to select new

contingencies as a function of previous reinforcement effective
ness.

The positioning of everyone's index finger along all of the

various price scales determines, for example, whether the partial
controlling farmer will cultivate his north forty or allow them to
lie fallow.

The latter outcome means that the time and resources

which would have gone into the north forty are now more profitably
spent on chickens, new dairy equipment, leisure, or the savings ac—

*Wilhelm Ropke, The Humane Economy. (Chicago: Henry Regnery
co., 1950) p. 695
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count (in which case the local banker can lend the money to a man
•who ■will employ it to open a much-demanded hardware store.)

Of

course, today’s prices are not necessarily tomorrow's prices, and
it may turn out that forty acres of wheat would have controlled the
greatest return after all.
taking entrepreneur.

In this sense the farmer too is a risk-

Ropke points out that the usual defense of

the market system emphasizes only the mainspring, the exclusive
use of positive reinforcement.

Overlooked is the market's "un

rivaled solution" to the problem of "a continual harmonious order
ing and guidance of the economic process."^- As it turns out, it is
the latter advantage that is more cogent in the unending dialog
between advocates of freedom, i.e., property and competitive trade,
and the advocates of etatostic technology, i.e., the planned mono
polistic collective.
"Competition as a stimulant is simply a psychological
technique that is as applicable in a collectivist economy
as in a market economy or, indeed, in any group, be it
school or regiment or any other. We may even note that as
far as the effects of competition on human destinies are
concerned, it may in collectivist systems, be hardened in
a way that is unknown and impossible in the market econ
omy. But the other function of competition, which is at
least equally important for its economic effectiveness,
the function of selection in the area of material means
of production meets with the greatest obstacles in col
lectivist systems. In relation to people, the carrot and
the stick are ruthlessly applied, but it is quite another
question whether in collectivist systems competition can
accomplish so uncompromising, undeviating, and continual
a selection of products and firms as takes place in the
market economy.

^loc. cit., p. 696
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. .Unlike the market economy, the collectivist economy
is necessarily debarred from such use of competition be
cause no collectivist system can create the necessary pre
conditions without losing its own identity. This pre
condition is genuine economic interdependence of firms.
Only on this condition is the formation of genuine scarc
ity prices for capital and consumer goods conceivable, but
there can be no independence of firms without private own
ership and related freedom of action.
"Thus everything is interlocked: competition as a
regulator of the economy presupposes free market prices;
free market prices are impossible without genuine inde
pendence of economic units, and their independence stands
or falls by private ownership and freedom of decision,
unimpaired and undisturbed by government planning. No
collectivist economy can possibly satisfy the last of
these conditions without ceasing to be collectivist, and
therefore it cannot enjoy the advantage of the regulatory
and guiding functions of competition."1

*loc. cit., p . 96
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PART THREE

THe Experimental Culture

Introduction

Skinner's defense of the comprehensive control of men by means
of a centrally coordinated perpetual experiment, represents a major
portion of his intellectual contribution.

Of immediate importance

is the fact that his conclusions do not rule out the incorporation
of markets within the evolving design.

In discussing the signific

ance of the potential size of catallactic relations and the ways in
which scientists may interpret, predict and control relations among
partial controllers (i.e. through control of laboratory-imposed or
coersive— legal independent contingencies) we are naturally led,
following Skinner, to expand our area of discourse to cover the
experimental community, the planned society and the culture of de
sign.
Since Skinner has virtually ignored the topic of social co
ordination by the market mechanism, we are left without his guid
ance in asking: What common scientific and technological problems
confront l) the planner-controller of a monopolistic state who
schedules all contingencies of reinforcement, and 2) the mixedeconomy technocrat who seeks knowledge of what the catallaxy is
doing and the means (utilizing precise coercive interventions) to
make it do what he finds important while avoiding too many unpre
dicted aversive consequences?

86
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The Attractive Culture

In a largely unfounded assault upon Skinner's scientific in
vestigations, Richard Herrnstein has made one significant observa
tion on the feasibility of behaviorally engineered societies,^ a
critical observation -which was not mentioned by Skinner in his
otherwise sufficient reply.^

Herrnstein's statement merits rescue

from its original straw-man context and a closer examination of its
implications.
"If only a few drives (read: phylogenetically established
susceptabilities to reinforcement) are involved in human
social behavior, then (governmental) controlling agencies
can promise to deliver the timely reinforcers. But sup
pose the list of drives is long, not fully known, and fin
ally, somewhat variable from person to person and from
time to time. Then think of the potential for mischief
as the controlling agencies unwittingly withhold rein
forcers belonging to drives not yet recognized as such or
allow unrecognized reinforcers to sabotage their condi
tioning. "3
Let us inquire further into the "potential for mischief"
Herrnstein is talking about.

If the official plan is less rein

forcing to its subjects than the catallactic relations controlled
by the current independent contingencies, the collective's subjects
will openly or secretly operate as partial controllers in violation
of the plan.

If police power is then applied in order to punish

^■Richard Herrnstein, "The Evolution of Behaviorism," American
Psychologist XXXII (Decomber, 1977)
% . F. Skinner, "Herrnstein and the Evolution of Behavior,"
American Psychologist XXXII (December, 1977)
^Herrnstein, "The Evolution of Behaviorism," op. cit.
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catallactic behavior and the easy communication among subjects
which breeds it, then, as Skinner has often warned, the way of life
will no longer be reinforcing.
sistance, or sedition.

There will be escape, passive re

To avoid Skylla and Kharybdis, the control

ling agents must consistently deliver more to their subjects for
complying with the plan than those subjects can aquire by employ
ing what partial control is left to them

catallactic relations.

Skinner's dictum, viz., "the subject is always right," must be re
spected.

More than that, however, achieving continuous prepotence

of all behavior stipulated in the collective plan requires finding
and making use of all the things the subject is right about.
Herrnstein has focused on the difficulties associated with
l) discovering individual inherited differences in reinforcement
susceptibility and 2) designing a unified societal plan which incorporporates and adjusts to such ideographic diversity.

The data

must be at hand which will enable planners to design contingencies
of just the minimum strength necessary for maintaining prepotency
over insubordinate behaviors controlled by the catallaxy or by un
planned monopolistic contingencies which cater to a subject's pecu
liar bent, and which select behaviors incompatable with the plan.
The successful plan must be continually revised in order to insure
that reinforcers of the momentarily right kind and quantity will be
brought to bare in making prepotent those behaviors which discover,
produce, and arrange in contingencies that new mix of reinforcers
which changing conditions, i.e., changing requirements for prepot
ency, will require.

Only when this objective has been satisfied

are the planners safe to apply whatever surplus control remains to
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the fulfillment of their "larger purpose.*
This problem of economically maintaining prepotency in a
catallaxy, although not solved, is at least partially addressed by
the concept of 'adjusting schedules' of reinforcement.

These are

schedules -which modify their response requirements or reinforcement
density as a function of some measure of the strength of the imme
diately preceding performance.

In a set of adjusting-schedule ex

periments, Perster and Skinner-* pegged changes in ratio require
ments to the duration of the post—reinforcement pause within the
immediately preceding ratio.

These pauses were interpreted as an

indicator of ratio-performance strain.

Thus for each of three

birds run individually under this procedure the ratio-schedule
setting was said to have been brought under the control of current
levels of deprivation, health, and "general r e a c t i v i t y . D u r i n g
the first 25 seconds of pausing the automatic programming equipment
gradually stepped down the ratio requirement.

The first keypeck

response breaking a pause immediately checked the decline and
raised the requirement five responses.

"With this technique the

researchers were able to let the birds establish their own cus
tomized ratios which maximally maintained responding without long
pauses.

The researchers were thus able to reach the birds' per

formance limits while avoiding the task of specifically attending
to levels of deprivation, aversive stimulation, health, and so on,

*B. F. Skinner, Schedules of Reinforcement, op. cit., pp. 720-1
“ibid.
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or -weighing the effect of distracting contingencies.
Such a shortcut to contingency customizing undoubtedly has
much to recommend it to the behavioristic technocrat, who, discov
ering that he cannot effectively banish the catallaxy, seeks to
consistently outbid it everywhere.
However, the approach has its problems.
A programmed community which would adjust all schedules to in
dividual susceptabilities must be capable of monitoring non—repeti
tious, non-mechanical, or non-localized tasks, as well as tasks
fulfilled by novel or largely covert responses. The data collection
and feedback necessary to cover the tasks of even the most spartan
society is an engineering exercise beyond the scope of any known
combination of machine and bureaucrat.
Even if instrumentation for ubiquitous labor-monitoring were
developed, behavioral problems would remain.
It is an obvious generalization from experimental analysis
that any activity attended by aversive stimulation will decrease in
rate whenever such a decrease has no appreciable effect on the
overall density of other reinforcement.

This is because a decrease

in aversive activity has the same effect, ceteris parabus. as an
increase in positive reinforcement.

When the increased reinforce

ment density of a work slowdown is, according to an adjusting
schedule, met with increased reinforcement per response, then it is
possible for a worker's tradeoff between work and remuneration to
have many solutions.

That is, their work-labor mix may settle any

where along an indifference curve which plots different combina
tions of work and compensation which, to the worker, are of equal
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reinforcement density.
Ferster and Skinner did not observe this effect, which stands
here only as a prediction, because the power of the food reinforce
ment was so great and the aversiveness of the peck was so little.
The birds were food deprived to 80 per cent of their free-feeding
weight.

Keypeck responses were chosen because "they can be easily

executed, and because they can be repeated quickly and over long
periods of time without fatigue."*

Finally, there were no promin

ent competing contingencies mapping to comparable deprivations,
thereby giving the peck an ’opportunity cost.1

Retaining the Monopolistic Approach

Notwithstanding all that has been said so far, monopolistic
analysis does enable us to act more effectively in the real world.
Where we have experimentally discovered that a particular schedule
of reinforcement produces a particular pattern of responding, and
where we see a person operating under such a schedule in the real
world, we may more confidently predict that one pattern will re
semble the other.

Furthermore, if controlled observation has shown

us that a change from one schedule to another produces a distinct
change in patterning, we may, with increased strength, predict that
if the same schedule transition occurs in the real world and the
effect of other variables are known to be negligible, the pattern
ing of the controlled setting will be approximated.

*B. F. Skinner, loc. cit., p. 7
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Since contingency schedules cannot be identified within the
catallaxy, we instead seek to identify independent contingencies,
i.e., to complete a structural account of what each subject is instrumentally capable of doing to all others.

It is the primary as

sumption of catallactic analysis, as an adjunct of monopolistic an
alysis, that if repertoires, motivating variables, genetics, health
and age— all of which we may tie together under the general rubric
of history— are sufficiently similar, then, to the extent that the
independent contingencies are duplicated, catallactic outcomes,
i.e., exchange rates, will be similar.

But the independent con

tingencies of the world cannot be brought into the laboratory.

The

catallaxy or market which controls a resident of say Kalamazoo is
worldwide and its network of independent contingencies is indivis
ible.

There is no segment, say a group, neighborhood, community

or state which can be isolated, functionally analysed and then used
as a predictive model irrespective of the effects of events upon
the larger catallaxy.

The pattern ofschedules of reinforcement is

repeated again and again over the surface of the earth.

There are,

perhaps, trillions of isolatable subsystems in the world maintain
continuous reinforcement, fixed-ratio-two reinforcement, and other
familiar reinforcement schedules.

In contradistinction, the inde

pendent contingencies controlling world economic behavior lock to
gether all economic agents of the catallaxy, without disclosing any
practical subsystems.

Their arrangement is neither uniform nor re

dundant; real-world inaependent-contingency features are hot amen
able to statistical generalization or averaging.

There are as

varied as the geography, as changable as the weather, and as irre—
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ducible as the ecosystems which contribute to them.

Although it is

true that ire may create catallaxies in the laboratory, the products
of these experiments can never stand as reliable simulations of the
exchange systems obtaining in the greater human economy.

Neither

can they yield a 'genetic code1 enabling us to extrapolate the or
ganization of the larger phenomenon.

Indeed, all such experiments

can offer is an inventory of functional relations among independent
contingencies and catallactic relations, general principles afford
ing a better interpretation of our economic environment.
all.

That is

Perhaps that is enough.

The Monkey-Island Catallaxy

In an effort to support the above claims— "which are offered as
useful scientific assumptions and may never be proven— we may re
sort to the challenge posed by an anomalistic conceptual experi
ment.
Suppose

that an experimental community of monkeys has been

rigged in a carefully controlled island environment.

The island

has been landscaped with several artificial trees which yield fruit
by means of servomechanisms operated from a hidden controlroom.
Suppose further that at various points on the island there are
vending machines with levers or slots and which dispense a variety
of food pellets, toys, tokens, and special tools.

The tools are

necessary for picking (or picking faster) the fruits from the bogus
trees.

Next, imagine that each monkey is wearing an electric-shock

punishment belt around its waist.
control—room console.

These too are operated from a

Now let us introduce several strategically

located trading platforms where the fruits, food pellets, toys,
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tokens, tools and other loose items (perhaps of the monkeys1 own
devising) can be placed in either of tiro clear plastic containers
at each end of a shriveling platform and 'exchanged* for -whatever
are the contents of the container at the other end.

Both contain

ers are always in clear view, permitting each user to always see
what the other is offering.

The trading platform will only swivel,

effecting a trade, when both monkeys simultaneously press their
'exchange consent buttons' located at the end stations of the plat
form.

We are freee to assume that all monkeys have previously been

taught (under monopolistic conditions) to use the trading platforms
for exchanging a wide variety of items for a wide variety of rein
forcers and to exchange presumably weak reinforcers for stronger
reinforcers.

(The training of verbal behavior in order to facili

tate haggling— possible at least with chimps— is here optional.)
Next, we give each monkey his own color-coded strongbox or cave
where he may safely place his aquisitions and which no other mon
key may touch without automatically receiving a persuasive jolt
from his punishment belt.

Finally, we must allow that every

square foot of the island is, in the best 1984 tradition, constant
ly trnder the watchful eyes of a number of hidden television monit
ors, enabling the scientists, armed with counters, clocks and clip
boards, to keep track of all monkeys at all times.
In considering this imaginary catallactic experiment we see
that the scientist can control the field of independent contingen
cies, but that as long as the exchange platforms are in operation
without coercion, it is impossible to control (or even identify)
single-subject contingencies for any one type of reinforcer.
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top of the basic environment and its

instrumentation, thescientist

merely l) sets the work requirements

for extracting goods on the

island (e.g. the force and time required to pull fruit from a tree
using a certain tool;

the number of

quired before a machine will deliver

lever presses or tokens re
a tool, toy, tidbit, or to— .

ken), and 2) enforces lavs (i.e. aversive monopolistic contingen
cies) by means of the punishing belts.
In a classical-liberal-commonwealth version of this experi
ment; t! eft, intermonkey coersion and conquest are punished.

(For

experimental ease in differentiating between coersion and trade,
nonpunished transfers of goods may be restricted to the trading
platforms— thereby, incidentally, limiting the extraneous influence
of Ilomans-type informal status-favor-friendship-suthority ex
changes.)

Under this experimental dispensation monkeys will be

able to work with machines or in orchards procuring reinforcers
which they may consume, trade or save.

They may also acquire tools

making it easier (i.e. cheaper; less work) to acquire goods in the
future.

These too may be used, traded or saved.

Yet the scientist is still manipulating variables.

Ee may,

for example, arrange the independent contingencies so that monkey
number six

has five times the work ratio required to produce ap

ples than has monkey number eleven, but only half of the latter’s
requirement in producing toys or bananas or tools.

It would be one

object of such an experiment to determine if such discrepencies af
fect the division of labor and relative exchange rates among all
goods on the island.
Apart form such gross, macro measures as total consumption,
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total production, total savings, i.e., the average contents of the
strongboxes over time, and total investment, i.e., total tool pro
duction over time, we have available to us only two micro measures,
viz., relative exchange rates and the demography of productivity,
i.e., a census of the division of labor.

Even so, empirical ques

tions relative to the operation of this catallaxy may still be an
swered.
What items would be exchanged and in what ratios?

Would one

monkey exchange (or work) for a type of food he does not eat in
order to better deal with another monkey who is controlling some
thing more palatable?
ated, a division

Would a static division of labor be gener

based upon the experimentally induced advantages

of the more effective fruit getters, toy getters and token getters?
Would the token exchange ratios generate semi-fixed price relation
ships among goods- (relationships the consistent application of
which would demonstrate mathematical logic?

Would some monkeys

create new products by assembling novel items from odds and ends
scattered throughout the island?

If tokens were eliminated would

some other commodity come to serve as a universal medium of ex
change?

Could that medium be experimentally inflated?

If so, to

what effect?
One sees that the possibilities for catallactic analysis are
as abundant as they are prohibitively expensive.

(Perhaps this

would-be scientific boondoggle could be conducted profitably as a
one-way-glass private commercial exhibit.)
At any rate, we must recognize that whatever its value, there
is nothing in such an experiment that allows us to predict inter-
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catallactic generality.

We may interpret the workings of the

larger world from the workings of the smaller, but that is all.
We must always remember that in the catallaxy 'out here’ it is
Providence and not Homo sapiens who knows and controls all of the
relevant independent contingencies taken together.

The Division of Labor

According to Adam Smith, "it is the power of exchanging that
gives occasion to the division of labor."

The degree of special

ization that is possible in any line of production is largely de
pendent upon the size of the market, i.e., the prices that partial
controllers are offering for various quantities cf the product to
be delivered at various times in the future.

Frequent and steady

offers to buy over a long period permits the production process to
be profitably broken down to distinctive sets of operations, each
fully occupying a single individual's attention.
the production process has several advantages.

This segment of
It leads to skill,

automaticity, and the elimination of wasted motion as the worker
becomes ever more effectively under the control of a special set of
contingencies.

Short cuts are found and mechanical innovations

are discovered by those experienced in what has to be done and in
how to do it with least effort.

Time and costs are also saved

merely insofar as specialized individuals need not pass from one
stage of assembly to another.

The divisions of labor which to

gether complete the productive process from natural resources to
finished product, make simple operations easily discriminable and
the possibilities for effective automation that much more obvious.
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Finally, the savings made possible by all of the above, i.e., the
accumulation of capital, make further large-scale investment in
equipment and tools both possible and worthwhile.
We may speak of an individual segment of production, a single
division of labor, as a field of partial control.

The individual

■who controls the variables of one stage may effectively haggle with
the controllers of other stages for larger shares of the return
from the finished product.

The more specialized and irreplaceable

the individual, the greater is his (or his union representative's)
control— ignoring, of course, the element of government-sanctioned
coersion, so prevalent in modern labor relations.

Presumably a

natural limit to the partial control of labor is reached where the
■wages demanded become so large in proportion to labor productivity
as to cancel all of the above-mentioned savings from the division
of labor and automation— at which point, for example, it becomes
easier or cheaper to arrange to make one's own car or do without
than buy one off the assembly line.
Anyone who would question the importance of the catallactic
division of labor would do well to contemplate the pencil.

Leo

nard Read^ has discovered that no one on earth knows how to make
one.
"At my office I phoned the president of the largest
pencil company in the world, asking if I might visit his
pencil factory. Ke was very nice and said yes.
I spent

Leonard Read, "The Miricle of the Market," in Champions of
Freedom; the Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series, (Hillsdale: Hillsdale
College Press, 1974) vol. 1
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the whole day at the factory -watching the stuff as it came
on the loading platform: the graphite, the wetting agents,
the lumber, and so on. I watched the extrusion process,
indeed I watched the whole thing. The last hour was spent
with the chemist. What is that? He would tell me, but as
we went down each line of explanation he would finally ad
mit to not knowing."*
Milton Friedman appreciates the significance of Read's
discovery.
". . .Where do you get the wood? Perhaps by cutting down
trees in the Pacific Northwest. How do you cut down some
trees? You have to have some saws to cut them with. Where
do you get the saws? You have to get some steel. Where
do you get the steel? You have to have a steel mill.
In
order to have a steel mill you have to get the iron ore
— and you can add the rest.
"What happens when I go down to the store and I put
down a quarter and get two of these pencils? I am trading
with thousands of people all over the world, people in
Washington State who are cutting down trees, people in
South America, people over in Malaysia— I'm making a deal
with them. . .
"Now how is this brought about? Is there a commissar
sitting in some central office who is sending out orders
to these people in Malaysia, to these people in South
America, to the people in Washington? How is it that they
are led to cooperate with one another? That's the miracle
of the price system because— note— of these thousands of
people who have been led to engage in this simple trans
action with me, not one of them has been forced to do it.
"Nobody has had a gun to his head.
They've all done
it. Why? Because each one of them thinks he's better off
in this transaction, and somehow or other I've done it be
cause I think I'm better off. Everybody is benefited.
There has been no central direction.
These people who
have cooperated with one another don't speak the same
language; they are people of all different religions.
They may hate one another in every respect, but this has

*loc. cit., p. 62
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not prevented some kind of wonderful machinery from
bringing these various components together into this
little pencil."*

The problem of superseding the catallaxy

A full and current inventory of l) an individual's behavioral
repertoire and 2) the environment-specific response-probability
hierarchies according to -which different parts of his repertoire
are emitted, together describe both his knowledge of the world and
his appreciation of the world's instrumental values and means.
Reasoning from this assumption about the behavioral nature of man,
one is forced to conclude that a coercion-free positive-reinforcement community cannot be monopolistically managed without, for
every stage of the coordinating plan, first anticipating and then
incorporating or eliminating all avenues by which subjects may em
ploy available means to secure reinforcing consequences.

The plan

must comprehensively provide for matching, bettering, or obstruct
ing the apportionment dealt by the catallaxy or by stray monopol
istic contingencies when these control behavior detrimental to the
plan.
Ideally, in a monopolistically ordered commonwealth, selected
planners place themselves under the control of manipulation-and—
feedback contingencies which generate behavior controlling and
monitoring all of the society's productive activities.

Specific

^Milton Friedman, "'What is America?," The Saturday Evening
Post, October, 1978, p. 104
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manipulations are differentially reinforced as they, to a greater or
lesser extent, direct the labor force to satisfy contingencies
yielding evidence to the planners of their continued ability to
maintain precise control and feedback.

Put more succinctly, changes

in the prospects for continued control are what shape and reshape
control practices.
Of special importance in such monopolistic economies is the
fact that the laborers are not directly reinforced by the productive
consequences of their labor.

They are prevented from selling or

freely consuming what their behavior has engendered.

Instead, these

natural consequences of their productive activity are diverted by
the planners for the arrangement of contingencies elsewhere and are
replaced for the laborer with a different set of programmed conse
quences deemed just sufficient by the planners to get the job done.
Only the planners measure the product of the laborer's exertions and
adjust contingencies of reinforcement accordingly.

Without the

ability to trade and, therefore, lacking the relative— scarcity-sig
nalling prices generated in the catallaxy, the laborer is both un
able and unfit to ascertain whether the product he produces is in
demand or whether it provides for what, from the planners' reference
frame, is 'of need.'

In this respect the laborer is not unlike the

behavior-experiment pigeon that receives grain after pecking a key,
but is unaffected by whether or not the keypeck itself has import
ance to others.

We may contrast this situation with that of the

partial controller whose only motive for production is the indica
tion that what he produces can reinforce others who supply him with
goods and services.
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The above comparative reference to the pigeon, although accu
rate, is too readily misunderstood.

Historically, the controversy

surrounding Skinner's technocratic socialism has concerned the sci
entists' ability to sufficiently specify the operational differences
between men and pigeons or between ’angels* and apes vith respect to
contingency control.

Enormously less has been vritten about the

problems faced in specifying or predicting the correspondence be
tween the laboratory chamber and the world, i.e., between the sever
al hundred synthetic contingencies arranged in operant-behavior ex
periments on the one hand, and the independent contingencies gener
ated within the natural environment and the resulting catallacticcontingency relations on the other.

Perhaps this lopsidedness in

the emphasis of critical analysis is but a measure of market-inter—
ventionist predilictions shared by both sides of the man-animal and
mind-body questions.

In any case, the reader must bear in mind that

these traditional questions, however they are resolved, are entirely
seperate from the present subject which is the problem of operation
ally defining, predicting, and controlling the contingencies of the
economic environment.

The 'given * environment

In spite of all those who would deny it, the fact is that even
if the psychologistic state could take account of each subject's
l) inherited reinforcement susceptabilities, 2) inherited behaviors
and the events which release them, 3) present levels of conditioned—
reinforcer effectiveness, and 4) learned ways of attaining both con
ditioned and unconditioned reinforcement, there would still be left
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the basic economic problem faced by all cultures, the problem lrhich
the authors of Walden Tiro, Small is Beautiful, and Capital and their
epigones hare passed by in silence, viz., the problem of taking into
account the changing 'given' environment in which the subjects of
the collectivist state, like the partial controllers of the catal
laxy move and are reinforced.
To ignore this basic environment (which in an exchange society
constitutes the set of all independent contingencies) is to invite
cultural extinction.

The continuation of any economic system's ca

pacity to reinforce its members depends upon learning and making ad
equate use of facts about what resources (contingencies) can be
aquired (satisfied), how, where, when, and— very important— at what
relative costs ( a behavioral quantity, expressible only as an ex
change rate between performances under different contingencies). On
ly with these facts is it possible to determine which means are most
economically (reinforcingly) employed in attaining given ends.

This

point is obscured, but not cancelled, when we recognize that the
targetted end for monopolistic-community planners is always the con
tinued prepotency of planned behavior; that the ends and means of
the total state are indistinguishable.
The shape of these survival-serving facts follows the dynamic
contours of the basic environment, various parts of which are the
respective provinces of geography, oceanography, meteorology, ecology, demography, technology, physical anthropology, and the history
of economic structural organization, but by far the greatest part of
which can only be characterized as the accidental and transitory
conditions obtaining at unique locations.
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F. A. Hayek has been one of a few social theorists who have not
underestimated the importance of people's behavioral adjustments to
the turbulent particulars of the independent-contingency environment
in their extracting from the world (either under a system of catal
lactic relations or centralized planning) a reinforcing way of life.
"The economic problem of society is thus not merely a
problem of how to allocate 'given* resources. . . It is
rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources
known to any members of society, for ends whose relative
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it
briefly, it is a problem of utilization of knowledge not
given to anyone in its totality."*
"Today it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific
knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge. But a little
reflection will show that there is beyond question a body
of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot
possibly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge
of general rules: the knowledge of the particular circum
stances of time and place.
It is with respect to this
that proactically every individual has some advantage over
all others, in that he possesses unique information of
which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can
be made only if the decisions depending upon it are left
to him or are made with his active cooperation. We need
to remember only how much we have to learn in any occu
pation after we have completed our theoretical training,
how big a part of our working life we spend learning par
ticular jobs and how valuable an asset in all walks of
life is knowledge of people, of local conditions and spe
cial circumstances. To know of and put to use a machine
not fully employed, or somebody's skill which could be
better utilized, or be aware of a surplus stock which can
be drawn upon during an interruption of supplies is so
cially quite as useful as the knowledge of better alter
native techniques. And the shipper who earns his living
from using otherwise empty or half-filled journeys of
tramp steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge

F. A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," in The Invis
ible Hand: Essays in Classical Economics, ed. Adrian Klassen
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965) p. 122
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is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or
the arbitrageur -who gains from local differences of com
modity prices are all performing eminently useful func
tions based on special knowledge of circumstances of the
fleeting moment not known to others."*
Hayek is writing about divers sets of contingencies with which
O

individuals are in unique contact.

In the catallaxy these are the

shifting independent contingencies providing individuals with par
tial control.

In the monopolistic collective these are the shift

ing contingencies of the environment (e.g. the present potential
for producing sugar) from which monopolistic controllers, employ
ing their subjects (e.g. growers of sugar cane), extract their con
tinuing means of subject reinforcement (e.g. the disposition of the
supply of sugar), while at the same time preventing the producing
subjects from diverting their products to contingencies of their
individual devising, viz., direct private consumption or exchange
— a loss of government control requiring increasingly elaborate de
tection methods and punishment contingencies.
Revolutionary edicts abolishing the catallaxy do not revoke
natural contingencies (e.g. those contingencies which yield sugar
cane to those who plant stem cuttings in the right way and under
the right tropical conditions).

Nor does issuing social directives

*loc. cit., p. 124
P

Environmental contact is unique for each individual as it is
for the three allegorical blind men who each touch one part of an
elephant. Each comes to know the elephant (or the contingencies
maintained by the elephant) differently. Although we know the same
world, none of us knows the world the same.
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halt the changing conditions of resources and transportation -which
make one method of production (e.g. the lime-centrifuge method in
the manufacture of cane sugar) cheaper than a rival process at one
time but more costly at some other time.

Laws of physics, no mat

ter how reactionary from the standpoint of someone’s social theory,
are beyond repeal.

Certain formulae and designs will always remain

superior to others in attaining specific ends under particular con
ditions.

Machines and tools may still operate according to the

wishes of the state planners, but only as long as there are still
materials for building and fixing, and operators who have the skill
and motivational history to use and maintain them.

Finally, con

course among individuals differentiated by specialized means will
still be a necessary feature of any society seeking the benefits
obtainable only through an intricate division of labor.
this last inevitability that these comes

It is with

the 'threat' of opportun

ities for unplanned mutually reinforcing exchanges among subjects.
The state which seeks to gain true experimental control of a
culture must not only eradicate the open market; it must also avoid
the bureaucratic system of monitoring and managing an extensive
division of labor, since such a system affords too many occasions
for clandestine partial control.

Monopolistic control requires

that the state isolate each of its subjects from all unplanned con
tingencies of reinforcement.

Such contingencies are sources of

partial control which orient individuals away from the planned dir
ection of the behavior engineers.

Partial control always works to

supersede the would-be comprehensive plan and to 'corrupt* (through
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bribery) the planners and their agents.
Successful isolation requires what only a few of the most
ruthless totalitarian regimes in history have attempted, viz., a
coercion-encased cloistered society based on minimum-subsistence
agriculture and a curtailed division of labor rarely extending be
yond small villare-farm compounds; self-denial, abstinence, chast
ity (for the beauty, charm and sexual stimuli of women also afford
varying degrees of partial control), political training in selfcriticism, and a learned passive acceptance of inevitable punish
ment.

Under such 'pure Maoist'

(Cambodian-type* or 'ecologically

balanced') regimes, those who divert their time and effort from the
planned daily -work quota in order to privately fashion reinforcers
for consumption or exchange, will fail to receive their -work-con
tingent subsistence-maintaining ration for the day and will there
fore be to weak (providing, of course, that the schedules are
properly fine-tuned) to continue their transgressions— should these
'economic crimes' have been overlooked by the coersive agents).
Such a society is truly non-capitalist in that it proscribes the
savings accumulation that would permit new productive ventures or
even leisure.

Effective experimental control and human equality

— the equality of the lowest sustainable level— are its only real
izable goals.
Apart form the present government of Cambodia, and increasing
ly less so, Red China, and increasingly more so, communist control

*Since this was written, the infamous Pol Pot regime of
French-university Maoism has been militarily displaced by a Sovietbacked bureaucracy-and-black-market system*
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led Vietnam, no country has relentlessly pursued the ideals of
economic planning and equality to their necessary economic conclu
sion.

In the intellectual communities of the Free World only a

small number of pure Maoists and radical environmentalists openly
advocate so extreme a renunciation of the productive contingencies
■which the world makes available and which over the centuries men
have discovered.

This is not to say that there are not great phal

anxes holding views which, if put into practice, would eventually
lead to the same Draconian measures.

Many, including our radical

political behaviorists, advocate action which has these consequen
ces, but in their case it is a profound ignorance of the fundamen
tal contributions of market economics and its relationship to rein
forcement psychology, rather than any sinister motives, which has
kept them from apprehending the difference between that which is
sought and that which is obtained.
The faith of socialism has always been that its bureaucracies
can discover all of the information which would figure in the ex
change outcome of interacting partial controllers, i.e., that it
could process these facts and incorporate them into a noncatallactic-control plan which would achieve similar results, while at the
same time modifying this pseudo-market solution to meet such other
goals as fairness (whatever that is), equality, birth control, edu
cation (whatever that is), safety (whatever that is), health (what
ever that is), as well as generally halting human activity where it
may interfere with the propagation of less-successful life forms.
Obviously, without these grafted objectives it would be the height
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of folly to divert a vast array of bureaucrats from society's poten
tial productive -workforce merely to attempt to accomplish by state
direction what the catallaxy -would have accomplished automatically.
It is a conclusion of nonstatistical market economics that the
problem of the dirigible economy is not simply the intelligent al
location of resources.

We can do nothing but accept the point made

by Hayek and others that even in this dawning computer age there
can be no book of data -which projects the specifications of the
■world's independent contingencies for any future time t.

The cat

allaxy is a means of learning, a means of adjusting all of soci
ety's members to changing environmental conditions.

It attaches a

discriminative number or price to each man-serving item in the
world.

This number indicate the reinforcing power which an item

exerts with respect to everyone's current tastes and current know
ledge and expectations of relative scarcities.

(Note: Naturally,

when the medium of exchange is a politically determined supply of
government fiduciary paper— rather than a convenient buy scarce
commodity such as gold— this coordination becomes distorted.)
There is no centralized data collection, computation, estimation,
interpretation, or error involved.

The fact that some individuals

send contradictory messages or work at cross purposes in no way in
terferes with its workings.

For a socialist commonwealth to suc

ceed it must be able to assume this important function.

Its de

signers must find ways of discovering each individual's uniquely
conditioned behavior repertoire as it is constantly adjusting to
heterogeneously distributed resources.

Only when this is done can

the controlling agents reasonably hope to employ systems analysis,
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linear programming, and other tools of operations analysis to plan
the arrangement of contingencies -which move individuals away from
their catallactically determined course and towards their pre
scribed objectives.

But even then, care must be taken that their

superimposed contingencies do not destroy the special time-place
behavioral adaptations of individuals.
follow an infinity of maladjustments.

If this happens there will
Stores will stock items

which no longer■reinforce'the people who produce them and they will
not stock enough of those things people have since come to seek.
Expensive processes will continue to be used in production long
after cheaper processes are discovered.

Railroads will be sent to

ghost-towns, spaceships will be sent to a sterile moon, and so on
and on.

To summarize, no planned society can survive without pro

viding for maintenance of the means of utilizing such information
as is supplied by catallactic prices, prices which, at present, are
our only source of knowledge about the relative importance of all
of the ever-nev specifics of a turbulent world.

Socialist theory

Those familiar with the Marxian "materialist conception of
history" may have already paired several of its elements with homo
logous elements of the present analytical system.

The independent

contingencies of a culture are its productive forces (or its means
or mode of production).

The catallactic relations they control are

the social relations of production (or production relations, or,
from Marx's earlier writings, the forms of intercourse).

The en

dogenous arrangement of man-made independent contingencies (i.e.
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Ill
the practice of private property and other aversive-control prac
tices related to man's ability to be reinforced through coercion of
others) adds a conditioned and conditioning superstructure to the
catallaxy.
The means of production according to Marx include nature and
the capital equipment made available by the application of techno
logy by skilled individual's, i.e., the machines, tools, factories,
roads, vehicles, formulas, charts, tables, mathematical techniques,
engineering principles, etc.— in short, all of the stations and
manipulanda of the current divisions of labor and all of the pro
ductive repertoires of the various members of society.

As -we have

conceptually demonstrated vith the imaginary monkey-island experi
ment, above, the 'means of production1 control, through operant
conditioning, all of the productive relations (catallactic rela
tions) of the society (e.g. -what each monkey produces and exchanges
with each other monkey).

They also control a society's politics,

lavs, education, and other (superstructure) practices— practices,
incidentally, -which did not obtain on the monkey island because the
shock-belt contingencies arranged monopolistically by the hidden
scientists took 'the lair' out of the monkeys' hands thereby making
the otherwise lov--probability exchanges prepotent over the 'rule of
forced'
The Marxian notion of production relations covers the produc
ing, exchanging, and distributing of goods and services.

This in

cludes the -way in -which labor is recruited, organized, and compen
sated, and the -way in which resources, production techniques and
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capital are distributed among alternative ends -which can be brought
to fruition at alternative times.

But there is more to production

relations, i.e., more to catallactic relations, than that.

In a

world in which the catallaxy is imperfectly known, the targeting of
means to achieve specific ends at specific times inevitably entails
risk.

In the language of reinforcement psychology, defective stim

ulus control generally leads to increased intermittency of rein
forcement.

As the motivations of a culture's partial controllers

are modified through satiation, deprivation, new conditioning, or
the completion of sequential segments of behavior chains, the oper
ation of the catallaxy needs to be changed accordingly, i.e.,
people will be more powerfully reinforced with appropriate adjust
ments.

In like manner, partial controllers will better increase

the density of reinforcement within their society if they can ad
just their practices to new technological possibilities and re
source availabilities.

It is the entrepreneur, whose behaviors are

selected by profit and loss, who acts to adjust production rela
tions to a changing world.

He adjusts inventories, combines fac

tors of production into new products, discontinues certain lines,
withholds goods until later times, transfers goods from place to
place, switches to different ingredients, and otherwise differen
tiates his products— all in accordance with his forecasts of dis
crepancies in the prices offered between one location and another,
between one period and another, or between one possible synthesis
of existing materials and another.

These forecasts are controlled

by the discriminative stimuli of the entrepreneur's historically
unique location within the concatenation of real-world events,
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i.e., by what he has learned to interpret as his reliable 'market
indicators.'

He may be right in his forcasts.

If so, profits

■will accrue to him -which -will both reinforce his entrepreneurs 1
technique and enable him to be right the next time in a bigger way.
He may be wrong.

If wrong, he suffers losses which both punish his

methods and insure that he will have less to be wrong with next
time.

Marx completely missed this 'social—Darwinist* aspect of the

catallaxy.
It is difficult to find fault with Marx's assertion that soci
ety's superstructural practices are distinct from its production
relations and that the superstructure comprises almost every nonexchange control technique employed by the members of society.
This category of control encompasses society's customs, folkways,
family organization, governmental and legal institutions, formal
education, literature and art (i.e. the way the book, theatrical
performance or painting controls one, apart from one's buying or
selling it) and mass media communications (when these are not de
signed exclusively to cater to partial-controller demand.)

Whether

the superstructure, as a set of practices, aims at protecting the
individual and his property from coercion, or promoting a welfarestate redistribution of production, or glorifying church or state,
or enhancing the power and ease of the superstructure's agents, its
relationship to the catallaxy is always parasitic (and only in the
first instance symbiotic).
Marx, it is not often realized, understood the impossibility
of explaining historical evolution of society's means of produc
tion, its production relations, and its superstructure through any
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analysis detailing the world-system of economically relevant mutu
ally determining variables to which the patterns of such an evolu
tion must be related.

Like Kant before him, and Spencer during his

lifetime, and Hayek after him, he knew that any predictive compre
hension of this all-embracing totality was beyond the means of
either natural science or economics, and much of his -writing was
directed against those who thought otherwise.
Acceptance of this position posed great difficulties for the
young Marx, for he had also accepted Ricardo’s (special— case) con
clusion that wages tend towards the bare-subsistence level, and
brought that same economist's (fallacious) concept of the labor
theory of value to its logical conclusion, viz., that those who
sell only tfeir labor must be exploited by those who gain through
their control of capital or land or who profit from their entre—
preneural behavior.

As the self-proclaimed intellectual champion

and revolutionary organizer of the working class, Marx was stopped
cold insofar as he was unable to find fault

with the premises,

logic, and major conclusions of the classical economists, conclu
sions which left room for no course other than
ventionist policies.

liberal non-inter

To restore hope to the working man in the

face of the dismal Maithusian-Ricardian long-run wage analysis,
Marx had to develop a new method and a new science which would com
pletely transcend the logic of the science of functional relations.
Towards this end, he placed his writing under the control of
the two dominant (and incompatible) philosophies of his current in
tellectual environment, viz., the idealism of Georg Hegel and the
materialism of Ludwig von Feurerbach.
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In the system of Hegelian philosophy, reality is a spiritual
process that is completely rational, a World-Min -which realizes it
self through the workings of its own logic.

Our human logic, Hegel

avers, is therefore our only approach to understanding reality.
What is self-consistent is rational and what is rational is real;
all human knowledge is indirectly and incompletely knowledge of the
absolute World-Mind.

Hegel's technique for comprehending absolute

reality is the logical method which proceeds from an initial thesis
or statement to a contradiction of that statement, and then to a
new statement which resolves the contradiction and carrys the sense
of the correct features of both of the former statements.

This new

statement is then followed by a new contradiction, and then by an
escape to a new synthesis, and so on.

History, as the working out

of the logic of the World-Mind, can only be known through applica
tion of this same dialectic.

Historical events move in the same

way Socrates rationally constructed the ideal polis in the dia
logue of The Republic, viz., by continually generating, from his
discussants, statements which contradicted their previous state
ments yet were deduced from them, contradictions which the students
would then attempt to reconcile with a new statement, whereupon
Socrates would again point up new contradictory implications, until
a point was finally reached where no new contradictions were forth
coming and the 'perfect state' had been described.

According to

Hegel the state is the worldly organization which most closely ap
proaches absolute reality.

History, as he interpreted it, moves

from pure being (which he identified with contemporary China),
through war and class conflict, to the absolute idea (interpreted
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variously as either the Prussian State or some future stage in the
evolution of the Americas), i.e., the final idea which thinks it
self.
Such an analysis, based simply on repeated contradictions of
no more than tiro elements at a time (rather than trillions of si
multaneous equations) presented Marx with just the escape from em
pirical-world complexity -which he was seeking.

Yet, the concept of

the World-Mind ran counter to the doctrine of materialism which was
supported by a powerful segment of the European intellectual com
munity.

So, like Glaucon, when confronted by Socrates with a con

tradiction, Marx attempted a reconciliation.
The result was dialectical materialism.

In this system the

realm of the absolute is the physical universe which nonetheless
operates according to the same process of contradiction and resolu
tion which Hegel attributed to human thought and the World-Mind.
Mind Marx reinterpreted as a manifestation of physiochemical
changes in the nervous system, changes conditioned by the objective
conditions obtaining at a stage of history.

In Marx's new under

standing of history, the paramount importance given by Hegel to
class conflict in the development of society, and the progressive
resolution of such struggles through the dialectical process, is
retained.
Thus, Marx created a new analytical apparatus with easily dis
criminated elements, e.g., social classes, which transform them
selves according to an incredibly simple process of development,
i.e., negation and resolution.

With this analytical tool he be

lieved that he could sidestep the impossible task of accounting for
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all of the relevant variables of the means of production (i.e. the
material productive forces of history; the -world changing indepen
dent contingencies) and all of the variables of the production re
lations and superstucture.

The specific phenomena of geography,

•weather, ecology, and physical and cultural anthropology could now
be sufficiently treated as one broad tendency, viz., the progress
of the means of production.

Successive bipolar class struggles

come about as the means of production progress.

The production

relations and superstructure appropriate to a world of handmills
contradict (aversively impede) the conditioning control of a new
world of steam mills.

The negation (overthrow) of the older pro

duction relations and superstructure then make easier further de
velopment of the means of production.

The two classes of any stage

of history (except the last, escatological communism) are identi
fied with the production relations and superstructure respectively.
To define these classes, i.e., to determine who was exploiting
whom, Marx simply adopted two of the three catagories of the class
ical theory of production, viz., labor and capital, and embellished
them with concepts borrowed from the earlier French Utopian social
ists, e.g., the decadent and philistine bourgeois and the noble
proletarian.
Marx was no doubt sincere in his belief that dialectical ma
terialism allowed those who understood it to readily discriminate
the side of progress from the side of reaction simply by ascertain
ing who is exploiting whom.

For Marx, the 'irrefutable* labor

theory of value supplied the answer to that question.

The

revolu

tionary course of those who sought to alleviate the misery of the
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downtrodden was therefore determined.

All of the misery of soci

ety, e.g., poverty, class distinction, racism, sexual frustration,
alienation exist simply because capitalism has not yet been nega
ted.

(The whole so-called contribution of "Marxist Psychology" is

little more than a variation of this theme.)

In fact, it is not an

oversimplification to say that the communism which Marx expected
was to be nothing more profound than the 'negation' of everything
and everybody that ever bothered him or left him depressed.
The kind of logic which proves that there will be good simply
because there now exists evil has its intrinsic appeal.
cess as measured by number of converts cannot be denied.

Its suc
Fewer

and fewer people are still able to see that Marxism's revelation,
viz., that an inherent 'logic* of the productive forces propels
society 'forward* via class struggle, is no more than an improper
generalization from a discredited metaphysical account of how the
mind operates which has been applied, along with obsolete wage and
value theories, to the problem of predicting and intelligently in
fluencing the course of the catallaxy.
Max Eastman has interprets the materialist conception of his
tory to be simply bad psychology:
"Dialectical Material ism declares that the world is
essentially material, and that mind evolved out of mat
ter in connection with the complex organization of the
nervous system in animals and men. But it does not, and
dare not, go on to say that the motions of this mind are
a continuation of the motion of matter in that central
nervous system, adaptive motions, to be studied primarily
from the standpoint of biology and physiology rather than
logic. For, studied from this standpoint and in their
actuality as concrete cases, these motions will be found
to be not essentially logical— much less 'dialectic'— and
the whole mystic-intellectual legend of Hegel will fall
to the ground altogether. As Hegel himself said, "To see
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that thought in its very nature is dialectical is a lesson
of logic.1 And the moment logic is cast down from its
position as a factual account of what thought in its 'in
ner essence' really is, and is recognized to be a set of
rules "which men have made for the better employment of
their thoughts, that moment this 'lesson of logic' will
lose its validity.
"It will loose its validity because it never had any.
But it vill lose the possibility of obscuring and confus
ing the boldest political minds of five generations of
mankind -with an unintelligible mixture of emotional mys
ticism and psychological half-truth. . . A dialectical
philosophy of the universe, "whether materialistic or
idealistic, stands or falls -with Hegel's fundamental
science of the mind.
It stands or falls -with the be
lief that 'the principle and very unadulterated self
of the mind' is to be found, not by examining its simple
beginnings, but by winding oneself all up in its most com
plicated and hypercultivated manifestations, where it has
become an end in itself, and where its end is 'to reach
and get hold of itself and to liberate itself to itself,'
whatever in honest fact that may mean, Marx's philosophy
of Dialectical Materialism is inextricably bound up with
this old-fashioned way of studying the mind."*
■What then explains change in society?
In previous sections we saw that human behavior can control
the independent contingencies of which it is a function.

Canals

can be built, clouds can be seeded, new machines employing new
technology can be made, and atomic powerplants can be voted illegal
and torn down.

The history of the means of production is the story

of natural and artificial reprogramming of the independent contin
gencies.
Perhaps the most important kind of independent-contingency re
programming are the changes which used to, unequivocally, be called

*Max Eastman, Marxism: Is It Science? (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 194l) pp. 251-2
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progress.

Marx, never imagining the productivity-eroding effects

of collectivism and etatism in the twentieth century, identified
progress with inevitable historical development.

The means of pro

duction, he supposed, develop according to a general law which
"acts as the prevailing tendency only in a very complicated and ap
proximate manner, as a never—ascertainable average of ceaseless
fluctuations.
Interpreting the causes of advances in the 'level of progress'
is easier than surveying them or measuring their impact during giv
en periods.

The means of production are reprogrammed when an in

dividual operating in the catallaxy predicts the high would-be
value of an as-yet nonexistent factor of production, and then un
der the control of his prediction proceeds to manipulate variables
in ways that make the appearance of a successful design more prob
able.

The entrepreneurs then select from the designs proffered

those which each predicts (never with certainty) will work and will
most economically control partial controllers in exchange episodes.
The behavior of Bell, Edison, and Ford are florescent examples of
such market-sponsored creativity.

Without the relative exchange

rates and money prices of the catallaxy, and with prices adminis
tered through centralized rational planning, it would have been im
possible for such potential innovators to discriminate whether one
productive factor or process would be more or less economical than

*Karl Marx. Capital vol. 3 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publish
ing House, 1959) p. 159
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another.

Knowing the existing quantity of a factor, its current

allocation, and its uses tells the individual nothing of its true
economic scarcity, i.e., its relative importance as reinforcement
for any individual, its value to others, or its power as a partialcontrol variable.
Catallactic relations are not the only source of human repro
gramming of the means of production.

The operation of the coercive

superstructure can also alter the independent-contingency environ
ment either through l) governmental aversive control, as -when law
makers set impact-resistance standards, gas mileage standards, and
exhaust-emission standards for cars, standards which can only be
achieved at the expense of other reinforcing automobile character
istics (e.g. price, power, capacity to hold a family, or run on
cheaper gas, etc.), or 2) social aversive control, as when anti
capitalist environmentalists threaten to sabotage a nuclear powerplant which they oppose because such plants are *too easily sabo
taged. 1

In either case, the objectives of the coercive agents are

achieved at the expense of production as it would have been shaped
by the unhampered market’s contingencies of cost, producer ability,
and partial-controller selection.

Steward’s non—dialectical theory of the irrigation cultures

It is not difficult to draw evidence from modern historical
and archaeological research contradicting the Marxian thesis that,
in their ’broadest tendencies,’ independent (productive) contingen
cies, catallactic relations, and cultural superstructure follow
dialectical patterns.
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Modern cultural theorists trace many separate lines of cultur
al evolution from, for example, scattered kinship groups to multi
community states.

Steward* identifies the practicability of irri

gation farming as the major independent-contingency feature con
trolling one such line which has been discovered to have been re
peated many times over long intervals in the prehistory and early
history of China, Mesopotamia, Egypt, the north coast of Peru,
probably the Indus Vially, and possibly the Vally of Mexico.
According to Steward, the evolution of irrigation cultures is
marked by three distinct stages.

In the first, primitive groups

gradually came under the control of agricultural contingencies
maintained along damp riverbanks or in higher terrain where rain
fall can sustain crops.

These natural contingencies were not

bountiful enough to permit much activity beyond the struggle for
food.

The complete division of labor could be encompassed within a

single kinship group.
pations.

Planting and gathering were the major occu

Villages were small; large concentrations of people could

not be sustained (and, without individual specialization, yielded
no advantage.)

The second stage began with l) the discovery that

river waters can be diverted by means of canals to irrigate large
tracts of land, and 2) the learned capacity of some individuals to
invest time and aversive effort for remote rewards.

This new con

trol by independent contingencies permitted the production of food

1

Julian H. Steward, in Evolution and Ecology: Essays on Social
Transformation, ed. Jane C. Steward and Robert F. Murphy: "Culural
Evolution," (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977) pp. 58-67
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in larger quantities, so much so in fact, that food deprivation and
and food contingencies ceased being the only important behavioral
variables.

"Irrigation farming made possible a large population

and freed the farmers from the need to spend all of their time on
basic food production."^
ed. 1

The independent contingencies had 'evolv

The catallaxy accelerated its continual redivision of labor,

i.e., the staking of new areas of specialization by partial con
trollers, thereby permitting even more varied and complex catallac
tic relations and further elaborations of the independent-contingency basis.

In Steward's words! "This period brought the inven

tion of the loom, weaving, metallurgy, the wheel, mathematics, the
ca-jendar, writing, monumental and religious architecture, and ex-

trmemly fine art products."

o

With specialization in the various phases of canal building
and the expansion of water networks to serve many separate communities, " a coordinating and managerial control became necessary."

3

Thus, was admitted the legitimate use of organized coercion, viz.,
eminent domain, taxation, and the conscription of labor for the
support of public works.
way.

Transition to a third stage was under

Now canal construction could be carried on with the labor and

taxes of people from neighborhoods which did not directly benefit
from a particular project.

In general, the legitimacy of discre

tionary aversive control allowed that the partial control of an in-

*ibid.
^ibid.
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dividual could be sequestered by the state to promote the elabora
tion of independent contingencies which would in no way enhance
that individual's partial control in return.
As use of these confiscated means began to be switched from
public vorks to the power and glorification of the state, i.e., of
the bureaucrats and soldiers, these cultures entered what Steward
discriminates to be a third stage.
partial controllers evaporated.

The profits and means of the

Production levels receded.

The

official coercive superstructure, in order to maintain their accus
tomed density of reinforcement, were forced to seek elsewhere.
". . .they began to raid and conquer their neighbors to
exact tribute. The states grew into empires.
The em
pire not only grew larger than the state but differed
qualitatively in the ways it regimented and controlled
its large and diversified population. Laws were codi
fied; a bureaucracy was devoloped; a powerful military
establishment, rather than the priesthood was made the
basis of authority. The militaristic empires began with
the Sumerian Dynasty in Mesopotamia, the pyramid-building
Early Dynasty in Egypt, the Chou periods in China, the
Toltec and Aztec periods in Mexico, and the Tiahuan per
iod in the Andes.
Since the wealth of these empires was based on
forced tribute rather than on increased production, they
contained the seeds of their own undoing. Excessive
taxation, regimentation of civil life, and imposition
of the imperial religious cult over local ones lad the
subject peoples eventually to rebel. The great empires
were destroyed; the irrigation works were neglected;
production declined; the population decreased. A
'dark age* ensued. But in each center the process of
empire building began anew, and the cycle was repeated.
Cyclical conquests succeeded one another in Mesopotam
ia, Egypt, and China for nearly 2000 years. Peru had
gone through at least two cycles and was at the peak of
the Inca Empire when the Spaniards came. Mexico also
probably had experienced two cycles prior to the Span
ish Conquest."*

*ibid.
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We see, then, an account of cultural histories -which is
neither dialectical, nor tending towards an escatalogical climax,
nor based on the 'contradictions' between the means of production
and the production relations.

The cycles of the irrigation civil

izations further suggest that progress is not inevitable, as Marx
and others of his century believed.

We have no more basis for

predicting that our moon— shooting empire trill end in eternal com
munism than we have for predicting that our decendents trill experi
ence cyclical declines and catallactic regenerations.
One may fondly hope, hotrever, that the disciplines of psych
ology and economics may yet jointly yield to us powerful advantages
trhich the vanished empires never had.

Varieties of cultural control

We discriminate only three methods of ordering human affairs:
l) the catallaxy with its division of labor, associated with 19-th
century (non— interventionist) liberalism; 2) bureaucracy, the at
tempt to administer the division of labor without the catallaxy,
associated with the Soviet Union, in particular, and with the 20thcentury state in general; and 3) Maoism (also called 'small is
beautiful* and 'negative-growth economics') which attempts to
eliminate both (l), which Maoists call 'economism,1 and (2) which
they call 'officialism,' tlereby causing a breakdown of specializ
ation from the catallactic division of labor to a 'medium-technology' society comprised of *jacks-of—all-trades and masters-ofn o n e ', associated with China's former Maoist regimes and presentday Cambodia under Pol Pot.
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The West

This thesis is meant to introduce to reinforcement psycholo
gists the long-forgotten first alternative, viz., the concept of
the catallaxy as a behaviorally based process which unintentionally
and impersonally distributes and coordinates planning among all
partial controllers so that each individual’s private budget— con
trolled plan is brought in line with everyone else's and with the
protean independent contingencies of the non-behavioral environ
ment.

A coercion-arresting but otherwise noninterventionist gov

ernment cannot be found in the world today; even the soi-disant
liberal free-market countires (e.g. Switzerland, West Germany, the
United States, and the Republic of China) are unstable mixtures
wherein a much-restricted and regulated market ('the private sect
or') is charged with production, and an unlimited political-demo
cratic coercive agency ('the public sector') is charged with fair,’
equal, and healthful distribution of that product.

In short, these

governments not only pursue the practice of creating the legal en
vironment in which catallactic relations can take place, but they
also engage in the incompatible practice of interfering with those
relations by orders and prohibitions (backed by networks of armed
agents and prisons) which divert economic production from those
channels which reflect the knowledge and priority plans of the in
dividual partial controllers.
Since no one knows all that the catallaxy 'knows', such sys
tems are unstable.

Each intervention has unforeseen consequences.

Some of these consequences are aversive.

Most will call forth ad
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justments by individual partial controllers, adjustments which the
interventionists were unable to predict and -which frustrate the
original aims of their interventions.

The unforeseen -will invite

further, compensatory, interventions -which, themselves, create
still newer problems.

The interventionists, applying a consistent

monopolistic approach, must expand the sphere of government to cov
er this multiplication of effects.

This process can only end ei

ther in achievement of a total soviet-like state or, before that
can happen, in some degree of economic collapse and popular retreat
from activist economic policy.

The soviet system

Bureaucratic government is an externally imposed 'nervous sys
tem' designed to substitute for the state-protected system of ca
tallactic relations, i.e., the partial-controller market-price sys
tem.

Bureaucracy is state economic planning.

Its general method

is to send all information to a single authority or planning agency
for integration and use in a giant discriminative-stimuli complex
-which then controls cost-benefit analysis, planning, and adminis
tration.

The bureaucratic system of the Soviet Union, seeking both

the productivity growth associated with the West and monopolistic
control of 'its citizens', has adopted a series of five-year plans,
each a massive tangle of regulations backed in many cases by speedy
use of the death penalty for 'economic crimes.'

In theory, the

task they have set for themselves involves all of the problems facthe economic-model builder discussed in Part Two of this thesis.
In practice, the consequences have followed the same pattern as in
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all socialist countries, viz., inefficiency, a lov density of pro
duction of effective reinforcers for the labor force, and the fail
ure of even the harshest aversive measures to combat the inevitable
flow of black-market activity and official corruption.

The average

soviet -woman, for example, spends between two and three hours each
day trying to find basic necessities like food and clothing and
■waiting in lines to purchase them.*

The scarcity and inferiority

of consumers' goods is explained not only by the failure of retail
ing, but also by the inherent ineptitude in the supply of pro
ducer's goods:
"The problem of 'new technology1— of technical mod
ernization and renovation of product capacity, technologal progress, ability to produce technically up-to-date
equipment, ability to operate it successfully, and rela
ted matters— goes back to the dawn of Soviet history.
. . .despite all the economic and technical progress of
the past half century, the problem does not seem to have
waned in importance or urgency in the minds of the Soviet
leaders. Lately, it has been linked with the so-called
technology gap vis-5—vis the West, with national goals of
military power and ideological prestige, with the steppedup purchases of Western equipment and know-how, and with
the overall objective of rapid economic progress at home.
At the same time the depletion of internal reserves for
the traditional Jextensive' form of economic growth since
the beginning of the seventies has added urgency to tech
nical progress.
In terms of economic performance, the
problem of 'new technology' is tied with the allegedly un
satisfactory payoff from the massive Soviet effort in re
search and development, the long standing and deeply in
grained resistence to product innovation at the factory
level, and other difficulties of a systematic character.
"Crucial to the understanding of this complex problem
is the appreciation of the role that the Soviet machinebuilding industry . . .plays in the process of innovation.
The industry's objective— as with all Soviet industries
— is to fulfill its plan, and the same is true of every

*Lance Morrow, "The Russian Revolution Turns 60," Time.
November 14, 1977, p. 49
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firm or association in it. The firm (association) is vir
tually assured of takers for its products to the limits of
its capacity.
It does not have to search out markets, in
vent new types of equipment or new uses for old types, or
engage in competitive struggle for markets.
It is little
concerned with ibe production and commercial problems of
of its customers, does not usually try to anticipate them,
and has little interest in supplying follow-up services
and technical advice.
(These shortcomings have attended,
for instance, the introduction of computers in the Soviet
economy. . . Hence, the chronic difficulty of making MB
(machine-building) firms adopt the production of new types
of machinery and abandon the production of obsolete types.
"In contrast, the role that Western MB firms play in
technical progress and innovation is a much more active
one, thanks to competiton, the search for markets, and
consequent attention to customer's needs, and the direct
involvement in research and development by many firms.
In
fact, in the West, individual MB f$rms are major genera
tors and diffusers of technical progress and innovation."
We will never be able to tell how much is lost by the ineffi
ciency of Soviet planning, but we can observe that even those at
its center have their own misgivings.
"Even Soviet economists have admitted that with the
continued use of present methods (of planning) and with
increased economic complexity, the Soviet Union would
eventually need more than its total population just for
management of the planning process. Many have argued that
this problem could be solved by automated information-col
lecting and the use of computers. Yet, others argue that
even these improvements will not suffice to maintain, much
less raise, the level of efficiency in Soviet planning."^
The stubborn fact that Russia's communist government and com
mand economy are still with us after six decades is no indication
of either the efficacy or strength of their system.

Whatever

Gregory Grossman, "Price Control, Incentives, and Innovation
in the Soviet Economy," in The Socialist Price Mechanism. Alan
Aboucher ed., (Durham: Duke University Press, 197?) p. 153
^Howard Sherman, Radical Political Economy. (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1972) p. 224
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achievements are ascribed to this ’Great Experiment' are rendered
suspect and unintelligible irhen it is acknowledged that any succes
ses were obtained with the concurrent operation of the world's most
pervasive black market; with large infusions of food, capital and
technology on credit from the West; with large-scale confiscations
of the productive capacity of its formerly market-system satelite
countries; and, perhaps most important of all, with the otherwiseunavailable economic guidposts offered by genuine scarcity prices,
i.e., catallactic exchange rates, generated in free-world markets.

Maoist China

Our interpretation of the historical application of Maoism in
Red China is more involved.

The Russian-trained Chinese revolu

tionaries rejected the market system on the basis of both commun
ist theory and long identification with humiliating foreign domin
ation.

The Soviet road to economic and technical progress was

tried.

Yet, centuries before, China had brought bureaucracy to its

natural, static and non-enterprising flowering.

Confucianism had

succeeded in elaborately ritualizing all interpersonal relation
ships, e.g., between subject and ruler, husband and wife, parent
and child, scholar and student, soldier and farmer, etc.

The an

cient system cane to be maintained by the subtlest control prac
tices, i.e., those based on 'face' rather than fines or imprison
ment, and its teachings formed the exclusive subject matter of an
cient civil— service examinations.
The Chinese Communist leadership was not long in realizing
that careful emulation of their Russian mentors' bureaucratically
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administered collectivism -was weaving a straight-jacket less ele
gant and more Western than the old one, but also just as incapable
of keeping pace with, much less directing, the dynamic division of
labor associated with the industrialized countries.

Failure after

failure convinced them that state 'officialism1 cannot isolate con
trol of each of the people without trading off the advantages of
intelligent contact with productive resources and a freely adapting
divison of labor.

The failure began with agriculture.

". . .given the number and diversity of Chinese farms and
the labor-intensive nature of cultivation, raising output
is a task that, as (early-1950s) Chinese Communist poli
cies have demonstrated, cannot readily be centralized,
even in the hands of the head of a single village, let
alone all the way up to Peking.
"Inability to centralize control over agriculture,
and hance inability to control or even predict wide fluc
tuations in agricultural output, make centralization in
nonagricultural sectors difficult as well. A drop in cot
ton output, for example, means that the textile industry
operates well below capacity and that exports might have
to be cut back. If exports are not cut back because of a
desire to maintain imports of key producer's goods, the
amount of cloth issued to Chinese consumers has to be re
duced, with resulting increase in demand pressure on other
commodities.
If, on the other hand, cotton imports re
place domestic production, imports or other producer's
goods might have to be reduced for this reason as well.
These difficulties are more serious the more general the
fall in agricultural production. Flexibility at all lev
els is required, and central plans, enforced by central
ized targets and rationed allocation of key inputs, tend
to be inflexible."1
Mao himself initiated the revolt against 'officialism.'
"In our work of socialist construction we are still
to a very large extent acting blindly. For us, the

Dwight H. Perkins, Market Control and Planning in Commun
ist Chinar (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966)'
pp. 204-205
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socialist economy is still in many respects a realm of
necessity not yet understood.
Take me as an example:
there are many problems in the -work of economic construc
tion -which I still don't understand.
I haven't got much
understanding of industry and commerce.
I understand a
bit about agriculture, but this only relatively speaking
— I still don't understand much."*
"Judging by the present situation, I am afraid that
it is necessary to expand the power of the regions. . .
Our Constitution bestows no legislative power to the
region. . . However, in confromity with the policies of
the Center, and within the law, the region can make rules
and regulations according to the requirements of its work
and local conditions. The constitution does not forbid
this."2
"The masses have boundless creative power. They can
organize themselves and concentrate on places and branches
of work where they give full play to their energy;
they can concentrate on production in breadth and depth
and create more and more welfare undertakings for them
selves.
"Now there are dozens of hands interfering with local
administration, making things difficult for the region.
Although neither the Center nor the State Control knows
anything about it, the Departments issue orders to the of
fices of the provincial and municipal governments. All of
these orders are said to have initiated from the Center,
thus putting great pressure on the regions. Forms and re
ports are like floods.
This situation must change and we
must find a way to deal with it."4
"Both proletarian parties and the proletarian dicta
torship will vanish in the future. But they are absolute
ly necessary today lest we become unable to suppress count
er-revolution, to resist imperialism, or to construct so
cialism. For fulfilling these goals, the proletarian dic
tatorship has to be coercive to a great extent. And this

^Chairman Mao Talks to the People; Talks and Letters 1956—
1971, trans. and ed. John Chinnery and Tieyun (New York: Parthenon
Books, 1974) p. 175
2^ o , ed. Jerome Ch'en (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969)
p p . 7 4 -7 5
o

Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. ed. Stuart Schram,
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) p. 65
4Mao, loc. cit., p. 75
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makes it necessary to fight against bureaucratism, against
structural obesity.
I propose a cut of tiro thirds of our
party and governmental organization.”*
Chinese Marxist-Leninist economists fell in esteem, their power being replaced by M a o ’s doctrine of 'no theory divorced from
practice.'

The distinctive economic-psychological technique called

'Maoism* emerged as an escape response from both the catallaxy (the
leadership was by now unalterably committed to using a straw-man
capitalism as its competitor, scapegoat, and bogeyman) and bureau
cratic state socialism.

Quite unprofoundly, the new Maoist economy

would be patterned after the organization Mao knew best, his mili
tarily successful revolutionary arny.

It was Mao's belief that

through decentralization, abolition of the chain of command, and
the intensive grass-roots political training of local groups to
shape selfless dedication to the aims of the collective, China
would take its Great Leap Forward.

No directed division of labor

was thought necessary; integration of production, it was expected,
would follow automatically from a people shaped with the attitudes
appropriate to an advanced society, i.e., with the psychology of
the future communist man.

Only acceleration of socialization could

bring about a transformation of production, socialization by means
of political education that would transform the superstructure.
Where Lenin believed social consciousness to be determined by pro
duction relations and not vice versa, Mao granted independent-vari
able status to consciousness.

He would shape the superstructural

ilo£. cit., p. 77

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134

ethic or consciousness appropriate to escatological communism
(i.e., the productive, selfless, altruistic, and loving servants of
mankind) and these nev beings, vithout bureaucracy or self-serving
economism, vould bring China's production and productive forces in
to the future— a simple case of engineering the dialectic through
socialist 'mind over matter.'
"The one situation vhere ideology was anything but a
secondary factor in economic decision making vas during
the decentralization and rectification campaigns of the
"great leap forward." The essence of this period -was a
transfer of decision-making authority to lover-level,
ideologically orientated cadres.
The rectification cam
paign (in this case in late 1957 and early 1958) was in
troduced to ensure the necessary ideological purity. Re
sulting frcm this were greater egalitarianism in agricul
ture and industry, abolition of free markets and private
farm plots, and a distaste for all types of monetary con
trol— all measures that could be justified primarily only
on ideological grounds. 'Whether these lover-level cadres
really believed in these steps or advocated them only to
protect themselves from political oblivion is impossible
to tell.
There is evidence that some of the top leader
ship in this period felt that such extreme measures vere
not alvays desirable, but tolerated them rather than damp
ing the enthusiasm and initiative of lover-level person
nel. The reason for the "great leap" was to raise out
put quickly, not necessarily to move tovard a true commun
ist society, but the result vas less output and more com
munism.
The consequence of this course of action vas total economic
disorganization.

Perhaps the abysmal failure of the back-yard

steel mills is the best-remembered consequence of this pure-Maoist
effort.

The communists themselves admit to a fifty per cent drop

in all production during this period.
After the Great Leap Forvard, partial control vas quietly re—

J’Dvight H. Perkins, op. cit., p. 210-211
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introduced.

The communes -were broken down and replaced in part by

small private plots and the free market, which in the following
years accounted for perhaps half of all agricultural produce.

In

come payments 'according to need' were de-emphasized and 'the level
of communal

services' reduced.

Economic power, e.g., partial con

trol, was transferred from commune and brigade levels to the fam
ily and team levels.

Reinforcement of the individual crept back

into the propagandistic literature, drama, and education.
From this point on, the leadership of China became divided be
tween the radicals (or pure Maoists) and the pragmatists (or right
ists).

The recouping of losses from the Great Leap Forward meant

sacrificing much control; the work of shaping the Chinese people to
fit the ideals of the radicals had to be put aside.

In 1959 Mao

was taken from his position of chairman, yet he was permitted to
retain his position as director of party ideology.

This supplied

him with the base from which he staged his return to power.
The radicals' comeback in the Great Proletarian Cultural Rev
olution followed six years after the Great Leap Forward.
the Maoists did not care about production.

This time

Mao's supporters, viz.,

teenagers, led by demobilized soldiers, were sent against produc
tion managers, urban workers, popular authors and artists, and all
of the followers of Liu Shau-ch'i, the man who had replaced Mao and
overseen the recovery from the Great Leap Forward.

These were 'the

capitalist roaaers,' the carriers of 'bourgeois ideas,' the enemies
of the Cultural Revolution.
"The theory of the Cultural Revolution is that an au
thoritarian bureaucracy, even using a system of wage and
bonus incentives, leads to worker passivity; whereas . . .
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The capitalist readers, by increasing production, gave
free reign to selfish motivations. This led people to
think primarily of increasing their personal wealth.
M a o ’s own comments regarding his newly engineered upheaval
show that he had learned no new lessons from the Great Leap For
ward:
"The aim of the Great Proletarian Revolution is to
revolutionize people’s ideology and as a consequence to
achieve greater, faster, better and more economical re
sults in all fields of work.
If the masses are fully
aroused and proper arrangements are made, it is possible
to carry on both the Cultural Revolution and production
without one hampering the other, while guaranteeing high
quality in our work. The Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution is a powerful motive force for the develop
ment of social productive forces in our country. Any
idea of counterposing the Great Cultural Revolution to
the development of production is incorrect.
American Maoist, John G. Gurley, of Stanford, concludes that:
"Mao saw the cultural revolution as largely a strug
gle within the superstructure— within the ideological
realm. Yet, the danger to China was more than that the
growing bourgeois ideas might in time restore capitalist
relations of production.
In fact, the bourgeoise was
being generated and regenerated, in hothouse style, by
the capitalist relations of production after the Great
Leap faltered in 1959. The Cultural Revolution attacked
not only the resulting growth of bourgeois values but the
social institutions and practices that bore capitalist
imprints and spawned such values. Although Mao saw the
bourgeois as a 'remnant,' it was in fact being continual
ly recreated by social relations not yet fully transform
ed into socialist forms.
The Cultural Revolution returned Mao to power, yet without

^Raymond L. Whitehead, Love and Struggle in M a o ’s Thought,
(Maryknoll, 1977)
o

John G. Gurley, Challengers to Capitalism; Marx. Lenin, and
Mao, (San Francisco: San Francisco Book Company, Inc., 1976) p . 133
O

uid., China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy, (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1976) p. 223
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fully replacing the pragmatists.

In 1973, Mao attempted to consol

idate his gains by yet another mass-mobilization, this time aimed
at Confucianism as well as against the newly-reborn bureaucracy.
This was an action
'Vrhich in fact led only to replacing one set of bureau
crats by another. Perhaps, indeed, despite the frag
mentary directives -which are all he has left us the last
five years of his life, he did not launch these campaigns
but, old and sick, -was simply unable to prevent the ultra-leftest clique, seemingly irell qualified to speak in
his name, from doing so on his behalf.
Be that as it may, it.is evident that the radicals' hold survived
only as long as Mao himself.

Today (early 1978), Mao's -widow and

his radical following are vilified outcasts.

The ruling pragma

tists are avidly courting Tito, dictator of Yugoslavia, to sound
out that country's so-called market-communism— a 'mixed economy'
of only a slightly different mix than is found in the West.

Ap

parently, the present Chinese leadership is seeking ways to em
brace the catallaxy while saving their oriental communist 'face.'
Meanwhile, only in Cambodia are communist leaders following through
with pure Maoism.
We have been forced to deal with the phenomenon of Maoism at
great length, drawing passages from many sources.

There must be

no misunderstanding concerning Mao's 'accomplishment.'

A large

minority of radical behaviorists respond to the ideas presented in
this thesis (when they respond at all) with statements of faith
concerning Chinese communism.

(Skinner himself, as we shall pres-

*Stuart R. Schram, op. cit., p. 68
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sently examin, has frequently voiced great hope for the future of
Maoism in the world and for the future of its current Western an
alogue, small-is-beautiful economics.)

These psychologists believe

with John Gurely, and other Maoists, that
economic development can best be promoted by breaking down
specialization, by dismantling bureaucracies, and by un
dermining the other centralizing and divisive tendencies
that give rise to experts, technicians, authorities, and
bureaucrats remote from or manipulating the masses. . .
Maoists will not accept economic development, however
rapid, if it is based on the capitalist principles of
sharp division of labor and sharp (meaning unsavory or
selfish) practices."!
We have seen that this fairytale has no meaning outside the
make-believe world of dialectical materialism, and we have seen
the consequences of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Rev
olution.

It is hoped that these two experiments have supplied

refutation enough.

*John G. Gurley, op. cit.. p. 6
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PART FOUR

Skinner's Socialism and the Marketplace

Skinner as both scientist and publicist*

By placing himself under the control of both the philosophical
•works of operationalism, behaviorism, and functional analysis on
one hand, and the organisms and facilities of a succession of
psychology laboratories on the other, Skinner has unquestionably
become the greatest experimental psychologist of our time.

There

can be no accounting the extreme importance of his contribution to
experimental method and to the theories of learning, verbal behav
ior, epistemology, and the philosophy of science.
In addition, Skinner has also exerted a tremendous, although
not novel, influence on American thought as a social theorist and
champion of a political program.

To account for the shape of Skin

ner's socio-political theorizing, the speculative historian of pol
itical ideas, pointing to the necessarily monopolistic character
istics of an experimental analysis of behavior, may reach the con-

Much of the following analysis concerning Skinner's orienta
tion with respect to the market culture draws, rather uncharitably,
from scattered tangential treatments and assertions, rather than
from the carefully considered elaboration of a major topic which
we would hope for.
I fear, however, that these tangents are all
we shall have to work from. Skinner's current academic community
apparently has not seen fit to interrogate him further in this
field.
139
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elusion that Skinner generated his social views from his method
rather than from his accumulated scientific results.

Another his

torian, adopting the sociological approach to intellectual history,
may go on to consider the peculiar 'community contingencies' ob
taining at Skinner's Harvard in those days of the New Deal and Fair
Deal, that period when the young psychologist's advocation of mono
polistic design was first evident.

During the then poorly under

stood monetary contraction and depression, businessmen and bankers
were treated as scapegoats for bad money policies, and Harvard Uni
versity emerged as the prestigious source of the federal govern
ment's 'Brain Trust," that cream of the technocratic elite and
their aids who filled the most powerful leadership and advisory
positions in Washington, New York and elsewhere.

One can wonder,

especially after Skinner's unflattering characterization of Har
vard's psychology faculty of the thirties and forties, whether his
receiving the teaching position and the honor of delivering the
William James Lecutres

(both in 1948) were not something more than

recognition of his (even then) considerable scientific contribu
tions: that they were instances of social selection recognizing
Skinner's praise, epitomized in Walden Two,* for total government
by benign and expert supervisors and science-governed social engin

^Although published in 1948, this book was actually written in
Minnesota in the summer of 1945, partly on the basis of Skinner's
regular conversations with "a group of philosophers and critics."
It was privately circulated one year before publication. Among
first readers was interventionist-economist, John Kenneth Gal
braith, who, as a former farm boy, pointed out to Skinner that
Hereford cows (a beef cattle) were miscast in the role of dairy
animal.
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eers.

(it cannot be ignored that other men, many as great as Skin

ner in their respective fields, have often languished in backwater
obscurity because the views of lesser men were less incompatible
and less threatening to the political orientation of the establish
ed intellectual aristocracy.)

Furthermore, it is reasonable to

suspect that those students who were selected as "the best and the
brightest" candidates for future leadership would reward greater
attention to a psychology professor during conjectures about tech
nologies of government control than they would during a presenta
tion of, for example, the precise procedure for obtaining a stimu
lus-general ization gradient.

Although Skinner may have been cap

able of discounting such social control, there does not appear to
have been any good reason for him to have done so.
Nonscientific origins in no way disqualify a scholar's polit
ical prescriptions from meriting serious critical attention.

I

point them out here simply to establish that the system of Skin
ner's social doctrine is logically separable from the system of his
science.

A refutation of the former will have no impact upon the

theory of operant reinforcement.
The socialism of Skinner is greatly at odds with the analysis
of control presented in this thesis.

Yet, both theories claim to

be an elaboration of the scientifically derived, even Skinnerian,
conception of man in relation to his environment.

Hopefully, a

dispassionate community of scientific scholars will see to it that
the fittest theory survives.
"If we must have something to admire, let it be man's
willingness to discard a flattering portrait of himself in
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favor of a more accurate and hence more useful picture.
Even here admiration is superfluous.
The hard fact is
that the culture which most readily acknowledges the
validity of a scientific analysis is most likely to be
successful in that competition between cultures which,
whether we like it or not, will decide all such issues
with finality."*

Accident and design in human cultures

Skinner claims that since "the American way of life," i.e.,
our market culture, is not centrally planned, it must be the prod
uct of selection of the accidentally advantageous.

-This can be

true only if one's definition of accident includes the unplanned
automatic integration of the sometimes—detailed and sometimes-scientific plans of each partial controller.

Skinner regards monopol

istic, i.e., function-analytic, design of a culture as superior to
the marketplace in promoting the continuation of a culture, i.e.,
the survival of a social environment's reinforcement practices.
This may also be true, but the strength of the market is not that
it promotes the continuation of current practices, but rather that
it allows continuous cultural adjustment to new and changing con
ditions, i.e., the generation and selection of mutations in cul
tural practice.
The catallaxy is not a practice which is selected, but a behavior-environment field characterized by the absence of certain

*B. F. Skinner, Cumulative Record: A Selection of Papers,
3rd ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972) p. 57

2

id., "Between Freedom and Despotism," Psychology Today.
September, 1977, p. 91
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aversive practices (including theft and fraud) and in which the
optimum selection of practices takes place.

Historically, this

field is the by-product of coercive practices which, admittedly
through monopolistic application, limit coercion— as in the imagin
ary monkey experiment outlined above.
The practices advocated by Skinner— e.g. "Programmed sequences
of contingencies, in the hands of skillful teachers (leading) to
the repertoire demanded by the social environment"*— merely replace
this field of selection with what masquerades as a monopolistic ex
periment, but is, in reality, the laboratory method of one-way
functional analysis blindly applied to an ever-turbulently environ
ment of billions of variables and no constants.

Skinner does not

appreciate the significance of the fact that any human control of
the social environment must be shared with a mostly unaccountable
physical environment, the environment which we must obey in order
to control.

Administration of the dependent-variable culture

Proceeding from the pseudodoxy that a single coordinating
agency can comprehend all economic and social contingencies and
make them compliant, Skinner goes on to assert that in such a soci
ety human benefactors would finally be free to discover, through
functional analysis, how people are "to be induced to use new forms
of energy, to eat grain rather than meat, and to limit the size of
their families."*

These and other presumably salutary objectives

*ibid.
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are found in several political essays which have folloved the
publication of Walden Tiro.

What Skinner, the propagandist, does

not face squarely is that the design of any strictly monopolistic
commonwealth must answer not only a few dozen or a few hundred
thousand, but all questions of how jsuch, what kind, at what time,
with what application, from whom, and to whom; as these questions
apply to every means and every end which each member of the culture
discriminates.

Failure to do so would mean readmitting the mixed

or black-market economy and relinquishing experimental control.
But how are the answers to such questions to be generated?

The

dissatisfactions and criticisms of environmentalists, conservation
ists, consumer advocates, dietary purists, concerned scientists,
professional educators,

'advocacy' journalists and knowledgeable

officials have so far not suggested a consensus for the comprehen
sive ordering of society's economic priorities.

Certainly it is

ridiculous to adopt the demands of lobbyists as appropriate postu
lates for a science of society.

Yet, Skinner repeatedly draws his

illustrations and much of his justification for monopolistic con
trol from such sources, and he does so without hinting by what
analysis of contingencies, independent or otherwise, appropriate
objectives are to be discovered and their relative importance,
costs, and benefits weighed.
This is not to say that Skinner offers no guidlines for admin
istration of the state.

He has several and treats them as axioms.

For example:"Simply by dividing the total amount of wages Americans
receive each year by the number of people who want jobs, we arrive
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at a perfectly reasonable annual wage for everyone."^

We are not

told what quantity and mix of products those equal shares of wages
will be able to buy after such a contingently administered redis
tribution has taken place.

Instead, we learn that "everyone suf

fers" when goods are unevenly distributed,^ that the "law of supply
and demand is misleading,"^ and that economic questions are triv
ial^ and need not be answered so long as a social environment can
"positively reinforce the behavior of those who support it . . .
and avoid creating negative reinforcers from which its members will
escape through d e f e c t i o n , m e a n i n g that a cultural design needs
only to outbid the net reinforcement of its nearest competitor.

The problem of outbidding the catallaxy

What is to be made of this?

We have seen that the catallaxy

makes precise use of the independent contingencies of the world as
it continuously integrates and reinforces the behavior of its par—

h o c , cit., p. xi; Skinner's logic is obviously faulty here.
To the extent that the number of people who want jobs falls short
of the number that comprises everyone, so far will that which each
receives fall short of what he claims to be a reasonable wage, so
if combined wages equals x^ dollars, but only half the people want
jobs, then Skinner's perfectly reasonable wage fund for everyone
will be twice what is, ceteris parabus, available.
^"Between Freedom and Despotism," op. cit.. p. 82
^Walden Two, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. x
4loc. cit., p. xiv
5loc. cit., p. xiii
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tial controllers.

Skinner indirectly acknowledges this fact in an

other context, but fails to see its relevance to the earnest so
cial engineer who endeavors to "make people consume less" through
the arrangement of contingencies which nevertheless, must be rein
forcing enough to wrest control from the catallaxy.

The stupendous

reinforcement power of the catallaxy is correctly appraised with
the statement that under its control
"a vast technology has been developed to prevent, reduce
or terminate exhausting labor and physical damage. It is
now dedicated to the production of the most trivial con
veniences and comfort. Not only do we not suffer extremes
of cold and heat, but we also keep our buildings within a
narrow range of temperatures. Not only do we not work to
near exhaustion, but we also ride the escalator rather
than climb stairs and push buttons to open the windows of
cars.*
We need not spend much time on criticisms— the sour grapes of
frustrated socialist production— that capitalism reinforces too
well.

Remarks about the absolute disutility of so-called overrein

forcement are all questionable.

For example, the environment which

yields optimal physiological conditions for the best quality scien
tific thinking— a commodity which Skinner doubtlessly values— may
in fact be obtainable only within that narrow temperature range
which the producers fo air conditioners, heaters, and thermostats
offer to partial controllers day or night, in every climate, and at
all seasons.

If this catallactic outcome causes scientists to be

come soft, we need only remember that the concept of specialization
of labor allows that not all individuals need be lumberjack types.

^■"Between Freedom and Despotism," op. cit.. p. 82
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And certainly the hurt, the aged, the arthritic, the tired, and
the handicapped benefit from cheaply mass-produced electirc win
dows, escalators, and the like.

Meanwhile, depending upon -widely

disbursed controlling variables, others may buy barbells rather
than car accessories, or patronize stores -with lower prices and no
escalators in order to save enough to buy running shoes or a book
advertising aerobics*
Too much candy may be bad for children, but it is sometimes
only contingencies involving the sweetest candy that can make a
vegetable child first move his limbs, or establish the few coins
which poor parents (who love noncontingently) can afford as effec
tive reinforcement tokens with which to reward their children's
helpfulness, or permit a doctor to quickly assure his young patient
that 'this doctor is okay.'

Finally, when considering the ill ef

fects of many products, one must remember that it is entrepreneurs,
controlled by partial-controller demand, who sustain the search and
selection that leads to safer, cheaper, and ever-less discriminable
substitutes for sugar, salt, cholesterol, meat, and so on.

The en

trepreneur is the market culture's fault-finder and its agent of
revolutionary amelioration.

The catallaxy achieves many of Skinner's aims

Despite Skinner's offense at the kinds of things which rein
force some partial controllers, the fact remains that the catallaxy
does supply a vast number of diversely conditioned people with a
highly reinforcing life.

In fact, there can be little argument

that Skinner's description of the kind of monopolistic culture he
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proposes serves even better as a description of the noninterven
tionist market culture:
". . .an environment in -which people -will treat each other
veil, keep the size of the population vithin bounds, learn
to vork and vork productively, preserve and enhance the
reinforcing character of the vorld, explore and analyze
that vorld, limit the use of resources and keep the envi
ronment safe for future generations and do all of this be
cause the results are positively reinforcing."^Catallactic relations involving a money medium attach prices and
costs to every resource.

Child raising, aprat from any subsidizing

velfare state, represents measurable costs to parents, vhile the
reinforcement a family derives from each nev child has been knovn,
after a point, to diminish.

Taken together these tvo facts have

generated the demands vhich have led entrepreneurs to discover and
market numerous means of bith control.
The partial controller sells his productivity often by hag
gling vith representatives of the investing entrepreneur over the
vages he vill recieve in return for the levels of output he con
trols.
The vorld is explored by partial controllers vho come upon nev
sources of control vith vhich to compete vith existing sources in
attracting reinforcement.

As a resource becomes scarce— and every

thing is potentially a resource— it also, through the agency of the
market, rises in its relative cost, until eventually, and vithout
direction from Washington, the price system brings about l) a great

*ibid.
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exodus to substitutes, 2) a careful search for new sources, and
3) an outflow of new inventions which bypass the now— costly pro
cesses altogether.
Skinner sees no need for such market allocation.

The govern

ment should do away with "usurping" entrepreneurs and is "most
clearly a government of the people by the people when it does so."*
He is disturbed that in America "People claim the right to do as
they please— to gamble away a fortune, risk unnecessary danger by
not wearing a seatbelt, die an alcoholic, consume resources and
pollute the environment without restrictions."^
Skinner alleges three general defects of the market culture,
viz., profligacy, inequality and coercion.

Each of these allega

tions may now be examined.

Profligacy

That resources are consumed is unavoidable; that the market
places no restrictions on their use is untrue.

The entrepreneur is

always seeking the cheapest and, therefore, most abundant means of
supplying the market.
doing so.

The size of his profits is a function of his

His capital accumulation, marketing techniques, product

research and development, and organizational ability are all se
lected by profit and loss.

Bankruptcy removes those who fail to

employ the most economical means of supplying reinforcing goods and
services to the members of the culture.
The problems of risk-taking and drinking, with which Skinner
faults the market economy, deserve special treatment.
Gambling, owing to the potentially big reinforcement involved
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and to the schedule by which small gains occur, is a highly rein
forcing activity.

Since money is a prerequisite for play, gambling

may be said to enhance the value of money earned or held by those
■who gamble.

To eliminate gambling -without replacing it with some

thing equally interesting for the same money is to render the lives
of society's would-be gamblers so much less reinforcing.
Gambling does have its special functions.

One group to whom

gambling is especially attractive are those who have plenty of
money, little regard for public opinion, and unusually negligible
entrepreneurial ability.

The fortunes of these less—fit market

servants do not survive; the profligate heir of the sober business
man can extinguish in one day the capital built up over a lifetime
of masterful partial control.

In the casino undeserved wealth is

relatively harmlessly transferred to more capable hands.

Poorer

persons, in contrast, generally increase their frequency of gam
bling as other means of getting money and realizing their lifetime
plans become further circumscribed.

Age, a defective repertoire or

reputation, labor unions, taxes, government monopolies and regula
tions all restrict one's control over one's employment, advance
ment, and enterprise.

Gambling permits one to escape the aversive

certainty of a disappointing outcome by offering, at least, straws
to grab.

In the same way, alcoholism is an escape from the emo

tional concommitants of an aversive environment.

For example, when

coercive labor-union power, minimum-wage laws and child-labor laws
restrict and distort the job market to the advantage of an elite,
organized minority; marginal workers and those below margin (i.e.
the young, the unskilled, and the independent) are forced to beg

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

competitively for employment.

These "workers can only interpret the

distorted market which turns them away as a valid indication of
their unhampered-market value, i.e., the terms of employment which
they could reach with employers were the employers free to bargain.
In other words, partial controllers whose labor commands a price
just a little less than the legal minimum wage may just as well
have skills that are worth nothing or, if they are supported by
the taxpayer in their unemployment, less than nothing.

Out of

work, in an economy with higher prices, resulting in part from re
stricted and overpaid labor production, life for the unemployed,
i.e., their self-evaluation, becomes cheap.

Drug addiction, in

difference to the loss of personal reputation through crime, parti
cipation in dangerous recreations, mass-media overdose, and refuge
in radical politics— in short all of the anti-social behaviors of
the unemployed young, become commonplace.

And the unnecessary

risks of driving without seatbelts, as Skinner points out, are in
differently incurred.

Inequality

Skinner is certainly correct in claiming that
"people differ in their ability to aquire property and
hence in the quantities they possess, and since posses
sion usually makes aquisition easier, differences have be
come very great.
However, his conclusion that such a state of affairs is avoidable,

^"Between Freedom and Despotism," op. cit., p. 82
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that it is undesirable, and (implied through his silence) that it
has no outstanding advantages must be regarded as completely -with
out foundation.

It has been said that communism, socialism, and

all egalitarian movements are prompted as much by envy, jealousy,
and the desire for effortless omnipotence, as by ignorance of basic
economics, and wre observe that both unproductive college students
and politically unpowerful yet highly intelligent professors have
traditionally been most susceptible to these doctrines.

(This

socio-political explanation is not intended to apply to Skinner.
One may read his autobiography and judge for oneself the place of
these motives there.)
Of course, the mentalisms (viz. envy, jealousy, desire for
power) of this 'chamber-of-commerce1 analysis can be recast or
translated into statements about environmentally controlled behav
iors, and such behaviors, if, indeed, they are less effective for
the 'subject,* can be modified.

The ethical education of children

can include learning that the opposite of selfish behavior is en
vious behavior, rather than altruistic behavior which— as a type of
exchange that is often highly reinforcing to oneself— is selfish
ness misunderstood,

Competitive sportsmanship, the adoption of

absolute self-standards (rather than comparative interpersonal
standards), a selling repertoire and a differentiated productive
repertoire to be sold, as well as a knowledge of elementary econ
omics that includes the role of the entrepreneur and the importance
of the specialized partial controller in the marketplace (i.e. in
dividualism) all can be taught, while at the same time the inevit
able consequences of attempts at the destructive leveling of par
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tial control to achieve a 'fair,* 'equal,' or socially just' dis
tribution of wealth can be pointed out.

Yet, a careful examination

of his -work reveals that Skinner nowhere entertains this possibil
ity.

He accepts as imperishable truth his dictum that "everyone

suffers" when goods are unevenly distributed, and accepting it,
proceeds to base his entire social prescription upon it, until
finally he is led to conclude, along with many other of our great
est thinkers as they have reached the twilight of their careers,
that a communist dictatorship like Mao's "China(,) may be closer to
the solution I am talking about.

Coercion

Skinner claims that government should renounce its liberal (in
the original sense of the term) role as custodian (in the sense of
watching and protecting rather than seeking to cure) of the partial
controllers, i.e., the polity that serves as adjudicator of disput
ed inter-partial-controller contracts, and acts to defend, through
aversive control, everyone's person and property from person-in
flicted infringement, viz., from murder, rape, physical damage,
slander, theft, pollution of the air that envelopes one’s home,
poisoning of one's river, etc., but which never acts to shield any
one from the selecting competition of someone else's superior or
cheaper goods and services.

Like Marx, Skinner maintains that such

a state is part of a terrible phase of history to be overcome only

b a l d e n Two. 2nd ed., op. cit., p. xv
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through the evolution of science and technology, and, especially
for Skinner, through the application of a science of behavior.*
"A state defined by repressive, formal, legal, social con
trols based on physical force has certainly figured in our
own development, ve may be ready to move on to another
state.
Eis alternative is, by now, no surprise.
"But "why should governments confine themselves to aversive
control? Why not use positive reinforcement— or, to speak
less precisely, rewards? Many governments have the means
of doing so; they have the power to provide as well as
punish."3
It has not dawned upon Skinner that no government punishes
anyone without someone else being reinforced thereby or that gov
ernments provide nothing which they do not first confiscate from
others.

If someone is reinforced by government action someone else

must be punished 01* else the transaction would already have taken
place cataltactically.
The university psychologist whose attention is intensely nar
rowed to his experiments has little reason to stop and consider
that the supply of food pellets and equipment with which he and his
assistants arrange laboratory contingencies, i.e., his seemingly
unlimited means of shaping and reinforcing the behavior of a few

Emphasis on a science of behavior has not freed Skinner from
his own "materialist conception of history." In fact, Skinner's
subliminal Marxism is clearly evidenced by a long list of state
ments such as: "Wars may be inevitable so long as wealth is uneven
ly distributed, but those who are lucky enough to have an undue
share naturally defend it." Reflections on Behaviorism and Soci
ety, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978) p. 17
^Walden Two, 2nd ed., oja. cit.. p. xv
"Between Freedom and Despotism," op. cit., p. SO

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155
laboratory animals, is largely paid for by taxes and by the dona
tions and endowments used by businessmen as vehicles for avoiding
yet-higher tax brackets and confiscatory penalties.

The scientist

holding government grants, for example, in the fields of aggression
and aversive control, is not likely to inquire after the nature of
the contingencies vhich have made these large sums of money avail
able and vhich, consequently, have exalted his research, enhanced
the pover and respect accorded him -within his department, and ele
vated his standard of living.

Yet, the aversive character of such

money transfers cannot be denied.

Any producer failing to surren

der a share of his produced value to the Internal Revenue Service
•will have that share plus a penalty forcefully removed from him.
Physical resistance to this negative punishment -will be met vith
further fines and a -warrant for his arrest.

Unremitting resistance

to the arresting federal marshals vill result in his being either
overwhelmed, incapacitated, or killed.

As far-fetched as this

sounds to our aculturated ears, the fact is that this set of con
tingencies is currently in maintenance for every producing American
and is the real source of the unlimited "pover to provide" vhich
Skinner discerns in government and vhich he unthinkingly recommends
as a substitute for coercion.

Coercion is inevitable

A government does not produce more than the catallaxy, it
merely redistributes catallactically generated production in -ways
more reinforcing to those vho control the aversive netvork.

At the

extreme, vhere the agents of government do not understand the func
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tion of the market, the catallactic division of labor is eventually
superceded by the completely bureaucratic police state in vhich
in vhich every vorker is left vith just one unpunished course of
action and vhere the analytical methods of operations management
attempt to cope vith an ocen of variables.

Such a state, unless

propped up from the outside, does not in the long-run survive.

The

bureaucratically administered economy soon cannot support its ovn
army of bureaucrats.

Political disintegration follovs disintegra

tion of the catallaxy.
In places vhere the market is better understood— as in postMaoist Red China— the market is alloved to operate only to the
point vhere the balance of catallactic productivity and coercive
confiscation leave the ruling group vith vhat they deem to be their
maximum long-run take.
Skinner maintains that the partitioning of the market culture
into monopolistically controlled Walden Tvos, i.e., the "small is
beautiful" approach to cultural administration, vould enable con
trollers to "more easily solve the problems facing the vorld to
day"^ and "vould make it possible to arrange more effective 'con
tingencies of reinforcement' according to the principles of applied
behavior analysis."

o

We have already seen that the elimination of

both the catallaxy and the bureaucracy requires isolating individu
als from all occasions in vhich independent contingencies may gen
erate catallactic relations.

This entails separating people from

^Walden Tvo, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. x
^ibid.
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accustomed ways of living, traumatic destruction of all products of
mercantile life deemed meretricious from the standpoint of the
state; the abolition of privacy, and massive killing to end the ag
gression and to stem the tide of escape which such necessarily pun
itive measures would— and, in every historical instance did— bring
about.

If successful— the Cambodian Maoists under Pol Pot are

driving to be the first— there would be no bureaucracy and no cat
allaxy, but also no higher order production, no sophisticated prod
ucts, and no relief from hardship, simply because the division of
labor would be suppressed along with the 'capitalist mode of pro
duction. '

The land would support only a fraction of the former

population, and vith each in a state of existence which Glaucon,
in Plato's Republic, upon hearing it described, termed a "city of
swine" because of all the reinforcing human handiwork such a com
munity would exclude.
It is inevitable that many will dismiss this thesis with the
objection that it is a tragic misunderstanding of Skinner, who,
everywhere, has spoken explicitly and emphatically against exten
sive use of aversive control in scientific cultural design.

To

this, I can only answer that, notwithstanding his strong opposition
to such practice, aversive control is the only way individuals can
be held to a rational and comprehensive societal plan when, as must
unavoidably happen from time to time, the catallaxy gains adventi
tious control over members of the culture, control which the state
must always recapture from the regenerated partial controllers if
it wants to stay in the driver's seat.
This idea is certainly not original.

The way in which the
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undoing of the rationally planned society comes about was first
predicted in 1902 by Dutch economist, N. G. Pierson:
"To receive less of a thing than was expected is a
disappointment for everyone— but not for everyone in the
same degree.
If, for example, meat is scarce, this will
hardly disturb those for -whom a vegetarian diet serves al
most as -well; but those who are unwilling to restrict
their consumption of meat will look for means which will
enable them to continue as usual. There exists no greater
difference than in the extent to which men value the en
joyment of particular things. As long as the communist
state can supply each person with what he wants, no trad
ing will arise as a result of such differences; but when
this is no longer the case, trading is inevitable. Then
price lists will be circulated which will tell us for how
many cigar, tea, or coffee certificates we can buy other
certificates. Thus the commercial principle, which such a
society sought in vain to abolish, comes once more into
the foreground. Profits which the State should have been
able to claim for itself fall to individual persons. The
phenomenon of value can no more be suppressed than the
force of gravity. What is scarce and useful has value.
It may well be possible, in a communist society, to make
value a source of profit to individuals, but to annihi
late value is beyond the power of man. Value is not the
effect but the cause of exchange.
Things do not have
value because they are exchanged; they are exchanged be
cause they have value— more value for some people than for
others."*

The pursuit of happiness

Skinner presents us with his promise of "a world in which our
susceptibilities to reinforcement will be less troublesome and in
which we shall be more likely to behave in ways which promise a
future,"^ i.e., "a social environment rich in immediate rein-

*N. G. Pierson, "The Problem of Value in the Socialist Commun
ity," trans. G. Gardiner, in Collectivist Economic Planning, ed.
F. A. Eayek (New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers, 1967) p. 75
^B. F. Skinner, Reflections on Behaviorism and Society, (En
glewood Cliffs: Prentice-Eall, Inc., 1978) p. 32
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forcers, so selected that they strengthen the kinds of behavior
vhich makes a future possible."*
The only problem vith this vorld is Skinner’s proffered means
of obtaining it.

The selection process vhich he expects to yield

the less-troublesome, future—promising, immediate-reinforcement
contingencies is not, for Skinner, the catallaxy.

From his social

vritings, it is clear that he does not understand hov, through en
trepreneurial activity in catallactic relations among partial con
trollers, the catallaxy adjusts to changing circumstances and pros
pects; hov market pricing takes the future— future demands for
goods and services and future supplies— into account in its sol
ution of the social-environment-contingency problem.

When he at

tacks the practices of the "usurping" entrepreneur and the "self
ish" rich, viio are "lucky" enough to obtain vealth, as dangerous
to the future of civilization, he reveals no comprehension of par
tial controllers as individuals vith unique sets of learned and in
herited characteristics, vho pursue happiness^ (i.e. behave) and,
in so doing, come to generate a spontaneous system vhich integrates
human valuations of time and resources scattered throughout the

*loc. cit., p . 30

2
Skinner acknovledges happiness as behavior that can be part
operant and part respondent (i.e. conditioned reflex), and also
part public (i.e. observable by second persons; e.g. smiling or
tearing) and part ’private event’ (i.e. receptors inside the skin
responding to stimuli inside the skin). As a radical behaviorist,
Skinner grants the private experience of happiness status as a dep
endent variable but never as an independent, i.e., controlling or
causing, variable. From this, perhaps not unreasonable, assump
tion, he then, as a positivist, leaps to the conclusion that happi—
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planet, a system in which the pursuit of happiness (now become par
tial control) provides the contingency selection promoting a future
of ever-increasing satisfaction for the -world’s population

In

stead, following Galbraith and, later, Schumacher, he excoriates
the high density of reinforcement obtainable in the market culture
as a fatal temptation:
"Happiness is a dangerous value, and the pursuit of happi
ness has clearly been too successful. Like other affluent
nations, we must, to coin a horrid word, 'deaffluentize.'"1
Skinner's pipe dream, viz., cultural selection of a positivereinforceraent way of life by scientific-principle-and-data-controlled monopolistic design, is an illusion shielded by a fundamental
ignorance of the market order— an ignorance not to be illuminated
by the four 'lights’ of economic theory with whom his writings have
shown some familiarity (viz., Marx, Veblen, Galbraith, and Schu
macher) or by his reading of recent history which leads him to
entertain the possibility that
"if Mao-Tse-tung created a social environment rich in pos
itive reinforcers, then they (the Red Chinese) may be do
ing what they want to do, and it is quite possible that
they may feel freer than Americans. Moreover, it is pos
sible that the reinforcers affecting their behavior have
been chosen precisely because of their bearing on the

ness, in itself, is unimportant, even though it is the general con
comitant of positive reinforcement and the removal of aversive
stimulation.
Reinforcement may elicit happiness, but its true im
portance is that it controls operant behavior. Skinner, therefore,
views the human condition as all means and no ends— except for cul
tural survival, an end which, he says, "chooses us" (with the medi
ation, of course, of the behavior scientists).
The primary rein
forcement psychologist opposes, then, both hedonism and eudaemonism.
*loc. cit., p. 32
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future of the Chinese way of life."!
In the field of cultural control, design does not remove and
replace the naturally evolved system of human interaction.

If

monopolistic social engineering is to work it must constantly dis
place (by continually outbidding or hampering) the operation of the
catallaxy and if the engineering is to operate on the principle of
positive reinforcement (metaphor: leading a mule along a trial by
dangling a carrot a few inches in front of its nose or by planting
carrots along the center of the trail at psychologically effective
intervals) it will not, at the same time, be able to "make people
consume less" in places where the market can still provide plenty.
(Metaphor: The carrots will not be able to keep the mule from ori
enting toward tastier, more-plentiful, or closer vegetation growing
— and leading— away from the trail that is of interest to the rid
er.)

Partial controllers cannot be induced to become the state’s

experimental subjects by offering them "deaffluentization," and
the government establishment that attempts to promote such a trans
ition through deception (i.e. by creating shortages or prohibitive
prices through its own interventions and then, in a mass-education
campaign, attributing these problems to irresponsible and obscene
corporate profiteering, the depletion of resources, or 'market ex
ternalities') is a government that will eventually be seen-through
and ignored.

Official and 'professional' admonitions will no long-

*ibid.
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er be heeded by resource owners, producers, entrepreneurs, or con
sumers.

The open market -will continue undeterred by the dire pre

dictions of the state's 'indicative planners.'

Ultimately, the

governing authority resolved to realize its designs will have only
one recourse: coercion (metaphor: the vhip and blinders).

However,

human beings (more, so than mules) have recourse to the black market
or emigration, as when people escape from iron-curtain and bamboocurtain countries to the West, or from socialist Britian to the
United States, or from New York City and 'Taxachusetts' to New
Hampshire or the sunbelt states.
Rigging the game of the pursuit of happiness is not so easy as
Skinner supposes.

Monopolistic Control and the Natural Selection
of Cultural Practices

Evolving practices

In addition to alleging its -would-be non-averseness, Skinner
further develops apologetics for the monopolistically designed and
controlled culture by linking its quasi-laboratory characteristics
to the concept of cultural survival.
"A group adopts a given practice— a custom, a manner, a
controlling device— either by design or through some event
which, so far as its effect upon the group is concerned,
may be wholly accidental. As a characteristic of the so-'
cial environment this practice modifies the behavior of
members of the group. The resulting behavior may effect
the success of the group in competition with other groups
or with the nonsocial environment. Cultural practices
which are advantageous will tend to be characteristic of
the groups which survive and which therefore perpetuate
those practices. Some cultural practices may therefore be
said to have survival value, while others are lethal in
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the genetic sense."*
As soon as ire recognize that the concept of survival of the
"advantageous," like Spencer's concept of the survival of the fit
test," tells us no more that that what can survive survives, ve are
led to inquire further after the nature of the field of variables
in which Skinner's design for cultural survival takes place.

Ac

cording to Skinner,
. .cultural practices . . .largely responsible for the
use "which is made of the genetic material born into the
group, since they determine whether the individual will
be able to develop his talents fully, whether educational
institutions will be open to him regardless of class or
other distinction, whether educational policies are pro
gressive or reactionary, whether he will be subject to
political or economic favoritism in the selection of a
profession, and so on. The culture also determines the
extent to which the members of the group are preoccupied
with food or sex or with escape from minor aversive stim
ulation in the search for 'comfort* or from such major
aversive stimulation as hard labor or combat, as well as
the extent to which they are subject to exploitation by
powerful agencies.
In turn, therefore, it determines
the extent to which they are able to engage in productive
activities in science . . . The experimental test of a
given culture is provided by competition between groups
under the conditions characteristic of a particular ep
och. "2
It is a crucial acknowledgement that:
"Since survival always presupposes competition, if only
with the inanimate environment, it does not appear to de
fine a 'good' culture in the absence of competition.
There appears to be no way in which we can test the sur
vival value of a culture
vacuo to determine its abso
lute goodness.

^B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, op. cit.. p. 430
^loc. cit., p. 431
*H o c . cit., p . 432
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The fact that survival is environment-specific relates the
problem of designing a lasting set of cultural practices to the
economic problems of l) selecting new adaptations to changing in
dependent contingencies, and 2) predicting -where, -when, and at -what
ratios of exchange catallactic relations will occur.

Such informa

tion is essential even to the cultural engineer of the monopolistic
community -whose only interest is in finding out -where, -when, and
how to short-circuit the market process.

We shall return to Skin

ner's appreciation of this matter shortly.
One point on which Skinner is not to be questioned is the
claim that certain consequences will necessarily follow the adop
tion of cultural survival as a criterion for cultural design.
"There are circumstances under which a group is more like
ly to survive if it is not happy, or under which it will
survive only if large numbers of its members submit to
slavery. . . In order to accept survival as a criterion
it thus appears to be necessary to abandon such principles
as happiness, freedom, and virtue.
" . . . Human behavior does not depend upon the prior
choice of any value. When a 1116111 jumps out of the way of
an approaching car we say that 'he chooses life rather
than death.1 But he does not jump because he has chosen;
he jumps because jumping is evoked by certain stimulating
circumstances.
This fact is explained in turn by many
earlier contingencies of reinforcement in which quick
movement has reduced the threat of impending aversive
stimulation. . . It is obvious after the fact that the
behavior has worked to his advantage. Eut this partic
ular advantage could not have operated before he jumped.
Only past advantage could have had an effect upon his
behavior.
He was likely to jump or to learn to jump be
cause his ancestors were selected from a large population
just because they jumped or learned to jump quickly from
the paths of moving objects.
Those who did not jump or
could not learn to jump are probably not represented by
contemporary descendents. . . An individual does not
choose to live or die; he behaves in ways which work to
wards his survival or death. Behavior usually leads to
survival because the behaving individual has been selected

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by survival in the process of evolution.
No fault can be found with this account of the selection of in
dividual behavior within the environmental fields of species-survival contingencies and ontogenetic-1earning contingencies.
in

It is only

his subsequent leap to link this phenomenon of individual surviv

al-learning to the behavior of

the culturaldesigner with respect

to

the survival of his whole super-individual culture that Skinner com
mits his most serious error.

The monopolistic controller as a^ cultural mutation

With respect to "the behavior of making a constructive sugges
tion about a cultural practice," Skinner states that:
". . .A long biological and cultural history has produced
an individual who acts in a particular way with respect to
cultural conditions.
Our problem is . . .to examin the
complex conditions under which design occurs. Some chang
es in culture may be made vecause of consequences which
are roughly described as happiness, freedom, knowledge,
and so on. Eventually, the survival of the group aquires
a similar function.
Skinner’s collectivist fallacy thus comes about in his examin
ation of the cultural conditions which bring about movement toward
adopting cultural design over other success criteria, i.e., his in
terpretation of the contingencies controlling advocation of the
scientist-monopolized culture.

Skinner, with Marx, is claiming

that individual self-interest (the quest for happiness, freedom,

^loc. cit., p. 433
2 loc. cit., p. 432
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knowledge, and, presumably, personal power, status, and dignity)
controls cultural mutation only temporarily and that it will be
replaced (or ’negated') in this province with the advent of new
control by scientist-formulated predictions of the specific prac
tices best fit to promote the survival of the culture.
Skinner's notion of cultural survival, like its Marxist ana
logue, viz.,

'the Good of the People,’ is an abstraction totally

removed from the welfare and survival of any single individual and
from any present loss, hardship, or suffering collectively incur
red in 'building the future'— a fact clearly demonstrated by Skin
ner's strong opposition to consumer sovereignty over entrepreneurmediated production and distribution.

It exemplifies a way of

thinking closely related to those ideas which have led to commun
ism's mass murders, terror, and systematic enslavement of millions.
People who work for the survival of the culture arrive late on
the scene, Skinner maintains,
"because the effect of a culture upon human behavior, and
in turn upon the perpetuation of the culture itself, can
be demonstrated only
when a science of human behavior has
been well developed.
The 'practice of changing practice'
is accelerated by science just because science provides an
abundance of instances in which the consequences of prac
tices are show. Theindividual who
is familiar with the
results of science is most likely to set up comparable
conditions in cultural design, and we may say . . . that
he is using survival as a criterion in evaluating a prac
tice."1
This is only-slightly-revisionist Marxism,

First a spe

cial science is proposed which, it is claimed, enables its

1loc. cit., pp. 433-4
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adepts to predict the lineament of that -which will survive, i.e.,
to see the shape of things to come in a future that will take its
course precisely because that science has been realized.

Skinner

speaks of behavioral scientists generating cultural mutations which
will "speed up the evolutionary process," as though, beating the
communist at his own game, the radical behaviorist could be the
midwife of a foreordained human destiny.

Next, it is declared

that this science is a means of changing societal relationships
to serve mankind's long-run interests wholly apart from the indiv
idual of those now living— except as these latter must be molded
and used in the overall design of cultural contingencies.
"A scientific analysis leads us to resist the more
immediate blandishments of freedom, justice, knowledge,
or happiness in considering the long-run consequences of
survival."1
The claim that the existence of a science of behavior that can
point up the consequences of controller-arranged contingencies will
automatically place the cultural designer under the control of the
survival of his culture is an unsupported assertion found through
out Skinner's social writings.
In light of the present analysis, we may only interpret this
this position as a species of wishful thinking, as a Skinnerian
'mand' rather than a Skinnerian 'tack.'

We cannot ignore our own

daily witness of how the demagogue's feigned concern for the gener
al welfare returns the same powerful feinforcement from the elec
torate as would the genuine

article.

We have all come to question

the degree to which science controls the official pronouncements of
the 'fiscalist' economists on the government payroll.

It is almost
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proverbial that the more general the objective of a group the more
general -will be the corruption of those who guide its collective
attainment.

Perhaps the 'practice of changing practices' -will be

accelerated, but this by itself does not establish that the scientist-controller -will not engage in practices which change practices
in ways reinforcing to himself, in ways that make him feel free,
just, and knowledgeable, but also comfortable, important, powerful,
and regal.
In considering how self-interest prevails over apparently cul
ture-serving measures, even after these latter have been accredited
by scientific analysis, it is instructive— esijecially to the Skin
nerian behaviorist— to turn to economist Ludwig von Mises' descrip
tion of how the scientific contributions of market economics have
been received throughout the last one hundred and fifty years of
cultural evolution:
". . .It would be a grievous error to assume that the hos
tility felt toward entrepreneurs and capitalists, toward
wealth and quite especially toward newly aquired wealth,
toward money-making and in particular toward business and
speculation, which today dominates our entire public life,
politics, and literature stems from the sentiments of the
masses.
It springs directly from the views held in the
circles of the educated classes who were in public service
and enjoyed a fixed salary and a politically recognized
status. . .
". . .A system of ethics whose authors are found in
the circles of priests, bureaucrats, professors, and of— '
ficers of the army expresses only disgust and contempt for
entrepreneurs, capitalists, and speculators.
"And now these educated classes filled with envy and
hatred, are presented with a theory that explains the
phenomena of the market in a manner deliberately neutral
with regard to all value judgements. Price rises, in
creases in the rate of interest, and wage reductions,
which were formerly attributed to the greed and heart—
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lessness of the rich, are now traced back by this theory
to quite natural reactions of the market to changes in
supply and demand. Moreover, it shoirs that the division
of labor in the social order based on private property
would be utterly impossible without these adjustments by
the market. What was condemned as a moral injustice— in
deed, as a punishable offense— is here looked upon as, so
to speak, a natural occurance. Capitalists, entrepre
neurs, and speculators no longer appear as parasites and
exploiters, but as members of the system of social organ
ization whose function is absolutely indispensible.
The
application of pseudo-moral standards to market phenomena
loses every semblance of justification.
The concepts of
usury, profiteering, and exploitation are stripped of
their ethical import and thus become absolutely meaning
less. And finally, the science of economics proves with
cold, irrefutable logic that the ideals of those who con
demn making a living on the market are quite vain, that
the socialist organization of society is unrealizable,
that the interventionist social order is nonsensical and
contrary to the ends at which it aims, and that therefore
the market economy is the only feasible system of social
cooperation.
It is not surprising that in the circles
whose ethics culminate in the condemnation of all market
activity these teachings encounter vehement opposition.
"Economics refuted the belief that prosperity is to
be expected from the abolition of private property and the
market economy.
It proved that the omnipotence of the
authorities, from whom wonders had to be hoped for, is a
delusion and that the man who undertakes to organize so
cial cooperation, . . .who directs organic and inorganic
nature in the process of production, cannot go beyond cer
tain limits. This had to appear to the servitors of the
apparatus of violence, both those in the imperium and
those in the magisterium, as a lowering of their person
al prestige.
They considered themselves as demigods who
make history, or at least as assistants of these demigods.
Now they were nothing but the executors of an unalterable
necessity. Just as the deterministic theories, entirely
apart from the condemnation they receive from the ecclesi
astical authorities on dogmatic grounds, encountered the
inner opposition of those who believed themselves to be
possessed of free will, so these theories too met with
resistance on the part of rulers and their retinue, who
felt free in the exercise of their political power."1

^Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics.
trans. George Reisman (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 19R0)
pp. 195—7
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But what of the theory which states that one will arrange con
tingencies well who will live under the control of them oneself,
i.e., the theory of democratic government?

Why have the masses of

the great democracies not seen to it that the findings of science
are utilized in the formulation of governing policy?

The same

economist again supplies an answer:
"Capitalism and its political counterpart brought the
masses civil liberties and unprecedented will—being.
It
gave practically everybody the opportunity to acquire
knowledge and to cultivate his talents. But it could not
remove the intellectual inertness and lethargy of the
crowds of commonplace people.
In offices and factories
they are coimnitted to routine jobs without any comprehen
sion of what makes the wheels turn and what magic rewards
the unvarying performance of some simple manipulations
with products of the most refined accomplishments of sci
entific technology.
Their ignorance, coupled with their
resentment against all those who eclipse them in any re
gard, makes them easy prey to the inflamatory propaganda
of the prophets of an earthly paradise to be achieved by
the establishment of the total state.
The historical emanation of a science of behavior and a tech
nology of monopolistic control does not automatically ensure that
cultural engineers will design a social environment that generates
their own genuine self-subordinating— as opposed to hypocritical or
self—righteously rationalized— altruistic control.
The original propounding of the gospel of Christian love was
an event which doubtless increased the frequency or probability of
saintliness in the remainder of mankind's earthly pilgrimage, yet
not all subsequent priests, popes, and Christian innovators have
been saintly.

Similarly, exclusive control of controllers by sci

*id., Forward to A Socialist finpire; The Incas of Peru, by Louis
Baudin [New York: Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961) pp. vi—vii
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entific methodology and ’objective' data is l) hard to get, 2) hard
to identify as gotten (or lost), 3) hard to make permanent ■within a
culture subject to exogenous environmental transformations and

Tin-

predictable variations in the ’scientific' repertoires of future
controllers, and 4) hard to identify as having been made permanent
or not, i.e., as surviving or not.

Monopolistic guessing about survival value and entrepreneuria1
guessing about profitability

Allowing, for the sake of argument, that a culture can exist
in which monopolistic planner-controllers are under the control of
science andhave subordinated their personal interests, both con
scious and unconscious, to the goal of cultural survival, there is
left an equally weighty problem, a problem which Skinner has not
entirely glosses over.
"Survival will not have a useful effect upon the cultural
designer unless he can actually calculate survival value.
. . .’fe may change the pattern of family life and of edu
cational institutions so that children will grow up to be
happier people, but are we sure that happy people are most
likely to survive in the world today? . . . Similarly, in
governmental design, it may be possible to give everyone a
considerable measure of security, but will the government
which does so then be supported by an energetic, produc
tive, and inventive people?"*
For the calculation of survival value, Skinner relies in part,
but only in part, on science:
". . .It is in the spirit of science to insist upon care
ful observation, the collection of adequate information,
and the formulation of conclusions which contain a mini-

*B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, loc. cit., p. 434
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mum of -wishful thinking. . .
"A demonstration of basic behavioral processes under
simplified conditions enables us to see these processes at
■work in complex cases, even though they cannot be treated
rigorously there.
If these processes are recognized, the
complex case may be more intelligently handled. This is
the kind of contribution which a pure science is most
likely to make to technology. For example, a behavioral
process frequently occupies a considerable period of time
and often cannot be observed at all through casual obser
vation. . . We are not likely to use the process effect
ively until the scientific study of simpler instances has
assured us that a given end-state will indeed be reached.
It is the business of science to make clear the conse
quences of various operations performed upon a system.
Only when we have seen these consequences clearly set
forth are we likely to be influenced by their counter
parts in complex practical situations."*
Most significantly, the rest is left to guessing.
"Although no one course of action may be exclusively
dictated by scientific experience, the existence of any
scientific parallel, no matter how sketchy, will make it
somewhat more likely that the more profitable of two
courses will be taken.
To those who are accustomed to
evaluating a culture in terms of absolute principles, this
may seem inadequate. But it appears to be the best we can
do. The formalized experience of science, added to the
practical experience of the individual in a complex set of
circumstances, offers the best basis for effective action.
What is left is not the realm of the value judgement; it
is the realm of guessing, When we do not know, we guess.
Science does not eliminate guessing, but by narrowing the
field of alternative courses of action it helps to guess
more effectively.
Intellignet guessing about relations within the social envi
ronment is, in a catallaxy, done by pertial-controlling entrepre
neurs.

The relative probabilities of the different courses, at

which the entrepreneurs intelligently guess, can never be known in

loc. cit., p. 435
'loc. cit., p. 436
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full.

In fact, the sourses themselves are as numerous and varied

for each entrepreneur as are the -ways in which his partial control
(i.e. money, capital, land, skill, inventory) can be employed in an
economy.

Not only can science not answer all of the questions

about profitability, it is also incapable of identifying all of the
questions.

Much indeed rides on what Skinner calls "the practical

experience of the individual."
In light of his penetration into the problem of man's inevit
able ignorance of the totality of the relationships of the social
environment, it is disappointing that Skinner ignores the one 'de
sign' which allows for the environmental selection of superior
guessing, i.e., the market system of behavior organization.

It

does not occur to Skinner— although he has made the analysis pos
sible— that the different guesses of different individuals may be
controlled by different hidden and unanalyzed sets of controlling
conditions, some of which control more advantageously than others,
so that one man's intelligent guessing may, for reasons unknown,
lead to greater advantage for greater numbers of people than an
other's.

In the catallaxy, when this happens, the man who guessed

best gets more to guess about and venture next time and the man
who's guessing resulted in waste gets less.

This is the function

of profit and loss.
How ironic, that this system of market selection, so consis
tent with Skinner's ultimate aims, is the very same market order
which seeks to abolish and replace with a non-competitive (Singlespecies') central-planning (and guessing) agency, i.e., a state
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which operates as a single entrepreneur who owns all productive
resources and commands a monopoly of aversive control to thwart
all competition.

Ecology and the catallaxy contrasted with constructed landscapes
and the dependent-variable culture

The relationship between the scientific analysis of human be
havior and the improvement of cultural practices is clearly misun
derstood by Skinner when he states that those
"who act to make the physical world more beautiful— the
ecologists concerned with natural beauty and the artists,
musicians, architects, and others who create beautiful
things— all increase the chances that living in the world
will be positively reinforced.
Those who use behavior
modification, properly defined, could be said to be con
cerned with preserving and furthering the natural beauty
of the social environment— or, to borrow a phrase from a
vanishing culture, to create more beautiful people.
First, let us clear up another misunderstanding.

Ecology,

i.e., the science which studies the patterns of relations among
organisms and their environment, does not concern itself with nat
ural beauty as Skinner claims.

Aesthetic behavior with respect to

nature is, however, the self-appointed jurisdiction of the soi-dis—
ant environmentalists, a political lobby which couches its argu
ments in the language of ecology.

The two are not the same.

For

example, an aluminum soft-drink can or even several thousand such
cans and an equal number of non-biodegradable plastic cups lying in
a forest do not affect the ecology in any significant way; no lower

^id., Reflections on Behaviorism and Society, op. cit., p . 11
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life forms are imperiled by them; animals do not "see the ugliness"
or "the alienation of nature by private interests and the capital
ist means of production" and fall over dead.

(in fact, a mess of

cans might be the best way to keep large numbers of campers away,
thus averting real ecological damage.)

Appeals to the aesthetic

enjoyment of a self-righteous elite who treat themselves to fre
quent "back-packing" expeditions with their nature clubs must not
be mistaken for a mandate by science.

The unknown consequences of

bottle-deposit legislation which obtain in the aluminum, steel,
glass, trucking and other industires (and the effects on poor in
ner-city children during a summer heatwave who l) bring home less
cold pop from the market, 2) climb into or tip over garbage cans in
in neighborhoods or parks looking for deposit bottles, and 3) learn
that working for an allowance does not yield much in return are
much closer to true ecological problems.
The ecologist knows, as the environmentalist apparently does
not, that the environment is not in equilibrium and never has been.
He knows that there is no balance of nature, just as the economist
knows that there is no evenly rotating steady-state economy.

The

ecologist-economist knows l) that a lumering company will, if per
mitted, cut down every tree on public land to which they have only
been awarded temporary 'lumbering rights,' but that where land is
privately owned the owner will see to it that the long-run value
of all of the resources on his property is effectively husbanded,
2) that the private competitive campground is always cleaner, dol
lar for dollar, than its public counterpart, and 3) that no one
would let an industiralist dump factory wastes into his private
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river without charging a stiff (monopoly) price, a price high
enough to ensure that pollution will not reach a point that -will
take profits from the owner's recreation business.

And so on.

Nov it is clear that Skinner has taken the environmentalist
platform rather than the ecologist's analysis as his special view
point.

It is this orientation that permits Skinner the above com

parison between the actions of those concerned with generating
beauty and the actions of the social engineer.

However, the "art

ists, musicians, architects, and others who create beautiful
things" are concerned with the manipulation of a closed set of con
trolling variables already secured and already known (e.g. paint
and canvas, music paper and piano, bricks and tables of engineering
specifications).

Each set represents a comprehensible small (or

closed) system that can be shaped, organized, and made beautiful
(reinforcing).

However, the beauty of all such homo-faber art lies

in its simplicity, completeness, relative permanence, and pleasing
discriminable form— in its whole effect upon the beholders.

Con

sequently, this "furthering-the-beauty" orientation is inadequate
as an interpretation of the consequences of social-control manipu
lations within the incalculably complex open set of relevant vari
ables which comprise the field of human— environment interaction.
Instead of following the aesthetically indifferent science of
ecology or market economics, Skinner has taken and shaped the ap
proach of the landscape architect.

Understandably, he prefers

planned beauty to unplanned ugliness.

However, he fails to ac

knowledge that the regularity, symmetry, and fashioned beauty of a
landscaped garden require tremendous doses of outside energy (viz.
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irrigation, mowing, pruning, dusting, pulling, fertilizing, and
planting) to be maintained— i.e., to survive.

Without this exter

nal intervention the biotic movement that has been held in check
(i.e. unplanned growth— including what hortensial aesthetes des
cribe as 'weeds' and 'pests'— and true endogenous natural selec
tion, i.e., nature's own free i&arket) will transform the habitat
into something very different and, perhaps, depending upon who you
are, ugly.

Therefore, it cannot be said, in Skinner's sense, that

a more beautiful natural environment has been "created"— rather, a
condition regarded as beautiful has been held for a while at a con
tinual cost.

Logical extension from landscaped gardens to monopol-

istically controlled social environments is obvious.

Yet, nowhere

does Skinner ask if we are willing to pay this kind of cost (i.e.
the cost of gaining and maintaining prepotency over the catallaxy)
and nowhere has he shown any taste for that "trivial" science which
makes the costs of "beautifying" the social environment known.

Economics and reinforcement psychology

Economics seeks to point up the nonobvious (or remote) conse
quences of human actions in a world of scarce resources and humans
for whom those resources form a substantial part of the sets of
conditions generating human behavior.

Reinforcement psychology

seeks to point up the nonobvious effects of the consequences of in
dividual action upon the subsequent action of that same individual,
i.e., the ways in which an individual's behavior is selected ac
cording to past encounters with consequences.

Both are different

from the natural sciences which seek to establish principles con
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cerning the effects of one class of non—behavioral event, under
known conditions, upon another class of non-behavioral event.

The

principles of reinforcement psychology (the science of consequencecontrolled behavior) are relevant to economics (the science of be
havior-controlled and behavior-controlling consequences) insofar as
the consequences of human action include all ramifications of the
contributions which the action of partial controllers or monopol
istic controllers make to the control of others within the social
environment.
Only in the autistic economy of Robinson Crusoe (without Fri
day) do economics and reinforcement psychology become the same in
their relation to the natural environment and natural sciences.
There, independent contingencies and monopolistic contingencies are
the same.

Crusoe, as a partial controller alone, is also an un

rivaled monopolistic controller of one.

With complete knowledge of

the relevant natural-science principles and of the changing partic
ulars of the island, (horrendously complex) monopolistic analysis
of Crusoe's behavior becomes theoretically possible, an analysis
which (again theoretically) could be conducted by Crusoe himself.
With the arrival of Friday, however, Walden One becomes Walden Two,
and the problem of community control becomes an question.

Examining Skinnerfs social prescription on a^ comprehensible scale

The device of Robinson Crusoe’s island has a long and vener
able history in social and economic theory.

The clarity which it

affords to the evaluation of utopian proposals is still available
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The insinuation of Friday as a partial— controlling newcomer to
the island imparts to both individuals benefits from the exchange
of specialized productive services made possible under a two-part
division of labor.

However, Friday also brings with him an end to

Crusoe's monopoly of human intelligence and power on the island,
and the loss of any tight experimental predictability of human
events which Crusoe may have enjoyed.
Crusoe may be interested in recovering that greater proportion

The method which step-by-step builds a (necessarily theoret
ical) causal or genetic account of economic development from Crusoe
to the real world belongs largely to the 'Austrian' school of econ
omics. See Murry Rothbard's Man, Economy, and State (Los Angeles:
Nash Publishing, 1970) for the best recent example.
This school of
'subjective use value' (i.e subjective in the sense of being based
on the inherited and learned behavior of the single individual)
takes as its theme the consequences of a world of imperfectly
adapted individuals each aiming at more satiated and less aversive
states within a changing environment that includes the market.
It
is interesting to further note that early members of this school
(e.g. Carl Menger, an originator of marginal-utility analysis)
strove to link their theory of value to the organic psychology of
their time, but soon found that neither the biology nor the physio
logy of the nineteenth century could supply an interpretive compli
ment to what its critics were calling the school of hedonistic psy
chologism By the time E. L. Thorndike's "Law of Effect" was enun
ciated the effort had already extinguished. The laws of economics
had by then come to seek sanction from l) Economic Man, i.e., a set
of arbitrary postulates, deductions from which are inductively
tested against the conduct of actual business firms, 2) introspec
tive or a^ priori knowledge of the intentional application of the
general category of means and ends, from which a completely deduc
tive or rationalistic economics was elaborated, and 3) statistical
inference, including, especially, regression analysis, which tests
the predictions and contents of econometric models of systems of
aggregate variables, models which make no appeal to either causa
tion or the properties of individual behavior. For an account of
the Austrian economists' historical flirtation with psychology, see
Lawrence K. 'White, The Methodology of the Austrian School, (New
York: The Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977).
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of predictability and environmental control which were in so many
ways reinforcing in his solitary (and poorer) days before Friday.
After all, he now finds himself doing work— which is as unpleasant
as ever— to produce commodities which he himself will not consume,
but which now are important only in a mediate way, as goods for
which Friday will exchange the prodcuts of his own labor.

Since

there is no absolute scale which measures how much fish equals a
given amount of clothing or how much time spent fishing equals the
time spent skinning animals and sewing garments, the determination
of rates of exchange falls, therefore, naturally to the process of
catallactic relations.
Partly because of the increased distance between labor and its
fruits and partly because of the open-endedness of the exchange re
lations, Crusoe begins to find his trading partner an especially
lazy companion who asks unreasonable amounts of aversive activity
in exchange for his own handiwork.

As the weaker and less produc

tive of the two, Crusoe is bound to formulate some varient of the
dictum: from each according to his ability and to each according to
his needs.

Yet, no matter how dissatisfied he is with his loss of

prediction and control and with Friday's apparently cutthroat dealling, the European is not willing to give up the considerable ad
vantages of Friday's specialized contributions only to return to
the autistic economy of a hermit.
One night, let us imagine, Crusoe opens his water-damaged
volume of Skinner's works and reads there:
"A social environment functions most effectively for the
individual, the group, and the species, if so far as pos
sible, people directly control people.
The design of a
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social environment in which they do so is one of our most
pressing needs.
It is quite clearly a special challenge
to psychology as a science of behavior."!
This appears reasonable to Crusoe. Ke considers:

Certainly

Friday consumes too much of our scarce energy resources; he eats
too much; he demands too many things from our joint production,
things which he really does not need; he does not do enough hunt
ing, gathering, fishing, building, and storing; he does not do
enough to keep the hut hygienically clean; in fact, the private
aims which Friday pursues contribute absolutely nothing to what I
know is in our best long-run interest.
He reads on:
"Those who act to improve government of the people, by the
people, for the people have been selected by special, pos
sibly accidental circumstances. Since they have been se
lected, they are an elite . . . Their task is . . .to
bring people under the control of more effective physical
and social environments."1
At this point Crusoe remembers his flintlock.

Here is the

"accidental circumstance" that entitles him to restore the monopol
istic prediction and control of his former autistic economy without
his foregoing the benefits he has been deriving from cooperative
exchange.
He quickly reads the essays on social control.

He learns that

constant direct aversive control would be bad design, that exten
sive use of punishment to achieve practical ends would lead to es-

^B. F. Skinner, "Between Freedom and Despotism," op. cit..
p. 91
^ibid.
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cape in ever-more refinedways, or possibly result in violent count
erattack or stubborn resistance. Rather than risk this, he adopts
Skinner's implied and specified solutions: he will confiscate all
of Friday's reinforcers (implied) and then dispense them contingen
tly (specified).
provider he is.

This will make Friday see him as the beneficient
Of course, this means that Crusoe will have to

forego much of the time normally spent hunting and trapping in or
der to supervise Friday, making sure that he does not override so
cial control by snitching from production (which is always at hand)
and secretly stockpiling his own self-reinforcement capability,
i.e., acting in stealth as Crusoe had acted freely before Friday
arrived.
After the first day of implementing the new system, Crusoe
stays up late by the fire collating new data in his plan for the
beautification of the island and for the continued survival of his
cultural control practices.

Suddenly, and doubtless owing to his

early ethical training in a contenental-liberal culture, Crusoe
feels a familiar twinge in his stomache: Was it necessary to blow
Friday's left hand off when he exhibited predictable aggression and
attempted to resist confiscation by coming at me with that rock?
For reassurance, Crusoe again turns to his edition of Skinner:
"A program of contingency management which begins by
taking something away from people suggests a lack of com
passion. . . But although a state in which all needs are
satisfied may appeal to those who have struggled to satis
fy needs, it is in a curious sense a state of deprivation,
a state in which people are deprived of reinforcements
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•which induce them to behave."*
After reading this, Crusoe picks up his pencil and -writes the
following on the back of one of Friday's performance charts:

If I

am to continue to induce Friday to behave, he must forever be kept
from obtaining all of the ends which are important to him.

Without

my continuous and consistent control over him, this scientific de
sign for beauty and survival on our island may never be realized.
Therefore, Skinner is right, insofar as I cannot ethically permit
Friday to be deprived of the deprivation which will induce him to
work for our culture.

As for Friday himself, his frivolous designs

when left to the exchange environment are incompatible with my sci
entific designs for survival.

Besides, as Skinner has the founder

of Walden Two say, "The majority of people . . .want to be free of
responsibility and planning.
cently provided for."^
plishes that.

What they ask for is that they be de

Obviously,

(he concludes) my plan accom

Q. E, D.

Confiscating something reinforcing in order to return it con
tingently may, as Skinner avers, suggests lack of compassion, but
it is unquestionably aversive insofar as the 'taking away' func
tions as punishment and evokes all of the behavioral by-products of
punishment which Skinner has taught about (viz. escape, aggression,
avoidance, unpleasant counter-productive emotional behavior).

*id., Cumulative Record, op. cit., p . 290

p

id.. Walden Two, op. cit.. p. 253
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the extent that the sequestering of reinforcers and means of rein
forcement is aversive, to that extent Skinner, with Marx (that
other ’exappropriator') is advocating violent revolution; and the
fact that he nowhere makes the connection or, perhaps, as a social
ist, is convinced that the concept of ownership is prescientific,
does not make the fact any less factual.
Skinner's justification for confiscation, i.e., the doctrine
of deprivation of the deprivation -which induced people to -work for
their culture is entirely spurious.

With the possible exception of

the ascetic saint, perfect satiety has never been achieved in the
laboratory or elsewhere.

Only relative satiety, relative depriv

ation, and relative states of aversive stimulation have been stud
ied.

It is not inconsistent -with the current findings of the sci

ence of behavior to say that the ordering of deprivations for any
organism continues indefinitely, that as prepotent responses bring
an organism to a certain level of deprivation relative to all other
dimensions of deprivation, the formerly next most powerful depriv
ation assumes control, and so on indefinitely.

The point at -which

the inside of the skin is in perfect homeostatic equilibrium with
the universe outside the skin may be asymptotically approached
through continuously effective operant behavior, but has never
been known to have been reached.

(Of course, -we are here merely

stating the law of marginal utility behavioristically.)
Skinner’s reference to a curious state of deprivation in which
people, because of satiety, are "deprived of reinforcements -which
induce them to behave productively" can only be viewed as a disin
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genuous defence of the right of Crusoe, the controller, to keep
Friday, the ordinary member of the culture, deprived so that Cru
soe may continue to use Friday as an instrument for operating upon
the environment in ways that satiate Crusoe and remove what is
aversive to Crusoe.

The fact that Crusoe is a trained scientist

who has data and methods to see remote consequences that others do
not and that he is reinforced by cultural survival and finds a poor
and sick society aversive; lends no power whatsoever to Skinner's
argument, since there remains the probability that such a wise
Philosopher King would conclude that the best design would be that
he abdicate monopolistic control in favor of the much-wiser market
place.
Could the Crusoe in our story reach any other conclusion?

Walden Two

Frazier's community, Walden Two, as it is described in Skin
ner's novel, Walden Two, cannot be evaluated.

The community is

supposed to be an empirical-experimentation-based monopolistic 'in
tentional culture.'

Yet, the book that portrays it is, itself,

wholly a rationalistic construction.

An assumption of its logic

is that there are no reasons why the community could not work.
Jules Verne, a man influenced by the same 'scientistic' Comteian tradition as Skinner, wrote a novel featuring a cannon designed
to shoot people around the moon.

Verne described the cannon's ar

chitecture, dimensions, materials, casting, and motive force.

Yet,

a modern physicist has calculated that Verne's projectile and its
occupants would have been vaporized half way up the barrel had the
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device really been fired.

Still, this contradiction of scientific

lav did not keep Verne from successfully fireing his fictional can
non, sending his voyagers around the moon, and, most reinforcingly,
back to earth.

What is more, the real-life readers of this best

seller felt vicariously rewarded by the accomplishment.

Verne had

succeeded in going beyond his reader's trained scientific ken, in
creating the illusion of a genuine record of empirical events, in
writing good science fiction. In a work of fiction we can describe
perpetual motion machines, the defying of gravity, and travel back
through time.

Those familiar with the laws of thermodynamics and

relativity will not be fooled.

We can also describe, impression

istically, a positive-reinforcement community run by a monopolistic
planning agency that remains effectively on top of things without
a market and without a popular scuffle.

Although not yet obvious

to the layman, this too is science fiction.
Walden Two is a rationalistic construction rather than an em
pirical record.
al analysis.

Yet, it is not rational enough to permit a ration

The construction is not rigorous.

The workings of

the various institutions have not been drawn with all interrela
tionships fit together.

Frazier's topical monologues and rambing

dialogues with the visitors, often interrupted at crucial points,
although direct and compelling, do not add up to a description of
Walden Two that is translatable into a system-analytic diagram or
econometric model.

Economic questions go unanswered.

According to his own estimate, sixty per cent of Skinner's
writings have been about society and not about the science of be
havior.

One can only wish that Skinner would have used that time
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to formulate a comprehensive and unified view of all behavioral and
social science, as earlier behaviorist, E. L. Thorndike did in his
monumental Human Nature and the Social Order.*

Walden Two and the

various collections of Skinner’s monographs do not fit the bill.
As it is -written, Walden Two enables Skinner to fudge, re
treat, and retrench -with respect to seemingly essential features of
his utopia (e.g. "The labor-credit system -was pure Marx.

A more

effective system could be designed today.”2) -while, at the same
time, keeping the alleged 'greater truth1 of its message intact.
It is, in this sense, a book that can be used much like the Holy
Bible, viz., a source of control that is beyond testing.

When at

tempts, e.g., the Twin Oaks community (described below), have been
made to emulate Frazier’s work, the ensuing failure (e.g. all orig
inal members of Twin Oaks have defected, their emptied ranks being
filled by a rapid turnover of fresh Walden Two converts) is invari
ably attributed to not following Skinner's system, or its spirit
(of experimentation), closely enough.

This is reminiscent of the

faithful of the perfectionist communities -who blamed the termin
ation of their communities upon a common failure to adhere strict
ly to the teachings of scripture.
For these reasons, we shall here ignore the workings of
Frazier's Walden Two and turn our attention, instead, to the real—

*E. L. Thorndike, Human Nature and the Social Order, (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1940)
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•world consequences of the efforts of the book's real-world follow
ing.

Although such communities do not receive Skinner's unquali

fied blessing, we shall, in examining them, at least have the sure
ty that we are not studying the machinery of a dream.

Twin Oaks

An experimental community has been operating in Virginia since
1967.

It was founded by a woman named Kathleen Kinkade and others

who were moved, at least in part, by Skinner's Walden Two.

The

farm and first new building were the gifts of a wealthy sympath
izer.

From the first, its members have been selected (or filtered)

by their attraction to the Walden Two ideology.

Skinner's book was

literally the promotional vehicle that created the market for this
enterprise.
"Because we have Wa1den Two, we do not need a leader or
teacher.
Cooperation is possible because we have all, be
fore we even joined, agreed upon the general principles of
the community described in that book. Enormous ground is
covered in that general agreement— including such items as
a scientific, experimental approach to problem solving,
the community of property, the dissolution of the nuclear
family, and the willingness to deliberate about the mould
ing of character and personality.
The community has clearly derived its governmental procedure,
its labor credit system, and its code of conduct from the novel.
The code is easily summarized: people must act and be treated as

^•Kathleen Kinkade, A Walden Two Experiment, Forward bv B. F.
Skinner, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1973^ p. 57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

189

though they are equal, no one must look more capable than anyone
else, trade secrets must be revealed, experience must have no priv
ileges, no one may complain, no one may discuss his political views
when local outsiders are present, everyone must be considerate,
everyone must clean up after himself, and everyone must be allowed
one place to be alone.* Three rotated planners are given absolute
power to set priorities, change the structure

of government, and

shape all policy as long as they remain within the code and can
avoid popular rebellion.

Administration of the plan is the job

of several bureaucrats, called managers.

The managers are respon

sible to the planners, but are generally granted considerable lee
way in choice of methods.

Each manager is in charge of a different

work catagory, e.g., food, farming, crafts, hammock assembly, con
struction, child control, etc.
Control of the members is ultimately based upon their relative
aversion to the world outside.

All are apparently repelled by the

competition to produce for the market, by buying and selling, by
the quest for individual success, and by the demands and sacrifices
of family life.

The strong egalitarian and anti-private-property

bent as well as the frequent Marxist cant and hippy appearance of
most of the members is indicative of a failure of socialization in
to the role of productive partial controller.

At any rate, a cer

tain amount of labor credits must be accumulated to avoid being
asked to leave.

^Journal of a Walden Two Commune: The Collected Leaves of Twin
Oaks, (Louisa: The Twin Oaks Community,1972) p . i i i
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" 'What would you do if a member didn't do his work?' asked
Burris of Frazier, in balden Two.
'I can't imagin it,'
said Frazier.
'We'd think of something.' We are often
asked that same question, but our answer is a little more
definite. . .'We would ask him to leave,' was the reply."
Labor credits are made contingent upon plan-serving activity.
The plan is divided into discrete tasks and a list of these is giv
en to each member.

The member ranks forty of the tasks in the or

der of his preference.

The managers then delegate members to each

task more or less by preference ranking.

High-preference tasks re

ceive fewer points and lower preference tasks receive more points.
There has been a recurring tendency to inflate the point require
ments.
In the community; food, shelter, and whatever else is avail
able is given non-contingently and 'equally.'
behavior controls the distribution process,

In practice envyhaving decided that

giving one person a musical instrument does not mean that everyone
should have one, or that everyone should have something of equal
market value, or that everyone should receive something equally in
proportion to his capacity for enjoyment, the community finally
settled upon the criterion of distributing commodities only insofar
as no member "feels that somebody else has unfairly usurped his
share.Thus

the envvocracy.

"Equality in a community is a relationship so structured
that no member envys another. Simple.
". . .We do not intend, if we can help it, to permit in
equalities of the type where one member has something that

*ibid.. p. 74
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the other member -would -wish to have but is denied for
no fault of his own."^
Despite claims that it is the 'small— is—beautiful' vangard of
the successor to the capitalistic corporate state, we may view this
communal establishment as an entrepreneural venture within the
catallaxy.

It offers to a certain subset of people a special en

vironment which is (to them) more reinforcing that that which the
competition is making known.

In this respect it is little differ

ent from Disneyland, Holiday Inns, retirement communities, or the
combined city and Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco— although in
other respects, e.g., profitability and financing, it more closely
resembles a donation—supported monastic retreat.

It has been pack

aged for a particular minority within American society— a group
which includes its founders— and, beign such, is representative of
the exotic specialized markets which characteristically are cater
ed to only in free-market societies.

The Asian communist coun

tires, which many of the community members fervently admire, would
never spare either the resources or the manpower for experimenting
with a possibly successful alternative to the authoritative dogma
for which they have sacrificed millions of lives.

It is, perhaps,

for such reasons that nonrevolutionary utopian communists have
traditionally sought the most laissez-faire countries for the conthe conduct of their social experiments.

Ms. Kinkade's community

is a registered legal partnership of Virginia.

Its members, Marx

ists included, and their joint property, remain under the protec

1ibid.
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tion of the federal, state, and local lavs of this vestigial lib
eral society.
What is of special interest to us in the present thesis is the
assertion by Ms. Kinkade that her group has created an experimental
society vhich is somehov opposed to the catallaxy and -which can
suggest the means of its replacement.

This belief is accepted al

most universally by the members of the community, by radical pol
itical behaviorists. by the devotees of Ms. Kinkade, and by most
Skinnerians.

They hold that the community has proven that partial

control may be harmlessly traded off for nonaversive experimental
control, and that smallness eliminates bureaucratic inefficiency,
involves little sacrifice, and solves the Hayekian problem of econ
omic knowledge and coordination.
"What keeps our system from turning into a tiresome
bureaucracy is its simplicity— that decisions can be made
swiftly by at most three people, and usually by a single
manager using his or her judgement."^
One must be completely blinded to the achievement of the mar
ketplace not to realize that the organization and planning of Ms.
Kinkade *s coumunity represent only the final and penultimate stages
of a vast catallactic process.

The decisions of her planners and

managers are almost an insignificant fraction of the prior decis
ions made within the catallaxy which are directly responsible for
the clothing, shelter, food, transportation, comfort, and enter
tainment of the coumunity.

We have already referred to Leonard

^Kinkade, op. cit., p. 55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Read's discovery that no one knows how to make a pencil*
cils abound in Ms. Kinkade's community.

Yet pen

All are 'imported.'

These

handy writing implements would be indispensible were there no pens
to substitute for them.

The pens are imported too.

And so are the

books, shoes, shirts, tractors, bannanas, medications, cars, ra
dios, telephones, flour, phonographs, steel products, plastic pro
ducts, eyeglasses, paper, cotton, scissors, light bulbs, clay pipe,
fiberboard, matches, and clocks, as well as the cord, chain, and
rings, out of which the members 'make' the hammocks they sell.
The community has materials and appliances from all over the free
world, brought to Virginia by profit-seeking importers.

One looks

in vain for any complaint that the things they need have not been
made available to buy.

At almost every point of its existence the

community has been sustained by the catallaxy which surrounds it.
Having begun to penetrate both its propaganda and its mys
tique, we see that this soi-disant intentional community, hailed
as the most successful in the country, is a collection of people
with common interests who are ensconced on a piece of southern
real estate where they enjoy the fruit of capitalist production
mixed with their own cooperative housekeeping.

(One notes that the

products of this community are no more varied or impressive than
those of any well-organized American family farm.)

Still, there

can be no gainsaying the fact that the members are receiving what
they appear to value, i.e., an atmosphere of communist fellowship
in which each verbally reinforces the others' belief that they are
the first to achieve in practice the leftist intellectuals' dream
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of eradicating dependence upon partial-controller relations.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to find fault with those
who seek such an atmosphere.

In the purchasing of an enjoyable

lifestyle, 'the customer is always right.'

Still, while recogniz

ing the principle of consumer sovereignty vithin the 'lifestyle
market,* ve may nevertheless ponder vhether this particular wish
ful-thinking mode of living can be sustained in more than just a
few exceptional showcase communities.
Of extreme relevance to this last question is the fact that
Us. Kinkade's community continues to take from the catallaxy more
than it gives back.

Without the extensive charity of what must be

a finite number of wealthy sympathizers, the community would have
operated at a loss every year of its existence.

In this respect it

is not unlike the philanthropy-supported indigent vorkfarms of
nineteenth—century England.

Subscriptions, donations, book royal

ties, and the outside work of a few members pay for the lion's
share of the community's market purchases.

The internal produc

tion of the community— which includes haimnock assembly, contract
typing, dairy farming, vegetable produce, crafts, printing, lectur
ing, and fold—dance instruction— contribute less than half of the
conmunity's revenues.^

Credit is extended to the community every

month by the local (profit-seeking) merchants.

And there is alms-

seeking:
"If your coming this way and have room in your station
wagon anyway, Twin Oaks could use: kitchen chairs, bedding

*Journal of a Walden Two Commune, op. cit., pp. 38, 96
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of all kinds, rugs, tools, building materials, hymn books
or other three— or four-part choral music, art materials,
yarn. . ."1
The lifegiving donations by exogenous friends and those mid
dle— class visionaries vho buy a hammock to support the Skinnerian
cause, are instances of the community's reliance upon the catal
laxy.

Tiro other forms of eatallactic dependence, viz., the taking

of outside work by some members and the surrender of the disposi
tion of the financial and real-property holdings of new members,
demonstrate within the community itself an undeniably parasitic re
lationship between man and man.
The clearest exposition of the collective exploitation of the
community's small but necessary group of partial controllers,

i.e.,

the outside workers, is found in the community's own official jour
nal :
"There are issues on which there is no possible agreement,
and on which a decision is badly needed. Take for exam
ple, the fourth item on the agenda, a discussion of the
current financial situation and a suggestion that we send
some of our members to find jobs in the nearby cities in
order to make ends meet. Status quo will not answer here,
for the current practices (we will say) mean ruin to the
Community. Loud voice has opinions and expresses them,
but there is no greatful acceptance of his ideas this
time, for every member is threatened by the suggestion.
There is intense argument. Several members, especially
those who know they can easily find work, argue in favor
of the Outside Job Plan and say (rather contemptuously)
that they will volunteer to to be the first to go, but
that in good time every member should take his turn. Some
other members, especially those who have not held regular
jobs for many years and are not sure they could get and
hold a job, argue that community is meaningless if members
have to hold outside jobs. Someone suggests borrowing

^•loc. cit., p. 93
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money and starting an industry. Another throws in cutting
back the standard of living and eating brown rice and hon
ey, having the phone taken out, and letting automobiles
ground themselves as they gradually run out of gas."*
"As to the outside job question, the board will know
whether it is necessary, and if it is, they will set up a
system and ask the members to cooperate with it."2
"Originally we needed only two outside workers to bring in
enough cash. Our current expenditures require eight work
ers. "3
"After we started depending primarily upon outside
jobs as a means of support, the planning job seemed a lit
tle easier."4
"Outside work has always been our least popular job,
and there are good reasons why this is so. Getting up at
5:30 in the morning is one of them. Sack lunches is an
other. For the least skilled, the jobs themselves can be
very bad. . . It is easy to become estranged and feel left
out. It is hard to fight the feeling that you are being
exploited, particularly if you come home to find that some
inside worker did not iron your blouse, or the lunch pack
er has forgotten that you cannot stand pickles in your
tuna salad. Inside workers tend to forget what outside
work is like, and adjust very quickly to the leisurely
pace of normal community activities.
"Suppose for example that you're the garden manager
and are trying to manage the garden in the evening and
weekends in spite of your outside job. You make plans,
requisition the labor, explain the work to those signed
up for it, and then come home to find it undone because
'it was too hot to work, and a bunch of us went swim
ming. ' . . .Occasionally a member will leave the commun
ity because outside work is so hateful that he cannot face
another twenty days of it."5

Moc. cit., P* 77-78
^loc. cit., P- 80
5loc. cit. , p. 91

II

cit., P- 96

5loc. cit., P* 91
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"It has been repeatedly suggested that ire allow certain
people to be entirely free from obligation to do outside
irork— those people fro Thom it is truly hideous, who
'freak out' in a factory or office. There is some jus
tice to the suggestion. Are ire not dedicated to the
principle 'From each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs"? But the drawbacks of basing a
policy on that principle are obvious. If we made excep
tions of that kind, ire would find our group of outside
workers once again consisting largely of volunteers who
have salable skills, spending most of their time outside
the Community supporting an ever-growing group of those
who intensely dislike outside work."*
Hardly anyone in the everyday world of business engages in
work for its intrinsic value.

There is both a supply of labor and

a demand for labor between employer and employee.

The higher the

wage that is offered, the more willing one is to transfer from a
more pleasant job to a less pleasant job.

Ms. Kinkade's community

sends its outside workers to be employed in unpleasant work by city
businessmen.

On payday these workers surrender their paychecks to

the appropriate community manager.

Later they each receive from

the community the same less-than—a—dollar allowance that all other
members receive.

In one sense the outside workers resemble the

American 'family breadwinner* with many children to support, but
the community's proportion of outside workers to dependents is con
siderably smaller than the nuclear family's average proportion of
breadwinners to children, making the outside worker's share of the
'bread* he earns correspondingly less than that of Dad or Mom.
The second form of group dependence upon the individual mem
ber's partial control involves the wealth which new members bring

1ibid.
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to the community.
"Our financial and property policies reflect our de
termination to avoid a privileged class. Members get no
cash income except a very small allowance which has ranged
between twenty-five cents and a dollar a week. Any money
which they might have owned before joining simply stays in
the bank for the first three years unless they want to do
nate it to the community. In any case, Twin Oaks receives
the interest on it, as well as the dividends on any stocks
and bonds, rents from any property, or any continuing in
come of any kind."*
As has been demonstrated by the Soviet state, Red China and
other collectivist efforts throughout history, whenever the fruits
of any increase in one man's exertions in aversive labor must be
distributed equally among a lar^e froup rather than placed at the
disposal of the man himself, the result is invariably a wholesale
failure of production.

This is why m o d e m socialist countries,

Red China included, regularly jettison their theories and resort to
market production or Western imports to pull their chestnuts out of
the fire.

Ms. Kinkade's "radical alternative to the kind of life

we have left," is no different than the larger historical variants,
despite the fact that her group is earnestly comnitted to "make our
little society conform to our ideals."2
"Many a hopeful member would take a managership with
the intention of seeing the department thrive under his
care, only to find that the other members working in his
department just don't care enough to do a good job, and
good projects were continually being sabotaged by indif
ference."2

^Kathleen Kinkade, op. cit.. p. 49
p

Journal of a Walden Two Commune, op. cit., p. 85

g

loc. cit., p. 90
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No manipulation of the labor-credit system has been able to
alleviate this problem beyond the first few optimisitc weeks.

Mem

bers dedicated to the principle of collectivism and contingency
management are puzzeled by their own "procrastination."*

It is

discovered that "there are always people who claim more credits
than they reasonably should."^

The rule of no public grumbling or

griping is violated to declare, "What I can*t stand is that nobody
O

here will take a project and see it through to the end."°
To combat this problem the comnunity adopted the political in
doctrination technique of public criticism and self-examination de
veloped by Mao Tse-Tung when confronted with exactly the same prob
lem.

As on girl publically confessed:
"Basically, I can get away with doing whatever I
want. But at Twin Oaks I am beginning to believe that in
the long run I don't really want to try to get away with
everything, because I've seen other people here act like
that, and I've seen how it affects the whole group; and I
think people who act completely selfishly are shits. I
don't want to think of myself that w a y . " ^
The socialist-self-criticism experiment accomplished two

two things in the community.

It changed verbal behavior and it

eliminated the practice of socialist self-criticism.
"'The main thing I got out of the session was that every
body criticised the same thing— my public bitching, even
when it was justified. I had really thought that some
people were mature enough to appreciate public criticism

1loc. cit., P» 62
^loc. cit., P* 60
3loc. cit., P* 51
4loc. cit., P« 63
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▼hen it was needed, and I didn't realize that dislike for
it was so universal. "'1
In the end, the community returned to reliance upon officially
circulated exhortations and admonitions aimed at everyone and at no
one in particular, e.g.:
HIf I don't do may vork someone else will have to do it
for me; if I do this very often I just von't be doing my
share; and everyone who doesn'tdo his share is a
schmuck."2
Faced vith the fact (evident in the increasing reliance of the
community upon the catallaxy) that the community is living beyond
its means, the response has not been

a careful examination and re-

evaluation of the problem of collectivist production, but rather a
rehash of modern communism's defensive inversion of that problem,
viz., how to shape human acceptance of the ever-smaller economic
pie, and how to teach the 'virtue' of zero-growth, negative-growth,
and sacrifice to the collective.
"In order to make even an adequate supply of anything
go around, it is necessary for everyone to have simple and
modest tastes and desires. That means creation of an en
tirely new culture— non-competitive, non-consumerist . . .
First there is the problem of making a decent supply of
desirable things available. That's economics. Then
there's the necessity of keeping people's desires within
bounds, so that the economic problem doesn't keep multi
plying. That's cultural planning.
Let us first consider the community's applied "economics."

In

an early article on "Twin Oaks Leadership" by Ms. Kinkade, we find

h o c ,

cit.. p. 69

h o c , cit., p. 60
%athleen Kinkade, op. cit.. p. 58
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the folloving passage:
"Somebody has to make decision (sic). Shall ire raise
corn next year? Hot much labor can t « afford to spare for
building an experimental dome? Hov many automobiles shall
ire license? To vhat extent should a biological mother
care for the newborn? Can ve put money into recreational
activities this year? Is it desirable to raise individual
cash allovances? Hoir fast can ire effectively absorb nev
members? Should visitors be encouraged? Shall ire openly
solicit funds?. . . These decisions are made by the board
of planners, unless it's clearly a managerial decision.
Clearly the comnunity has adopted the centralized-economy ap
proach to the problems of production and distribution.

They have

accepted at face value the assurance of Skinner, Schumacher, and
the pure Maoists that small-scale production can replace market
coordination and obviate the problems of bureaucracy.

The question

nov is: irith their small scale and vith the vast simplifications
made possible by an exogenous and gratuitous supply of a great many
necessities, hov are the remaining economic decisions made?

H

o y

do the planners come to utilize the independent contingencies of
the environment for this or that end?

H

o y

do they gauge the rel

ative value of this or that alteration of the community habitat?
H

o y

is the superstructure designed vhich they impose upon all mem

bers?

Hov do they measure efficiency or their chosen standard of

distribution, i.e., envy.

H

o y

do theyscientifically (and not just

mathematically) integrate the facts of their simple and externally
assisted community to devise a plan vhich realizes their self-des
cription as an intentional community?

In short, hov do they re-

^Journal of a Walden Tvo Commune, op. cit., p. 61
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place the partial-controlling entrepreneurs?
The ansver to all of these questions is unequivocally supplied
in a much-later article:
H .
• .could ve buy some covs and some trees and a smaller
freezer? Or should ve put off some of these projects un
til
next year? And hov doyou budget things like that?
"Money isn't the only thing that has to be budgeted,
either. Bov much labor vill the garden and food proces
sing demand? Hov much vill be left for construction?
Considering the number of simple facts that ve .just do not
knov. the planning problem is staggering. For instance,
ve don't knov hov veil any of the vegetable crops vill
do, and therefore hov much food there vill be to process;
hov many members and visitors vill be on hand each veek
for the vork; vhat skilled people may have joined by then
or vill be visiting; vhether or not unexpected sources of
cash may appear. Planning is really just careful gues
sing."* (italics supplied)
For those vho are capable of critically examining vhat Ms.
Kinkade has accomplished and vho can judge vithout favoritism and
vithout regard to their established reputation, ve see here explod
ed the myth that small communities are manageable (and therefore
beautiful); that communism suddenly vorks vhen the system of the
catallactic division of labor is partially dismantled.

The econom

ic problem of Ms. Kinkade's community is not solved— it is merely
covered up by 'foreign aid' from the vell-off American left.

The

supposedly scientific and rational planner is revealed as no more
than a single risk-taking entrepreneur, an entrepreneur vith the
usual limited information, but one vho has been given monopolis
tic domination of the entrepreneurial function, thereby removing

*loc. cit.. p. 97
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himself from the field of competitive selection on the basis of
superior allocative judgments, the comparative measure vhich is the
only measure of entrepreneurial performance and *survivability.'
The monopolist planner does not scientifically refute the sugges
tions of the other members, he merely passes over their judgment to
make his ovn educated guesses.

The overridden suggestions of the

others, the vould—be entrepreneurial competitors, are never tried.
The regular pool of planners, appealing to the resulting econ
omic blindness of the community have developed a ratio" lization
for keeping control in their hands and avay from rivals.
"The job (of planner) requires agility of mind, rea
sonableness of judgment, commitment to the goals of the
community, and sharp self-avareness. . . The charge of incompetence (has alvays fallen) vide of the mark, because
it imputes to the job vhat the job vas never intended to
have. Furthermore, the accuser invariably marks himself,
by his accusation, as not understanding the purpose of
plannership. This in turn makes us fearful that such a
person vould abuse the position if he had it, so he never
gets it. . .
"At the bottom of the anger on this subject is the
assuoqjtion that the person vho can do intellectual vork
like decision-making is somehov better than one vho has
difficulty thinking straight, and that the appointment to
a job that requires thinking therefore merits and gets
prestige based on that evaluation. . • Recognizing this as
a prejudice vhich is detrimental to an egalitarian soci
ety, ve are determined to do avay vith it, if possible in
one generation.
One can only pity the intelligent and innovative young Skin
nerians vho have been taken in by this ruse.
Having established that the community has no rational means of
making the supply of goods and services meet the demand, ve finally

^-Kathleen Kinkade, op. cit., p . 244
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turn to the system vhich Ms. Kinkade and the other planners have
adopted to make the demand fit the supply.
Their rule is that "no member shall enjoy financial privi
leges that are denied the rest of us. . ."

The poor and non-pro

ductive derelicts are to be made into successfully ascetic saints.
Each member receives according to his needs and everyone's needs
are equal (except vhen an individual has managed to vin a conces
sion from group envy.)
allovance.

All receive the same food, all get the same

Furthermore, conscious exchanges of prestige, status,

and even recognition of achievement are denied to everyone.

Even

invention and innovation are accorded little attention for fear of
raising the spector of human inequality and marshaling social pun
ishment.
"If some people are more useful than others, let them
serve more. We vant a society that rejoices in the use
fulness and enjoyable talents of its members, vithout ac
cording anyone prestige or honor on account of them."1
We recognize here, not the acknovledgement of Skinner's con
tingency-controlled man, but a call for Mao's perfectly altruistic
communist man, the man imagined to emerge from the final dialectic
al negation of the capitalist superstructure and from the Great
Cultural Revolution.

Ms. Kinkade, the most frequent planner of the

community, seeks the engineer, inventor, creative artist, and la
borer vho vill vork harder and harder even as everything they
create is taken from them and distributed to meet the needs of the

1ibid.
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conanunity.

Ultimately, she seeks individuals vho vill operate

vithout approval, vithout attention, vithout freedom or dignity,
but only vith needs (everyone's constant demand for the fruits
of productivity), and envy, and pover (vhich resides in the plan
ners vho lay claim, as allocators, to everyone's productive and
creative capacity.) Although a fev members appear to be convin
cing first approximations, ve are, nevertheless, safe concluding
that the cultural engineering that vould shape such miraculous
persons is novhere in evidence at Tvin Oaks.
The gap vhich these intentional communalists perceive between
their and their practice is the falsehood they live.

Practice can

not contradict theory unless that theory is vrong or misapplied,
and only careful reasoning vhich dravs from both psychology and
economics may determine vhich is the case.
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POSTSCRIPT

We have seen that the problem of predicting behavior -when tvo
organisms share control of relevant determining variables.

In such

a case the tvo sets of contingencies vhich obtain in the mutual
shaping of shaping cannot be identified.

The several reasons for

this are perhaps all condensable to one.

There are more unknovn

behavior variables than there are knovn behavior-variable deter
mining functional relations.
We have considered an alternative analysis, borroved from
Weingarten and Mechner, vhich treats the exchange relationships betveen partial controllers as its dependent variable, and takes the
cross-controlling contingencies betveen organisms (i.e. those in
vhich the manipulandum operated by one organism produces behaviorcontrolling consequences for another organism and vice versa) as
its independent variable.

The sum of all such behavior-relevant

contingencies in a social environment comprise vhat ve call the in
dependent contingencies of a catallaxy.

We call such independent-

contingency analysis the study of catallactic relations or the sci
ence of the catallaxy.

We have discussed its limitations as an in

ductive science, turning to the experimental vork of Boren and of
Fouraker and Siegal and to our ovn imaginary experimental settings
vith monkeys and vith men.

It lacks the resolving pover of the

monopolistic analysis of behavior.
We have seen hov in human society partial control is estab
lished and maintained vhen coercion, i.e., the arranging of aver-
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sive contingencies, is restricted and ire have learned hov partial
control implies a fluid but orderly division of the independent
contingencies of the environment into distinctive provinces of con
trol— roughly covered by the concept of private property, the own
ership of the means of producing and distributing.

This is the

germ of the important phenomenon of the division of labor which is
essential to any industrial and scientific civilization.
Our analysis has led us to discriminate cultural control as
operating along three interlocking avenues, viz., independent con
tingencies, catallactic relations, and the less—clearly understood
superstructure of coercive practices, i.e., the province of law,
government, and other institutions and groups which control through
punishment or the promise of punishment— a concept for which we are
indebted to Karl Marx.

We have also made general observations con

cerning predictable consequences of the dispensation obtaining un
der four different superstructural arrangements, l) the classicalliberal market economy, 2) the many variants of the mixed or in
terventionist economy, 3) the planned socialist economy, and 4) the
'pure Maoist' or 'small— is-beautiful' economy.

We have examined

the problem of the evolution of cultures and the eternal problems
of a science-and-engineering technology of society.

We have seen

from Hayek and other members of the individual-based 'Austrian
School' of economics, how fundamental barriers to social analysis
and control stem from the inevitably turbulent and varigated earth
environment (including its human fibers); an environment in which
the particulars may all singly conform to known scientific laws,
but in which the present concatenated state of things, i.e., the
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interrelated set of particulars currently obtaining, is never
knovn.

We have seen hov Marx attempted to solve this (insoluable)

problem through the uysticism of dialectical materialism, i.e.,
the Mumbo Jumbo vhich teaches that since mind is an aspect of mat
ter that proceeds by actively contrasting opposites, then reality
must develop in the same vay, and that therefore a future good
society vhich the mind longs for can be scientifically speeded
along simply by destroying ('negating*), through revolutionary ac
tion, all that offends one about present society.

We noted the ap

peal vhich Marxian analysis holds for Skinnerians seeking a broader
cultural analysis.

We have also seen hov in the West, government-

sponsored econometricians and macro-econoraists attempt to solve the
problem of specific prediction vithin the tripartite catallaxy
through functional analysis.

Yet, ve have seen, appealing to the

contributions of Hayek and Herrnstein, and to our ovn discursive
reasoning about the catallaxy in relation to scientific analysis,
that sets of simultaneous equations built upon government and busi
ness statistics or laboratory simulations are vholly inadequate for
obtaining the predictability required to plan the economy of even
a small community.

We have attempted to separate Skinner, the Har

vard socialist, i.e., the function-analytic (rather than histor
ical-materialist) Marxist, vho is isolated most clearly by the
characterization of Fraizer in Walden Tvo. from B. F. Skinner, the
great psychologist and exacting scientist-philosopher.

And finally

ve have looked at an actual attempt to realize Walden Tvo, an at
tempt that has received Skinner's (qualified) endorsement.

From

the members' ovn account of its conduct, ve see that their experi—
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supports the general conclusions of this thesis, despite the fact
that they have contrary interpretations and vould object violently
to all that is presented here.
This thesis has been vritten in full kncvledge of the charges
of negativism and subservience to capitalist reaction or anti-pro
gressive forces that it vill encounter.

It vill be interpreted as

a throvback to Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner and as a
musty and old-fashioned vay of looking at human affairs.

Host

damning of all, it vill be called an apology for plutocracy.

The

individual's vho vill pronounce these judgments, vhatever their in
dividual status, vill be representative of the dominant 'progres
sive* vievpoint in both the groves of academe and the seats of gov
ernment.
In elaborating the present thesis, I have dravn much support
from the example of a liberal economist vhose books vere burned by
Hitler's National Socialists, banned in all of the communist
states, and deliberately sabotaged (in typesetting, printing,
proofreading, binding, and pricing) by a vell-coordinated conspir
acy among a nameless group of "liberal” intellectuals at the Yale
University Press*— in all three instances the interventions vere
conducted by men vho sought (and seek) to improve their respective
cultures by eliminating 'harmful teachings' and 'incorrect
thought.* Completion of the present vork vould never have appeared
vorthvhile to me had I not read the folloving vords of that econo-

^Henry Hazlitt, "Mangling a Masterpiece," National Reviev
May 5, 1964, p. 26
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mist:
"We need not consider the hostility that the sciences of
human action encounter from vithout. There is, to be
sure, enough of such external opposition, but it is
scarcely capable of arresting the progress of scientific
thought. One must be very strongly prepossessed by an
etatist bias to believe that proscription of a doctrine
by the coercive apparatus of the state and the refusal to
place its supporters in positions in the church or in gov
ernment service should ever do injury to its development
in the long run. Even burning heretics at the stake vas
unable to block the progress of modern science. It is a
matter of indifference for the fate of the sciences of hu
man action vhether or not they are taught at the tax-supported universities of Europe or to American college stu
dents in the hours not occupied by sports and amusements.
But it has been possible in most schools to dare to sub
stitute for praxeology and economics subjects that inten
tionally avoid reference to praxeological and economic
thought only because internal opposition is present to
justify this practice. Whoever vants to examine the ex
ternal difficulties that beset our science must first of
all concern himself vith those vhich arise from vithin."^
This thesis, it is hoped, has done just that.

*Ludvig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, op.
cit., pp. 185-6
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